My comments appear below, with Mankiw's original column in italics. -- JD
The New York TIMES / December 23, 2007
Economic View: How to Avoid Recession? Let the Fed Work
By N. GREGORY MANKIW
(N. Gregory Mankiw is a professor of economics at Harvard. He was an adviser to President Bush and is advising Mitt Romney, the former governor of Massachusetts, in the campaign for the Republican presidential nomination.)
The economy is teetering on the edge. Many economists, as well as online betting sites, put the risk of recession next year at about 50 percent. Once we get the final numbers, we might even learn that a recession has already begun.
The question on the minds of many in Congress and in the White House is this: What they should be doing now to keep the economy on track? The right answer: absolutely nothing.
This advice isn't easy for politicians to follow. Because economic downturns mean fewer jobs and falling incomes, they are painful for many families. Voters can confuse inaction with nonchalance and send incumbents packing. But just as patients should avoid doctors who recommend radical surgery for every ailment, voters should be wary of politicians eager to treat every economic ill. Sometimes, bed rest and wait-and-see are the best we can do.
This slam at politicians seems unfair in general, coming as it does from a member of an even lower ilk, an orthodox economic pundit. It ignores the political push in Congress -- mostly coming from Mankiw's GOP -- to do absolutely nothing about recessions, unless it involves tax cuts for the rich or cosmetic "cures" (such as that of 2001-02).
More importantly, it ignores the all-important role of gridlock in DC: many, many different politicos can veto any kind of fiscal action. This includes the President. Indeed, these days the two DP-dominated houses of Congress and the President seem pretty good at blocking each others' initiatives.
Orthocons like Mankiw like to portray the government as chomping at the bit, ready to jump in to mess with the economy. Au contraire. Among other things, the politicians would rather that the Fed get the blame for any economic mess.
Congress made its most important contribution to taming the business cycle back in 1913, when it created the Federal Reserve System. Today, the Fed remains the first line of defense against recession.
Even if the Fed can pull the rabbit out of the economic hat, it should be mentioned that it did not become the "first line of defense" until the end of the fixed exchange-rate system in the early 1970s, which shifted the balance of power from fiscal to monetary policy. Before that, the Fed's job was mostly to keep the US$ at par, as part of a fixed exchange-rate system.
The Fed's control over the money supply is a powerful lever to move overall demand for goods and services. When its trading desk buys bonds and expands the money supply, it lowers interest rates and encourages the private sector to borrow and spend more. The influence of interest rates on the economy is particularly strong in housing, where buyers are rate-sensitive. Because housing woes are the source of the current slowdown, the Fed's tool kit is well suited for the task at hand.
Mankiw presents the "Economics One" (or is it Econ Zero?) version of monetary policy, but the Fed has admitted that it in effect lacks control over the money supply. It does have control over the availability of bank reserves and thus the fed funds (overnight bank-loan) interest rate, a very short-term rate. But in the short run (which is what's important if we're talking an on-coming recession), the fed funds rate is only vaguely connected with the (long-term) mortgage interest rate that Mankiw refers to. If the Fed encourages repeated cuts of the fed funds rate, as Greenspan did, that would likely have an effect of depressing mortgage rates. But the Fed seems loath to repeat Greenspan's policy, because it would encourage inflation and/or a disastrous decline of the US$.
Also, will the banks be willing to lend, especially in the housing market? Due to the "sub-prime" crisis, banks have a lot of "non-performing" (i.e., bad) assets. Do they really want to send good money after bad? Getting beyond such subjective matters, falling asset values hurts the banks' capital (equity). Not only does this upset the banks' stock-holders, but prudent banks would keep their capital from falling too far or too quickly. And the aftermath of a credit crunch seems like a good time to be prudent, if you're a banker.
Finally, with mortgage (and other) debt high compared to potential home-buyers' incomes and assets, they are likely loath to borrow more just to take advantage of lower interest rates. With house prices falling, also, many prospective home-buyers will likely wait for a better deal later on.
If there are problems on both the supply and demand sides, Mankiw's monetary mechanism seems meager at most.
The recession-fighting effects of monetary expansion, however, are not limited to the housing market. When lower interest rates make fixed-income investments [i.e., bonds] less attractive, investors turn to the equity [stock] market and bid up stock prices. Higher stock prices, in turn, make consumers wealthier and more eager to spend. They also make it easier for corporations to expand their businesses with equity financing.
If speculators begin to expect a replay of Greenspan's repeated rate cuts of the early 2000, they would expect bond (fixed-income investment) prices to rise. Those interested in capital gains -- and that means most or all of them -- would thus want to buy bonds (all else constant). In addition, in times of trouble (such as the period after a credit crunch), government bonds are really attractive, since they are quite safe. So again they would be bought up. These forces undermines Mankiw's purported mechanism, because the speculators' money would not be going into equities.
But some speculators and financial investors may turn to the equity market, buying stock shares and driving up their prices. This would make wealthy consumers wealthier and more eager to spend. (Somehow Mankiw ignores the skewed nature of stock ownership. I don't know why!)
The problem is that this is poor compensation for the fall in the prices of homes. It's true that this hasn't hit the rich folks much, if at all. But it's mass consumption that's the rock-bottom (secure) base of economic expansion. It's the mass of consumers -- not the rich elite -- that props up the economy.
It's the mass of consumers who are excessively burdened by consumer and mortgage debt. (It would be a mistake to forget consumer debt (credit cards, etc.) since it's far from the majority of the population that's been doing mortgage borrowing lately.) It's their stagnant consumption spending that will likely drag down the US economy for years to come, even if there is no recession.
In addition, Mankiw should invoke the phrase often used by better economists, "all else equal." The equity market is extremely flaky, subject to speculative booms and busts and impacted by extraneous events. Even if the Fed cuts interest rates more, that does not mean that stocks will automatically go up. For example, Mankiw must ask "what's happening to corporate profits?" if the recession hurts profits -- as usual -- it would depress equity prices (all else equal).
As leftist business observer Doug Henwood regularly observes, Mankiw's story is based on an illusion: corporations do not issue new stock very often as a way of financing expansion. Instead, the main story of late has been that of corporations buying up their own stock. Business expansion, if any occurs in the near future, would be paid for more through retained earnings (profits not distributed to stockholders) and borrowing (bond issuance).
And do corporations really want to "expand their businesses"? Maybe, but a recession discourages expansion. Perhaps Mankiw has heard of the "accelerator effect." It refers to the way that even slow growth of the demand for products can cause a fall in business fixed investment. A recession isn't needed to have this effect. The problem is that fixed investment causes increased ability to produce (potential supply). If fixed investment stays constant in the face of stagnant demand growth, that means that potential supply grows faster than demand. Smart business-types would refrain from further fixed investment, no matter how easy it is to raise funds by borrowing or by issuing new shares.
This effect discourages any kind of business expansion, no matter how financed. In fact, it can cause a recession.
Slow or negative growth also hurts cash flow and profits, all else equal, which undermine retained earnings and self-financing of expansion. With falling or flat rates of utilization of productive capacity, business rates of profit would be hurt, undermining expected profits and the incentive to expand, all else equal.
By making United States bonds less attractive to world investors, lower interest rates from a monetary expansion also weaken the dollar in currency markets. A depreciation of the currency is not in itself to be feared. Treasury secretaries often repeat the mantra of favoring a strong dollar, but these pronouncements are based more on public relations than hard-headed analysis.
True.
A weak currency is a problem if it results from investors losing confidence in a country's economy and currency. The most damaging cases are the episodes of sudden capital flight, as occurred in Mexico in 1994 and several Asian countries in 1997. This outcome is unlikely for the fundamentally sound American economy, but fear of it is one reason that Treasury secretaries maintain public fealty to a strong dollar.
A serious recession would undermine the image of the "fundamentally sound American economy" -- and in finance, it's image that counts. In fact, the image might be sapped by the continuation of US government fiscal deficits and/or by fears of inflation.
But if a weakened currency comes about because the central bank is trying to stimulate a lackluster economy, the story is very different. In that case, depreciation is not a malady but just what the doctor ordered. A weaker currency makes domestic goods more competitive in world markets, promoting exports and bolstering the economy. The dollar's falling value is one reason exports of goods and services have grown more than 10 percent in the past year.
The Fed can go too far, because even a strong currency can be subject to a speculative bust (or boom). This problem is most likely to hit when interest rates are lowered again and again.
Nonetheless, the boost to exports is the most effective result of expansionary monetary policy (interest rate cuts). The problem is that it simply shifts the recessionary problem to the rest of the world, or at least the rest of the world that does not fix its currency to the US$ the way China does. This is an important reason why the fraternity of Central Bankers does not want US rates falling too much. This desire discourages the Fed fully responding to the recession.
The Fed constantly monitors all these developments to ensure that the economy has the stimulus it needs, but not too much. William McChesney Martin, the Fed chairman in the 1950s and 1960s, famously joked that the Fed's job is "to take away the punch bowl just as the party gets going."
As the economy flirts with recession, we need to remember that this aphorism has a flip side. The Fed also has the job of spiking the punch with grain alcohol when the party starts to flag, and that is exactly what it has been doing.
Gee, the economy is like a drunken party? what an analogy!
The Fed has cut its target for the benchmark federal fund rates to 4.25 percent from 5.25 percent last summer. It is a good bet that we will see further cuts over the next few months. And if the chance of a recession turns into a real recession, you can count on it.
What if the financiers' fear of inflation influences the Fed?
Admittedly, monetary policy can sometimes use an assist from fiscal policy. If an economic downturn is deep, if a recovery is anemic or if the Fed is running out of ammunition, Congress can help raise aggregate demand for goods and services. In 2003, the Fed had cut its target interest rate all the way to 1 percent, the economy was still suffering from the lingering effects of recession, and there were increasing worries about deflation. A tax cut was a good complement to monetary expansion to get the economy going again, even though it increased the budget deficit.
Note: the Fed could "run out of ammunition" if the fed funds rate got down very low, like it did when Greenspan drove it down to 1 percent.
The government can't raise spending instead of cutting taxes? In fact, increased spending is a major reason (along with export expansion) why a recession may not happen. It's old-style military Keynesianism: war and militarism breeds short-term prosperity.
Today's situation is different. The Fed has plenty of room to cut rates further, if it deems such cuts necessary. [Right.] At the moment, recession is only a possibility, and inflation is a bigger worry than deflation. In this environment, there is no need for a short-run fiscal stimulus. Congress is better off focusing on longer-term problems, like the looming entitlement crunch [??] or fundamental tax reform. (But don't hold your breath.)
Does the "entitlement crunch" refer to the rich folks' expectation that they deserve regular tax cuts?
IN creating the Fed, Congress wisely made it a technocratic institution free of many of the political pressures that accompany other policy decisions in Washington. Subsequent experience in the United States and abroad confirms that more independent central banks lead to better economic outcomes. That's why, in recent years, many nations have passed reforms to insulate central banks from [democratic] politics.
This "independence" is a sham. Mankiw's statement should be re-stated as saying that the Fed is an "institution largely free of democratic accountability," i.e., free of the need to respond to democratically-elected politicians or to voters.
That's because the Fed is subject to tremendous political pressure from banks and Wall Street sorts. The presidents of the privately-owned Reserve Banks are represented on the Federal Open Market Committee, while the President of the New York Fed is always on that committee. The New York Fed has strong connections with Wall Street. The FOMC's leadership worries a lot about displeasing -- and thus hurting -- financial markets. In many ways, the Fed is nothing but a bankers' cartel that's allied with Wall Street.
BTW, if the banks have a lot of nonperforming loans, they may have to rely on their holdings of government paper (T Bills, etc.) as a reliable source of income. Expansionary monetary policy aimed at fighting a recession would hurt that income. As a result, the banks may oppose rate cuts. Back in the early 1930s, they succeeded in this program, making the economic collapse worse.
By "better economic outcomes," Mankiw means lower inflation. What he's saying is that financier-dominated central banks are pretty good at fighting the financiers' enemy, i.e., inflation. That does not refer to avoiding recessions, though the Fed will try to solve the problem if a recession hurts banks and Wall Street.
The Fed's independence [sic] was created by statute and could just as easily be taken away. The Fed is now coming under heat for not having prevented the subprime crisis, for not fully anticipating it once it was inevitable, and for not responding more vigorously now that it has occurred. Daniel Gross, a financial journalist writing for Slate, has gone so far as to liken the Fed and its chairman, Ben S. Bernanke, to FEMA and its erstwhile head Michael Brown.
The truth is that the current Fed governors, together with their crack staff of Ph.D. economists and market analysts, are as close to an economic dream team as we are ever likely to see. They will make their share of mistakes, but it is too easy to find flaws when judging with the benefit of hindsight. The best Congress can do now is to let the Bernanke bunch do its job.
The staff of Ph.D economists and market analysts are on crack? I learn new stuff every day!
Seriously, Mankiw's conclusion is that we should stop worrying and learn to love Big Brother Ben, even though his institution has messed up severely in the past and tends to reflect the short-term urges of banks and financiers?
Copyright 2007 The New York Times Company
--
Jim Devine / "Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti." (Go your own way and let people talk.) -- Karl, paraphrasing Dante.
Sunday, December 23, 2007
More Housing Woes Ahead? Part 2
In a recent Ohio case. the judge dismissed a number of foreclosure requests because the plaintiffs could not show that they were the legal owners of the properties. This ruling seemed like it was a minor technicality is going to the complicated nature of the securitized mortgages. BusinessWeek published a short article, saying that the ruling was more serious. Although the creditors can rectify the situation, to do so will not be an expensive. Perhaps more interestingly, the article suggests that the failure to do the proper paperwork may open up some parties is to legal liabilities.
Orey, Michael. 2007. "Foreclosures: Not So Fast." Business Week (10 December).
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_50/b4062028776327.htm?chan=magazine+channel_news
"The notion that large numbers of homes across the country might one day have to be seized as security for mortgage loans seemed preposterous during the go-go days of the recent housing-market boom. As Wall Street collected millions of mortgages into giant securitization pools, one of the key legal procedures for transferring ownership of the loans appears to have been often ignored. At a minimum this lapse could impose extra costs on the mortgage industry when it can ill afford it. At the maximum it could open mortgage investors to an obscure legal attack by homeowners that in some cases could block foreclosure."
"The problem stems from a shortcut that many players in the fast-moving securitization business have used in recent years. Normally, when a loan is sold, a simple document is prepared showing that the debt and any collateral attached to it has been transferred to the purchaser. That piece of paper is called an assignment. But in buying up thousands of mortgages at a time, Wall Street commonly skips this step, which requires separate paperwork for each loan. Instead, the industry customarily relies on a lengthy contract, known as a pooling-and-servicing agreement (PSA) to spell out arrangements for all of the loans in a pool. But, as some recent court rulings indicate, a PSA may not be good enough when it comes time to foreclose."
In the wake of the Boyko ruling, which came as a surprise to Wall Street, mortgage-industry representatives said it would be easy for players such as Deutsche Bank to fix the technical problems and resume foreclosing on homes. That may be true, but these added steps will introduce costly delays and additional fees to the foreclosure process. Lawyers will have to draft assignment documents, paralegals will have to get them signed and recorded, and filing fees will have to be paid. "These deals operate on very, very thin margins," notes Joseph R. Mason, a finance professor at Drexel University in Philadelphia. Even an extra dollar a loan, he says, is "a huge cost"."
"There also could be a more troubling consequence for investors, says Kathleen C. Engel, a professor at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. Players in the secondary market for mortgages rely on an obscure but critical legal theory--known as the "holder in due course" doctrine -- to insulate themselves from problems with the underlying loans. "Under the doctrine, a homeowner who believes that a lender deceived him about the terms of a loan can't press such claims against the purchaser of a mortgage, such as a mortgage-backed securities trust. The holder-in-due-course doctrine protects pension funds and the like from having to worry about any misbehavior by home lenders--and thereby greases the wheels for the whole mortgage-securities market. But it's a different story if, as appears to be common practice, the trust waits to complete paperwork transferring a loan until after it goes into default. In that case, the holder-in-due-course protection evaporates, and anybody who tries to foreclose could face defenses from the borrower that he or she was lied to when seeking a loan."
Orey, Michael. 2007. "Foreclosures: Not So Fast." Business Week (10 December).
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_50/b4062028776327.htm?chan=magazine+channel_news
"The notion that large numbers of homes across the country might one day have to be seized as security for mortgage loans seemed preposterous during the go-go days of the recent housing-market boom. As Wall Street collected millions of mortgages into giant securitization pools, one of the key legal procedures for transferring ownership of the loans appears to have been often ignored. At a minimum this lapse could impose extra costs on the mortgage industry when it can ill afford it. At the maximum it could open mortgage investors to an obscure legal attack by homeowners that in some cases could block foreclosure."
"The problem stems from a shortcut that many players in the fast-moving securitization business have used in recent years. Normally, when a loan is sold, a simple document is prepared showing that the debt and any collateral attached to it has been transferred to the purchaser. That piece of paper is called an assignment. But in buying up thousands of mortgages at a time, Wall Street commonly skips this step, which requires separate paperwork for each loan. Instead, the industry customarily relies on a lengthy contract, known as a pooling-and-servicing agreement (PSA) to spell out arrangements for all of the loans in a pool. But, as some recent court rulings indicate, a PSA may not be good enough when it comes time to foreclose."
In the wake of the Boyko ruling, which came as a surprise to Wall Street, mortgage-industry representatives said it would be easy for players such as Deutsche Bank to fix the technical problems and resume foreclosing on homes. That may be true, but these added steps will introduce costly delays and additional fees to the foreclosure process. Lawyers will have to draft assignment documents, paralegals will have to get them signed and recorded, and filing fees will have to be paid. "These deals operate on very, very thin margins," notes Joseph R. Mason, a finance professor at Drexel University in Philadelphia. Even an extra dollar a loan, he says, is "a huge cost"."
"There also could be a more troubling consequence for investors, says Kathleen C. Engel, a professor at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. Players in the secondary market for mortgages rely on an obscure but critical legal theory--known as the "holder in due course" doctrine -- to insulate themselves from problems with the underlying loans. "Under the doctrine, a homeowner who believes that a lender deceived him about the terms of a loan can't press such claims against the purchaser of a mortgage, such as a mortgage-backed securities trust. The holder-in-due-course doctrine protects pension funds and the like from having to worry about any misbehavior by home lenders--and thereby greases the wheels for the whole mortgage-securities market. But it's a different story if, as appears to be common practice, the trust waits to complete paperwork transferring a loan until after it goes into default. In that case, the holder-in-due-course protection evaporates, and anybody who tries to foreclose could face defenses from the borrower that he or she was lied to when seeking a loan."
More Housing Woes Ahead? Part 1
The Wall Street Journal reports on the spread of homes with negative equity. As of a year ago, estimates were that 7% of mortgages that originated in 2004 through 2006 the amount owed was more than their homes were worth, but housing prices have fallen nearly 5% since then and are predicted to fall further. [In the comment below, Molnar pointed out that my original commentary was in error. Thanks for keeping me honest].
Hagerty, James R. 2007. "Price Indexes Will Map Out Spread of 'Negative Equity." Wall Street Journal (22 December): p. A 2.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119829696940946747.html?mod=todays_us_page_one
"Last March, First American CoreLogic, a housing- and mortgage-data supplier in Santa Ana, Calif., calculated that nearly 7% of 32 million U.S. households studied as of December 2006 owed more than their homes were worth, based on computer estimates of the property values. The homes studied had mortgages originated in 2004 through 2006, around the peak in the housing market. Since the end of 2006, U.S. home prices on average have fallen nearly 5%, said Mark Fleming, chief economist at the firm. That suggests that about 11% of the homes studied now would have negative equity. An additional 5% or so probably have equity of less than 5%. That doesn't leave much cushion at a time when prices are still falling and most economists don't expect the market to hit bottom for at least another year."
"Economists at Merrill Lynch say home prices are likely to fall 10% in 2008 after slipping 5% this year. Mark Zandi, chief economist of Moody's Economy.com, a research firm in West Chester, Pa., recently forecast that on average U.S. house prices will decline about 13% by the second quarter of 2009 from a peak in the second quarter of 2006. Declines will be much larger in Florida, California, Arizona and Nevada, as well as in the metropolitan areas of Washington, D.C., and Detroit, he said."
Hagerty, James R. 2007. "Price Indexes Will Map Out Spread of 'Negative Equity." Wall Street Journal (22 December): p. A 2.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119829696940946747.html?mod=todays_us_page_one
"Last March, First American CoreLogic, a housing- and mortgage-data supplier in Santa Ana, Calif., calculated that nearly 7% of 32 million U.S. households studied as of December 2006 owed more than their homes were worth, based on computer estimates of the property values. The homes studied had mortgages originated in 2004 through 2006, around the peak in the housing market. Since the end of 2006, U.S. home prices on average have fallen nearly 5%, said Mark Fleming, chief economist at the firm. That suggests that about 11% of the homes studied now would have negative equity. An additional 5% or so probably have equity of less than 5%. That doesn't leave much cushion at a time when prices are still falling and most economists don't expect the market to hit bottom for at least another year."
"Economists at Merrill Lynch say home prices are likely to fall 10% in 2008 after slipping 5% this year. Mark Zandi, chief economist of Moody's Economy.com, a research firm in West Chester, Pa., recently forecast that on average U.S. house prices will decline about 13% by the second quarter of 2009 from a peak in the second quarter of 2006. Declines will be much larger in Florida, California, Arizona and Nevada, as well as in the metropolitan areas of Washington, D.C., and Detroit, he said."
Friday, December 21, 2007
The WTO, Gambling, and Intellectual Property
The United States Puritanical values collided with its neoliberal ideology in passing a law that prevented online gambling. Several companies -- Microsoft, Google, Yahoo -- just paid fined for posting ads for Internet gambling. Antigua and Barbuda protested since the US allows other forms of domestic gambling. They demanded huge compensation for their loss of business. The WTO judgment offers a much smaller amount, but it gives the country the right to violate intellectual property up to $21 million.
Kanter, James and Gary Rivlin. 2007. "In Trade Ruling, Antigua Wins a Right to Piracy." New York Times (22 December).
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/washington/politics-trade-wto-gambling.html
"Antigua and Barbuda won compensation from the United States on Friday in a long-running trade dispute about gambling, but the amount was far lower than the tiny Caribbean nation had been seeking. A World Trade Organization (WTO) arbitration panel granted Antigua's request to levy trade sanctions on U.S. intellectual property, for instance by lifting copyright on films and music to sell it themselves, prompting concern from Washington."
"The WTO panel said Antigua was entitled to compensation of $21 million a year from the United States for being shut out of the U.S. online gambling market. The ruling is only partial consolation for the former British colony, which built up an Internet gambling industry to replace declining tourism revenues, only to find itself shut out of the world's biggest gambling market."
"The award falls far short of what Antigua had demanded -- $3.44 billion in "cross-retaliation," allowing it to seek damages outside the original services sector. Washington had argued Antigua was entitled to only $500,000 in compensation."
Kanter, James and Gary Rivlin. 2007. "In Trade Ruling, Antigua Wins a Right to Piracy." New York Times (22 December).
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/washington/politics-trade-wto-gambling.html
"Antigua and Barbuda won compensation from the United States on Friday in a long-running trade dispute about gambling, but the amount was far lower than the tiny Caribbean nation had been seeking. A World Trade Organization (WTO) arbitration panel granted Antigua's request to levy trade sanctions on U.S. intellectual property, for instance by lifting copyright on films and music to sell it themselves, prompting concern from Washington."
"The WTO panel said Antigua was entitled to compensation of $21 million a year from the United States for being shut out of the U.S. online gambling market. The ruling is only partial consolation for the former British colony, which built up an Internet gambling industry to replace declining tourism revenues, only to find itself shut out of the world's biggest gambling market."
"The award falls far short of what Antigua had demanded -- $3.44 billion in "cross-retaliation," allowing it to seek damages outside the original services sector. Washington had argued Antigua was entitled to only $500,000 in compensation."
Words That Could Go Down In History
"But I won't be unsupervised! I'll be with the basketball team!!"
Thursday, December 20, 2007
A Million Refugees from Iraq Since Surge Started
Juan Cole reports through a link to McClatchy that a million refugees have fled Iraq since the surge began, with 500,000 leaving during the July to October period of greatest troop runup, a fifth of these having experienced torture or other violence. This rather offsets the happy talk stories about people dribbling back recently, most of them because they have run out of money and the Syrians want them to leave.
Link is http://www.mcclatchydc.com/iraq/story/23159.html.
While we are at it, after a meeting this past weekend in Baghdad, the Kurdish leaders are threatening to leave the Maliki government. Remains ongoing differences over oil laws and contracts, aggravated by invasion from Turkey of Kurdistan, apparently supported by the US. While still denouncing the Kurdish oil contracts as illegal, the Iraqi oil minister is now negotiating contracts with big majors like BP and Shell under the old Saddam-era oil law (see iraqioilreport.com).
Link is http://www.mcclatchydc.com/iraq/story/23159.html.
While we are at it, after a meeting this past weekend in Baghdad, the Kurdish leaders are threatening to leave the Maliki government. Remains ongoing differences over oil laws and contracts, aggravated by invasion from Turkey of Kurdistan, apparently supported by the US. While still denouncing the Kurdish oil contracts as illegal, the Iraqi oil minister is now negotiating contracts with big majors like BP and Shell under the old Saddam-era oil law (see iraqioilreport.com).
David Wessel and Mark Thoma on The Summers Call for Fiscal Stimulus
Update: At the end of my post, I noted Sudeep Reddy’s argument that state and local fiscal policy will bail us out of this recession. If this claim struck you as odd, Menzie Chinn also found this to be odd as well.
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My EconoSpeak colleague Brenda Rosser seems to more pessimistic than even Lawrence Summers as she argues that a $75 billion fiscal stimulus may not be enough. David Wessel also seems to think a fall in aggregate demand is likely:
The policy mix to boost aggregate demand is indeed the hot topic of the day.
David starts with the usual reasons why we rely on a fast, nimble, and perhaps independent Central Bank and its monetary policy tools rather a sluggish and political Congress and its fiscal policy tools for aggregate demand management. David then makes a few arguments why monetary policy alone may not do the trick. One of these arguments strikes me as very odd:
To David’s credit, he picks up on the fact that easy money will tend to raise net exports. But given our massive current account deficit, isn’t dollar devaluation on its own not only desirable but necessary?
Mark Thoma seems to have a preference for using changes in government spending over tax policy if we need to turn to fiscal policy for stabilization purposes:
Then there is the view that all will be AOK:
Sudeep Reedy offers up five reasons why a recession may be averted. One comes from a usual White House silliness that job growth is still terrific, while another comes from the dubious claim that the slump in residential investment is over. A third – and more plausible - argument is that net export demand will pick up some of the slack. The last two come from the belief that easier monetary policy and increases in government spending are already in the works. Real government purchases for 2007QIII, however, were only 2.7% higher than they were for 2006QIII so Reedy’s claim focused on the increase in state and local spending. Why not also focus on the even larger percentage increase in defense spending while one is at this game? Reedy failed to note the important fact that real nondefense Federal purchases haven declined over the past year. It would seem the new found GOP fiscal discipline campaign is working against using fiscal policy as a stabilization tool.
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My EconoSpeak colleague Brenda Rosser seems to more pessimistic than even Lawrence Summers as she argues that a $75 billion fiscal stimulus may not be enough. David Wessel also seems to think a fall in aggregate demand is likely:
That the economy needs help isn't at issue. The issue is whether to mix fiscal stimulus with monetary policy - whether the government should do something more than offer a little help to some struggling homeowners.
The policy mix to boost aggregate demand is indeed the hot topic of the day.
David starts with the usual reasons why we rely on a fast, nimble, and perhaps independent Central Bank and its monetary policy tools rather a sluggish and political Congress and its fiscal policy tools for aggregate demand management. David then makes a few arguments why monetary policy alone may not do the trick. One of these arguments strikes me as very odd:
The Fed can't cut rates because it fears a dollar crash. At the Fed, the gradual decline in the dollar is viewed as a tonic for the economy; it'll help boost exports, though it does exacerbate the central bank's inflation anxiety. But cutting rates too much too fast could trigger a market-rattling, confidence-shaking plunge in the dollar.
To David’s credit, he picks up on the fact that easy money will tend to raise net exports. But given our massive current account deficit, isn’t dollar devaluation on its own not only desirable but necessary?
Mark Thoma seems to have a preference for using changes in government spending over tax policy if we need to turn to fiscal policy for stabilization purposes:
If we are going to use tax cuts as a fiscal policy tool to stabilize the economy, we have to be willing to move the tax rate in both directions, up as well as down. We are quite willing, currently, to move the tax rate down but when people like Martin Feldstein call for a temporary tax cut to stimulate the economy, if such a policy were to be enacted does anyone doubt the difficulty of raising taxes again later even with automatic expiration provisions?
Then there is the view that all will be AOK:
Predicting the economy's path is especially difficult at turning points, and the economy is sending mixed signals. But here are some reasons why the economy might avoid the ditch
Sudeep Reedy offers up five reasons why a recession may be averted. One comes from a usual White House silliness that job growth is still terrific, while another comes from the dubious claim that the slump in residential investment is over. A third – and more plausible - argument is that net export demand will pick up some of the slack. The last two come from the belief that easier monetary policy and increases in government spending are already in the works. Real government purchases for 2007QIII, however, were only 2.7% higher than they were for 2006QIII so Reedy’s claim focused on the increase in state and local spending. Why not also focus on the even larger percentage increase in defense spending while one is at this game? Reedy failed to note the important fact that real nondefense Federal purchases haven declined over the past year. It would seem the new found GOP fiscal discipline campaign is working against using fiscal policy as a stabilization tool.
CGE: Is There a Defense?
I’ve been asked to review an article using computable general equilibrium (CGE) methodology. I’m likely to decline, but before I do I want to ask the vast universe that follows this blog: is there any defense against the argument that CGE and its offspring (DSGE) are simply bad economics?
There are two arguments actually:
1. CGE is an attempt to implement empirically a model that has been blown away theoretically. For 30 years we have known in precise terms why representative agent GE models are hogwash. We also know that the conditions for unique solutions are impossibly restrictive. Finally, while we have models that can translate modern, post-utility understanding of economic behavior into functional form, to do this throughout an economy, in every nook and sector, would be a gargantuan, and probably pointless, project. To put it bluntly, CGE modelers take as their starting point refuted theory.
2. CGE is false empiricism. It claims to generate results based on real-world data, but testing is nil, and I mean nil. Is there any literature out there I have missed in which past models are examined retrospectively against actual economic outcomes? If not, where is the falsifiability?
I will wait to send my rejection email. Maybe one of you can convince me that it is worth a few hours of my time to promote “better” CGE work.
There are two arguments actually:
1. CGE is an attempt to implement empirically a model that has been blown away theoretically. For 30 years we have known in precise terms why representative agent GE models are hogwash. We also know that the conditions for unique solutions are impossibly restrictive. Finally, while we have models that can translate modern, post-utility understanding of economic behavior into functional form, to do this throughout an economy, in every nook and sector, would be a gargantuan, and probably pointless, project. To put it bluntly, CGE modelers take as their starting point refuted theory.
2. CGE is false empiricism. It claims to generate results based on real-world data, but testing is nil, and I mean nil. Is there any literature out there I have missed in which past models are examined retrospectively against actual economic outcomes? If not, where is the falsifiability?
I will wait to send my rejection email. Maybe one of you can convince me that it is worth a few hours of my time to promote “better” CGE work.
Further Thoughts on Populism, With Application to Criticisms of Edwards’ Fancy Digs
Inspired by Barkley, I have more to say about populism. In a nutshell, the word has multiple connotations, and political opinion-molders manipulate the ambiguities for their own purposes. Let’s disentangle and shed some light.
I think the Wikipedia entry is right in identifying “the people” in populist thought as counterposed to an elite that insults and oppresses them. But what do populists propose as the remedy?
Long ago, in an article for a journal with no web presence and therefore no linkability, I wrote that there are three ways that political movements can claim to be democratic. (1) They can claim that their leading members are “of the people”, that they can be trusted to represent the majority because, by birth and life circumstances, they are part of it. I called this agent-based publicness. (2) They can claim that their programs would benefit the interests of the majority. This is akin to the utilitarianism of mainstream economics, particularly if metrics, such as median income, are used to take distribution into account. I called this interest-based publicness. (3) They can promote programs or institutions that expand the direct role of the majority in deliberation and decision-making in the public sphere: transparency, participation, etc. I called this process-based publicness.
In my view, all three have a role to play, and all of them have blind spots that need to be recognized and offset. What interests me right now is not the question of what mix would be best in general or in the US in 2008, but how these different approaches are confused in our current political discourse.
First, all three can be expressions of populism if they are presented as solutions to the dispossession of the people by the elites.
And what do they look like today?
Agent-based populism: A candidate has a personal style, including a method of speaking, that shows he or she is “like us”. This could mean anything from avoiding complicated academic language to making references to pop music, to going to NASCAR races (OK, not in 2008 any more) or on hunting trips. It can also mean being multi-racial if “the people” are seen as multi-racial. It depends, obviously, on who “we” are. Mike Huckabee’s populism is, as far as I can tell, almost entirely of this sort. South of where I normally sit (in an office in the US), one of the chief populist claims for Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales is that they really understand the poor, nonwhite majority because this is their heritage too.
Interest-based populism: Every reader of this blog knows that America has reached new depths of economic inequality under Reagan-Bush-Clinton-Bush. An interest-based populist in this context should be someone like Edwards who campaigns on this reality and proposes policies on the grounds that they would reverse it. (Whether those policies are adequate to the job is another matter.) It is possible, however, for someone to argue that the true interests of the people are not economic but cultural, the preservation of their prejudices, taboos, etc. This opens the door to populists like George Wallace or, today, Lou Dobbs—to take an example from the media.
Process-based populism: I make a big deal of this possibility because I believe it has much more to offer than it is given credit for, but I have to admit that it is barely visible on the current political landscape. A candidate could take up this mantle by championing democratic social movements, unions and greater direct public participation in government. Civil liberties largely fall within this framework as well, as they provide the foundation for popular activism against the state. There is much discussion of how to expand the capacity and role of civil society elsewhere—in Latin America and the EU especially—but hardly any in the US. Kucinich gives us a small taste of this, when we can find him, and Obama (very) obliquely hints at it.
So this brings us to the use of “populism” as a pejorative, and specifically as it pertains to Edwards. Those who say he is a false populist because he enjoys an upscale lifestyle are relying on populism #1: he is not truly of the people. But he could live in bourgeois luxury of the most extreme sort and still deliver on populism #2. Think FDR.
A second critique of populism goes directly at #2, I believe. It is argued that the immediate interests of the downtrodden are in conflict with sound economic policy. The poor want handouts, but this would bludgeon the budget, wipe out incentives for investment, etc. By appealing too openly to the multitudes, someone like Edwards is seen as being at risk of becoming beholden to their short-sighted demands. Here the underlying presumption is that the poor have little understanding of their long-term interests and are prone to being bought off. Indeed, there is a cynical form of populism, much practiced in Latin America, in which a few highly publicized giveaways are used to win support, while fundamental policies continue to favor the rich.
My judgment, for now, is that Edwards is not guilty of this second sin.
What we mostly lack, I think, is the third dimension, empowerment. Is it accidental that it is historically linked to socialism?
I think the Wikipedia entry is right in identifying “the people” in populist thought as counterposed to an elite that insults and oppresses them. But what do populists propose as the remedy?
Long ago, in an article for a journal with no web presence and therefore no linkability, I wrote that there are three ways that political movements can claim to be democratic. (1) They can claim that their leading members are “of the people”, that they can be trusted to represent the majority because, by birth and life circumstances, they are part of it. I called this agent-based publicness. (2) They can claim that their programs would benefit the interests of the majority. This is akin to the utilitarianism of mainstream economics, particularly if metrics, such as median income, are used to take distribution into account. I called this interest-based publicness. (3) They can promote programs or institutions that expand the direct role of the majority in deliberation and decision-making in the public sphere: transparency, participation, etc. I called this process-based publicness.
In my view, all three have a role to play, and all of them have blind spots that need to be recognized and offset. What interests me right now is not the question of what mix would be best in general or in the US in 2008, but how these different approaches are confused in our current political discourse.
First, all three can be expressions of populism if they are presented as solutions to the dispossession of the people by the elites.
And what do they look like today?
Agent-based populism: A candidate has a personal style, including a method of speaking, that shows he or she is “like us”. This could mean anything from avoiding complicated academic language to making references to pop music, to going to NASCAR races (OK, not in 2008 any more) or on hunting trips. It can also mean being multi-racial if “the people” are seen as multi-racial. It depends, obviously, on who “we” are. Mike Huckabee’s populism is, as far as I can tell, almost entirely of this sort. South of where I normally sit (in an office in the US), one of the chief populist claims for Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales is that they really understand the poor, nonwhite majority because this is their heritage too.
Interest-based populism: Every reader of this blog knows that America has reached new depths of economic inequality under Reagan-Bush-Clinton-Bush. An interest-based populist in this context should be someone like Edwards who campaigns on this reality and proposes policies on the grounds that they would reverse it. (Whether those policies are adequate to the job is another matter.) It is possible, however, for someone to argue that the true interests of the people are not economic but cultural, the preservation of their prejudices, taboos, etc. This opens the door to populists like George Wallace or, today, Lou Dobbs—to take an example from the media.
Process-based populism: I make a big deal of this possibility because I believe it has much more to offer than it is given credit for, but I have to admit that it is barely visible on the current political landscape. A candidate could take up this mantle by championing democratic social movements, unions and greater direct public participation in government. Civil liberties largely fall within this framework as well, as they provide the foundation for popular activism against the state. There is much discussion of how to expand the capacity and role of civil society elsewhere—in Latin America and the EU especially—but hardly any in the US. Kucinich gives us a small taste of this, when we can find him, and Obama (very) obliquely hints at it.
So this brings us to the use of “populism” as a pejorative, and specifically as it pertains to Edwards. Those who say he is a false populist because he enjoys an upscale lifestyle are relying on populism #1: he is not truly of the people. But he could live in bourgeois luxury of the most extreme sort and still deliver on populism #2. Think FDR.
A second critique of populism goes directly at #2, I believe. It is argued that the immediate interests of the downtrodden are in conflict with sound economic policy. The poor want handouts, but this would bludgeon the budget, wipe out incentives for investment, etc. By appealing too openly to the multitudes, someone like Edwards is seen as being at risk of becoming beholden to their short-sighted demands. Here the underlying presumption is that the poor have little understanding of their long-term interests and are prone to being bought off. Indeed, there is a cynical form of populism, much practiced in Latin America, in which a few highly publicized giveaways are used to win support, while fundamental policies continue to favor the rich.
My judgment, for now, is that Edwards is not guilty of this second sin.
What we mostly lack, I think, is the third dimension, empowerment. Is it accidental that it is historically linked to socialism?
Wednesday, December 19, 2007
The Payoff From Being Too Big to Fail?
The Wall Street Journal had an interesting piece suggesting that banks pay a premium for takeovers that bring their size up $100 billion. Maybe if the writeoffs get a bit bigger, Too Big To Fail status may pay off.
Two Federal Reserve economists, "Elijah Brewer III and Julapa Jagtiani, combed through 13 years of banking merger data to establish whether banks were willing to pay extra premiums to attain TBTF [Too Big To Fail] status, which they concluded was around $100 billion in assets."
"... the researchers found that premiums shot up when a bank did a deal that vaulted it over the $100 billion asset threshold. Overall, the nine banks that did such deals paid an additional $14 billion to $16.5 billion to get to that gold-plated TBTF status."
""It's more than Too Big To Fail. It includes all the benefits of being so big and powerful. These may not just be benefits from being bailed out, but being able to talk to the White House and Congress," Ms. Jagtiani said in an interview. "There is a lot of subsidy provided to really large banks," she added, noting that the study was the opinion of the authors and not the Federal Reserve. "It seems like we may be encouraging misallocation of resources." She did caution that "at the Federal Reserve, we don't have a list of Too Big To Fail banks"."
Cimilluca, Dana. 2007. "Can Banks Grow Too Big To Fail? Research Finds Lenders Would Pay More to Cross $100 Billion Threshold." (12 December): p. C 2.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119743338212123099.html
Two Federal Reserve economists, "Elijah Brewer III and Julapa Jagtiani, combed through 13 years of banking merger data to establish whether banks were willing to pay extra premiums to attain TBTF [Too Big To Fail] status, which they concluded was around $100 billion in assets."
"... the researchers found that premiums shot up when a bank did a deal that vaulted it over the $100 billion asset threshold. Overall, the nine banks that did such deals paid an additional $14 billion to $16.5 billion to get to that gold-plated TBTF status."
""It's more than Too Big To Fail. It includes all the benefits of being so big and powerful. These may not just be benefits from being bailed out, but being able to talk to the White House and Congress," Ms. Jagtiani said in an interview. "There is a lot of subsidy provided to really large banks," she added, noting that the study was the opinion of the authors and not the Federal Reserve. "It seems like we may be encouraging misallocation of resources." She did caution that "at the Federal Reserve, we don't have a list of Too Big To Fail banks"."
Cimilluca, Dana. 2007. "Can Banks Grow Too Big To Fail? Research Finds Lenders Would Pay More to Cross $100 Billion Threshold." (12 December): p. C 2.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119743338212123099.html
Who is a "Populist"?
In recent election cycles the term "populist" has been applied to such varied figures as John Edwards, Mike Huckabee, Patrick Buchanan, and Ross Perot, arguably sharing a sort of economic nationalism for the poor. Originating in anti-aristocratic agrarian movements in Europe, especially the Russian Narodniki of the late 1800s, the movement in the US attempted to encompass the urban working class as well, as symbolized by the rural Scarecrow marching along with the urban Tin Woodman on the Yellow Brick Road to defeat the Wicked Witch of the East, with populist heroine Dorothy and the Cowardly Lion stand-in for fundamentalist and anti-imperialist populist William Jennings Bryan, he of the "Cross of Gold" speech, in Baum's populist fantasy novel. The movement would be partly absorbed by the later Progressive and New Deal movements.
The movement has always had a deep divide, with race the central issue. So, on the one hand we have the progressive wing, symbolized by the remnant Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota and the presidential candidacy in 1948 of FDR's former Ag Secretary, Henry Wallace for the Progressive Party. On the other, in the Deep South, we got "Pitchfork" Ben Tillman in South Carolina, whose follower, Strom Thurmond, would run as the "Dixiecrat" in the 1948 presidential campaign. Today, this divide most clearly shows up in the struggle over immigration.
The movement has always had a deep divide, with race the central issue. So, on the one hand we have the progressive wing, symbolized by the remnant Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota and the presidential candidacy in 1948 of FDR's former Ag Secretary, Henry Wallace for the Progressive Party. On the other, in the Deep South, we got "Pitchfork" Ben Tillman in South Carolina, whose follower, Strom Thurmond, would run as the "Dixiecrat" in the 1948 presidential campaign. Today, this divide most clearly shows up in the struggle over immigration.
Summers: Increase Aggregate Demand Now
When Angrybear introduced me as a ProGrowthLiberal, he speculated that I tended to agree with Lawrence Summers on macroeconomic policy. So one might wonder if I agree with his latest:
I’ve been calling for a more expansionary monetary policy for while, but I have also been calling for long-term fiscal restraint. So do I agree with Larry’s recent call for fiscal stimulus?
When it finally became evident to most economists that we were in the midst of a business investment led recession back in 2001, this Rubinesque Bear suggested that we have a redux of the 1993 Clinton fiscal philosophy – a little short-term fiscal stimulus with a commitment that we would gradually move to long-term fiscal restraint. The hope was that a mix of short-term interest rates – which the Greenspan FED gave us in spades – combined with an acceleration of public and private consumption but the promise of higher national savings in the out years might help reverse the investment and general aggregate demand slump. What we got from the Bush White House was very little in short-term fiscal stimulus and a virtual guarantee that we would have long-term fiscal irresponsibility. It has always been my view that this upside fiscal policy was one reason why long-term interest rates took much longer to decline and why the business investment slump lasted so long. Sure, residential investment rose back then – but that only partially offset the dismal performance of business investment - as well as the export slump.
Today, business investment is stronger but residential investment has plummeted. If Dr. Summers is dusting off the 1993 Clinton fiscal philosophy, which was also what Robert Rubin had convinced a few moderate Republican and Democratic Senators to advocate back in late 2001, then I agree with him 100 percent. And maybe this time – the President might also work towards passing the recommended policy package rather than undermining at every turn like he did six years ago.
Hat tip to Mark Thoma.
Former Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, once a fiscal hawk among Clinton Democrats, said the government should consider a $50 billion to $75 billion tax-cut and spending package to stave off a deep recession. Mr. Summers, now a Harvard University professor and investment-fund manager, also urged the Federal Reserve to take more aggressive action to ensure that its rate cuts actually reduce consumers' interest charges and stimulate spending.
I’ve been calling for a more expansionary monetary policy for while, but I have also been calling for long-term fiscal restraint. So do I agree with Larry’s recent call for fiscal stimulus?
When it finally became evident to most economists that we were in the midst of a business investment led recession back in 2001, this Rubinesque Bear suggested that we have a redux of the 1993 Clinton fiscal philosophy – a little short-term fiscal stimulus with a commitment that we would gradually move to long-term fiscal restraint. The hope was that a mix of short-term interest rates – which the Greenspan FED gave us in spades – combined with an acceleration of public and private consumption but the promise of higher national savings in the out years might help reverse the investment and general aggregate demand slump. What we got from the Bush White House was very little in short-term fiscal stimulus and a virtual guarantee that we would have long-term fiscal irresponsibility. It has always been my view that this upside fiscal policy was one reason why long-term interest rates took much longer to decline and why the business investment slump lasted so long. Sure, residential investment rose back then – but that only partially offset the dismal performance of business investment - as well as the export slump.
Today, business investment is stronger but residential investment has plummeted. If Dr. Summers is dusting off the 1993 Clinton fiscal philosophy, which was also what Robert Rubin had convinced a few moderate Republican and Democratic Senators to advocate back in late 2001, then I agree with him 100 percent. And maybe this time – the President might also work towards passing the recommended policy package rather than undermining at every turn like he did six years ago.
Hat tip to Mark Thoma.
Green Gas Emissions, Risks and Uncertainty: When Kenneth Arrow Speaks – Just Listen
Kenneth Arrow explains the general issue thusly:
While Arrow notes that the critics of the Stern Report cite the role of uncertainty as their rational for taking no action, he fires back with his own analysis of the roles of uncertainty and risk.
Two factors differentiate global climate change from other environmental problems. First, whereas most environmental insults – for example, water pollution, acid rain, or sulfur dioxide emissions – are mitigated promptly or in fairly short order when the source is cleaned up, emissions of CO2 and other trace gases remain in the atmosphere for centuries. So reducing emissions today is very valuable to humanity in the distant future. Second, the externality is truly global in scale, because greenhouse gases travel around the world in a few days. As a result, the nation-state and its subsidiaries, the typical loci for internalizing externalities, are limited in their remedial capacity. (However, since the United States contributes about 25% of the world’s CO2 emissions, its own policy could make a large difference.)
While Arrow notes that the critics of the Stern Report cite the role of uncertainty as their rational for taking no action, he fires back with his own analysis of the roles of uncertainty and risk.
There is greater disagreement about how much to discount the future simply because it is the future, even if future generations are no better off than us. Whereas the Stern Review follows a tradition among British economists and many philosophers against discounting for pure futurity, most economists take pure time preference as obvious. However, the case for intervention to keep CO2 levels within bounds (say, aiming to stabilize them at about 550 ppm) is sufficiently strong to be insensitive to this dispute. Consider some numbers from the Stern Review concerning the future benefits of preventing greenhouse gas concentrations from exceeding 550 ppm, as well as the costs of accomplishing this. The benefits are the avoided damages, including both market damages and non-market damages that account for health and ecological impacts. Following a “business as usual” policy, by 2200, the losses in GNP have an expected value of 13.8%, but with a degree of uncertainty that makes the expected loss equivalent to a certain loss of about 20%. Since the base rate of economic growth (before calculating the climate change effect) was taken to be 1.3% per year, a loss of 20% in the year 2200 amounts to reducing the annual growth rate to 1.2%. In other words, the benefit of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions can be represented as the increase in the annual growth rate from today to 2200 from 1.2% to 1.3%. As for the cost of stabilization, estimates in the Stern Review range from 3.4% of GNP to -3.9% (since saving energy reduces energy costs, the latter estimate is not as startling as it appears). Let’s assume that costs to prevent additional accumulation of CO2 (and equivalents) come to 1% of GNP every year forever, and, in accordance with a fair amount of empirical evidence, that the component of the discount rate attributable to the declining marginal utility of consumption is equal to twice the rate of growth of consumption. A straightforward calculation shows that mitigation is better than business as usual – that is, the present value of the benefits exceeds the present value of the costs – for any social rate of time preference less than 8.5%. No estimate of the pure rate of time preference, even by those who believe in relatively strong discounting of the future, has ever approached 8.5%.
Tuesday, December 18, 2007
History Note: Chico Plane Hijacked to Arkansas
My home, Chico, California, is not often seen as the center of the world, but we do have some distinctions. For example, the first airline hijacking on US soil occurred here. It may also be the only time that anyone ever hijacked a plane to Arkansas.
http://blogs.ocweekly.com/navelgazing/main/another-california-first-hijac/
http://blogs.ocweekly.com/navelgazing/main/another-california-first-hijac/
Monday, December 17, 2007
Blood for Oil in Iraq Achieved! Now We Can Come Home!
Great news! As of this past week or so, for the first time oil production in Iraq has exceeded what it was under Saddam Hussein before the US invaded, a whopping 2.3 million
barrels per day!! For a country with the world's second largest oil reserves, this is a great achievement!!! Clearly, our goal there has been achieved, so now our troops can come home!!!
barrels per day!! For a country with the world's second largest oil reserves, this is a great achievement!!! Clearly, our goal there has been achieved, so now our troops can come home!!!
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