In China, some people might be looking forward to a U.S. slowdown. That's because an American recession could do what Beijing has not been able to accomplish -- namely, cool off China's overheated economy, which in 2007 grew at its fastest pace in 13 years.
I had tried to summarize an interesting economist blog discussion a while back with a tribute to the Tinbergen condition and Brad DeLong got it right with this discussion of China’s policy conflict:
This policy conflict could end in one of several ways: (1) A sudden large burst of inflation in China, as the PBoC finds that it can no longer maintain both the current exchange-rate peg and a stable effective money stock, and sacrifices the second to the first. (2) A sudden large rise in the value of the yuan, as the PBoC finds that it can no longer maintain both the current exchange-rate peg and a stable effective money stock, and sacrifices the first to the second. (3) Slow and gradual versions of (1) and (2) as holders of nominal yuan assets in the first case and nominal dollar assets in the second let their wealth be gradually but substantially be eroded without ever taking steps to cut their losses. (4) Something more unpleasant.
Tinbergen might look at the problem this way (assuming a 2-nation model with China and US and the two nations). The US is worried about a lack of aggregate demand as well as a current account deficit, while China is worried about excessive aggregate demand. Now China’s current account surplus in a 2-nation model is essentially the same thing as our current account deficit. We have three policy tools: (1) US domestic demand; (2) Chinese domestic demand; and (3) a host of expenditure-switching policies. China is employing tight domestic demand policies, while the US is considering expansionary domestic demand policies. Both will tend to widen the current account deficit as China’s exports to the US will grow, while our exports to China will fall. While China will lament our expansionary domestic demand policies (at least according to Business Week), some American policy makers might be hoping to export more to China and would therefore be cheering against their attempts to control Chinese inflation. But what about policy option (3)? Of course, some American policy makers are advocating tariffs and quotas against Chinese goods as a form of expenditure-switching policy. Those of us who still belong to the free trade bandwagon on the other hand are hoping for more yuan appreciation – which was Brad’s (2). But to sacrifice full employment in the US so as to satisfy what the Chinese wish to do in regards their own macroeconomies strikes me as very short-sighted.