Shortening the workweek would create jobs and stimulate the US economy – and give workers the benefits other countries provide.
First, if money is not going to be printed, it has to come from somewhere. If the government borrows a dollar from you, that is a dollar that you do not spend, or that you do not lend to a company to spend on new investment. Every dollar of increased government spending must correspond to one less dollar of private spending. Jobs created by stimulus spending are offset by jobs lost from the decline in private spending. We can build roads instead of factories, but fiscal stimulus can’t help us to build more of both. This is just accounting, and does not need a complex argument about “crowding out.”
Now the NIPA savings-investment identity holds in all models--it is, after all, an identity, true by definition and construction. And every single model that has been built in which there is a possibility of high unemployment and idle resources is a model in which fiscal policy works because increases in government spending lead to unexpected declines in inventories and unexpected declines in inventories lead to firms to expand production, which leads to increases in income and saving. I would, therefore, say that Fama's claim is "wrong". Not only does it not hold in all models in the class, it does not hold in any models in the class.
Second, investment is “spending” every bit as much as consumption. Fiscal stimulus advocates want money spent on consumption, not saved. They evaluate past stimulus programs by whether people who got stimulus money spent it on consumption goods rather save it. But the economy overall does not care if you buy a car, or if you lend money to a company that buys a forklift.
Third, people must ignore the fact that the government will raise future taxes to pay back the debt. If you know your taxes will go up in the future, the right thing to do with a stimulus check is to buy government bonds so you can pay those higher taxes. Now the net effect of fiscal stimulus is exactly zero, except to raise future tax distortions. The classic arguments for fiscal stimulus presume that the government can systematically fool people.
But with the credit markets still tight, corporations are being forced to pay much higher interest rates than they did a few years ago, putting more strain on balance sheets already hammered by falling profits and a grinding recession.
Even companies with strong credit ratings are paying about 5 percentage points more than the federal government to borrow money, according to Standard & Poor’s. That is more than double the premium they paid last January. Companies with so-called junk credit ratings are paying a 15 percent premium. “That’s an extraordinary spread,” said Diane Vazza, head of global fixed-income research at Standard & Poor’s. “That’s unprecedented in the speculative-grade market.”
Professor Krugman is also discussing only one side of the issue when it comes to where the economy is today. Professor Krugman is taking the fact that the US is in a liquidity trap for granted, and that the US is wrestling with the zero-lower-bound for interest rates, even though there are obvious reasons for why you would argue that the US is not in or near a liquidity trap ... the economic actors are not exposed to 0% interest rates. No final loans to private individuals or companies are made at or near a 0% interest rate ... There is another phenomenon, that is not a liquidity trap, but that can also create disinflation and even short-lived deflation. The phenomenon is a credit crunch. In a credit crunch credit becomes hard and/or expensive to come by, and this dampens the willingness to borrow, spend and invest. The difference between a liquidity trap and a credit crunch is that in a liquidity trap people have ample access to cheap credit and still choose to not borrow money, while in a credit crunch people do not borrow money either because they can't or because they view borrowing as too expensive. The basic attributes of these two phenomena are such that they are mutually exclusive. In a credit crunch you have limited access to cheap credit, in a liquidity trap you have ample access to nearly free credit; you can't have both.
This may be as close as we’re going to get to a Fed chairman labeling some in Congress as irresponsible. Sure, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke was typically careful with his wording in a Jan. 13 speech in London. “The public in many countries” is “understandably concerned” that government is spending money to rescue the financial industry, “when other industries receive little or no assistance,” Bernanke said. After explaining how the world economy “is critically dependent on the free flow of credit,” Bernanke issued his challenge: “Responsible policy makers must therefore do what they can to communicate to their constituencies why financial stabilization is essential for economic recovery and is therefore in the broader public interest.” Three days after that speech, 33 of 39 Republican senators ignored Bernanke’s warning and voted against releasing the remaining $350 billion in Troubled Asset Relief Program money. (So did eight Democrats, mostly liberals, plus independent Bernie Sanders of Vermont.) Fortunately, that left enough supporters, mostly Democrats, to clear the release of the much-needed money. Too many senators shrugged their shoulders at Bernanke’s wise words.
It is relevant in answering this question that the origins of this recession were in the financial sector, and especially in the excessive mortgage credit to sub prime and other borrowers. The widespread collapse of the financial sector, and the wholesale retreat from risky assets, clearly has called for a highly pro-active Fed. But it is not obvious why this should lead to greater confidence in the power of government spending stimulus packages. Of course, perhaps the prior emphasis on crowding out, and skepticism toward the stimulating effects of government spending, were wrong, or that recessions were too short and mild after the 1981-82 recession to call for Keynesian-type stimulus packages.
Well, my definition of a liquidity trap is, purely and simply, a situation in which conventional monetary policy — open-market purchases of short-term government debt — has lost effectiveness. Period. End of story. Now, if you prefer a different definition of a liquidity trap, OK; call our current situation a banana, instead. But changing the name does not change the essential fact — namely, conventional monetary policy has lost effectiveness. Yes, there are other things the Fed could do — and it’s doing them, on an awesome scale. But they’re controversial, precisely because, unlike conventional monetary policy, they involve picking and choosing among potentially risky investments. And there’s a much stronger case for fiscal policy than in normal times, because we don’t know how well these unconventional measures will work.
The Washington Post reports about a move afoot to give the Federal Reserve more regulatory power over the financial system.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/25/AR2009012501686.html?hpid=topnews
Considering that the Federal Reserve is supposed to be independent of the government, it would seem that getting such powers to the Fed would be ill-advised.
In addition, considering that the Fed's posture in the bailout makes the Treasury Department looks like a paragon of transparency, giving such powers to the Fed seems even more questionable.
When the Democrats promised change, I thought they meant change for the better. Maybe I was wrong.
Appearing on ABC's This Week, Nancy Pelosi said that Republicans have had the opportunity to be included in crafting the stimulus bill -- even if not many of their ideas have been adopted. "Well, we will take some," said Pelosi. "We will judge them by their ability to create jobs, to -- to help turn the economy around, to stabilize the economy, and to see how much they cost."
In an appearance on Fox News Sunday, John McCain said he won't vote for President Obama's stimulus package as it stands now. McCain said there need to be more tax cuts for businesses, payroll tax cuts, and for existing tax cuts to be made permanent: " Well, the plan was written by the majority in -- a Democrat majority in the House, primarily. And so, yeah, I think there has to be major rewrites if we want to stimulate the economy."
Yes you can: Save jobs by sacrificing your time and money.The Sandwichman points out the potential pitfall of the "proportional cut in pay" line. If workers are expected to handle the same workload in four days, it's just a speed-up with a pay cut. And what does that do to consumer spending? Here's where government needs to step in to make up the difference in pay as part of its economic stimulus package. More on that angle from Dean Baker in Monday's Guardian.
As employers and employees confront the spectre of mass layoffs, creative measures are coming to the fore, including individual workers cutting their workweek to four days, with a proportional cut in pay.
The idea gained currency this week in U.S. President Barack Obama's call-to-duty inauguration speech. America's recovery, he said, in part will rely on "the selflessness of workers who would rather cut their hours than see a friend lose their job."
Paolo Virno's A Grammar of the Multitude is a short book, but it casts a very long shadow. Behind it looms the entire history of the labor movement and its heretical wing, Italian "workerism" (operaismo), which rethought Marxism in light of the struggles of the 1960s and 1970s....
6.5. Thesis 4
For the post-Fordist multitude every qualitative difference between labor time and non-labor time falls short...
If we can say that Fordism incorporated, and rewrote in its own way, some aspects of the socialist experience, then post-Fordism has fundamentally dismissed both Keynesianism and socialism. Post-Fordism, hinging as it does upon the general intellect and the multitude, puts forth, in its own way, typical demands of communism (abolition of work, dissolution of the State, etc.). Post-Fordism is the communism of capital.James Callaghan, in 1976:
We used to think that you could spend your way out of a recession and increase employment by cutting taxes and boosting government spending. I tell you in all candour that that option no longer exists, and in so far as it ever did exist, it only worked on each occasion since the war by injecting a bigger dose of inflation into the economy, followed by a higher level of unemployment as the next step.
Team Obama is reportedly using a number around 1.5. To think about what this means, first assume that the multiplier was 1.0. In this case, an increase by one unit in government purchases and, thereby, in the aggregate demand for goods would lead to an increase by one unit in real gross domestic product (GDP). Thus, the added public goods are essentially free to society. If the government buys another airplane or bridge, the economy's total output expands by enough to create the airplane or bridge without requiring a cut in anyone's consumption or investment. The explanation for this magic is that idle resources -- unemployed labor and capital -- are put to work to produce the added goods and services. If the multiplier is greater than 1.0, as is apparently assumed by Team Obama, the process is even more wonderful. In this case, real GDP rises by more than the increase in government purchases. Thus, in addition to the free airplane or bridge, we also have more goods and services left over to raise private consumption or investment.
A much more plausible starting point is a multiplier of zero. In this case, the GDP is given, and a rise in government purchases requires an equal fall in the total of other parts of GDP -- consumption, investment and net exports. In other words, the social cost of one unit of additional government purchases is one … What do the data show about multipliers? Because it is not easy to separate movements in government purchases from overall business fluctuations, the best evidence comes from large changes in military purchases that are driven by shifts in war and peace. A particularly good experiment is the massive expansion of U.S. defense expenditures during World War II … I have estimated that World War II raised U.S. defense expenditures by $540 billion (1996 dollars) per year at the peak in 1943-44, amounting to 44% of real GDP. I also estimated that the war raised real GDP by $430 billion per year in 1943-44. Thus, the multiplier was 0.8 (430/540). The other way to put this is that the war lowered components of GDP aside from military purchases. The main declines were in private investment, nonmilitary parts of government purchases, and net exports -- personal consumer expenditure changed little. Wartime production siphoned off resources from other economic uses -- there was a dampener, rather than a multiplier.
Consumer goods were rationed; people were urged to restrain their spending to make resources available for the war effort. Oh, and the economy was at full employment — and then some. Rosie the Riveter, anyone? I can’t quite imagine the mindset that leads someone to forget all this, and think that you can use World War II to estimate the multiplier that might prevail in an underemployed, rationing-free economy.
In the deep south of Japan sits the tiny island of Himeshima. Farmers cultivate delicious prawns, the rare chestnut tiger butterfly flitters around the beach and 2,400 islanders wallow in total job security.
It has been so on Himeshima for 40 years and suddenly, faced with the most alarming economic downturn since the Second World War, everyone from the central Government in Tokyo to the country's biggest industrial conglomerates is desperate to copy its secret: work sharing...
