It is stable, easier to measure, hard to game
"Of all the Accumulative Excizes, that of Harthmoney or Smoak-money seems the best; and that onely because the easiest, and clearest, and fittest to ground a certain Revenue upon; it being easie to tell the number of Harths, which remove not as Heads or Polls do: Moreover, 'tis more easie to pay a small Tax, then to alter or abrogate Harths, even though they are useless and supernumerary; nor is it possible to cover them, because most of the neighbours know them; nor in new Building will any man who gives forty shillings for making a Chimney be without it for two."
Tuesday, August 18, 2009
Monday, August 17, 2009
"You never want a serious crisis to go to waste."
In the famous words of Rahm Emanuel, the crisis is doing its work very well. One might have expected that people would be picking up the pitchforks to demand change; instead, they have been whipped up to demand more of the same. Can anybody here imagine what would've happened if lefties had tried to hold their own tea parties at Republican meetings? People got arrested for wearing anti-Bush T-shirts.
As a result and crisis management of Rahm Emanuel, the United States continues its rapid degeneration in fine fashion. Here at home, we're about to begin the first of our furloughs was the beginning of the semester. Presumably, we have to sign some paper agreeing not to do any work, probably to protect the state of the university from any kind of legal liability for forcing us to work without pay. Thinking about a twist on next week's lecture during such times would be some kind of violation of a legal contract.
Gov. Arnold is on a tear, pushing for an undermining of the state pension plan.
Hopefully, health care reform -- now rebranded as insurance reform -- will be dead. I assume that the major reform will be to reduce the funding of Medicare.
Obama said that the choice is between hope and fear. He should have used the past tense. Either through political incompetence or some deep-seated neoconservative instincts, he has dashed any hopes -- at least, the hopes of any rational person. In many ways, we have the third Bush administration -- secrecy, war, and the coddling of the rich and powerful.
In the Confiscation of American Prosperity, I wrote: "Since the election of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932, every Democratic administration with the exception of Lyndon Johnson’s has been more conservative -- often far more conservative -- than the previous Democratic administration. Similarly, every elected Republican administration, with the single exception of George Herbert Walker Bush’s, has been more conservative than the previous Republican administration." At least, Obama has made sure that I will now have to revise a second edition.
As a result and crisis management of Rahm Emanuel, the United States continues its rapid degeneration in fine fashion. Here at home, we're about to begin the first of our furloughs was the beginning of the semester. Presumably, we have to sign some paper agreeing not to do any work, probably to protect the state of the university from any kind of legal liability for forcing us to work without pay. Thinking about a twist on next week's lecture during such times would be some kind of violation of a legal contract.
Gov. Arnold is on a tear, pushing for an undermining of the state pension plan.
Hopefully, health care reform -- now rebranded as insurance reform -- will be dead. I assume that the major reform will be to reduce the funding of Medicare.
Obama said that the choice is between hope and fear. He should have used the past tense. Either through political incompetence or some deep-seated neoconservative instincts, he has dashed any hopes -- at least, the hopes of any rational person. In many ways, we have the third Bush administration -- secrecy, war, and the coddling of the rich and powerful.
In the Confiscation of American Prosperity, I wrote: "Since the election of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932, every Democratic administration with the exception of Lyndon Johnson’s has been more conservative -- often far more conservative -- than the previous Democratic administration. Similarly, every elected Republican administration, with the single exception of George Herbert Walker Bush’s, has been more conservative than the previous Republican administration." At least, Obama has made sure that I will now have to revise a second edition.
Hours of Labour 12
by Sydney J. Chapman (translated and condensed by the Sandwichman)
Let me now summarize my main conclusions, and humanize them by restoring the moral and social elements from which our premises were to some extent abstracted. I have hitherto spoken of progress in such terms that the critic would have some excuse for charging me with narrowness of vision. Progress is not summed up in improvements in productive methods that reduce the cost of things, nor in these improvements combined with the application to production of ideas that render work pleasanter and more educative. Nor is it wholly, or in bulk, summed up even if we add improvements in distribution (resulting in a more satisfying sharing of wealth) and a greater responsiveness of production to the needs of the community. The essentials of what most of us really understand by progress are to be found only in the world of consciousness – in the spiritual constituents of the universe. I mean something we cannot exactly define if we are not philosophers – and hardly then – but something implying a full living, with understanding of life and its surroundings, including its ethics, and a living with volitional powers strong enough to enable us to follow our lights. As all this is actually, though vaguely, desired in some degree by humanity generally, it is no doubt covered by the satisfactions measured in demand, but the admission of its reflection on one plane cannot be regarded as its adequate inclusion in our social philosophy.
The most important aspect of the question of the length of the working day consists in its relation to the most intimate constituents of progress. Let us call progress in this sense "culture" – a term, perhaps the best of the single terms available, to convey my meaning. Now the world appears to be so designed that culture has on the whole a proportionately important place in the most primitive economic conditions. The hours of labor in such conditions may be long, but work is not so continuously absorbing that social intercourse during work is impossible, while variety of experience, contact with nature, and the calls made on initiative afford that intimacy with life as a whole, and that evocation of moral forces, which must be obtained in later stages of civilization largely through systematic education and books. I have argued above that each step in civilization brings intensified specialism. Work is by no means rendered non-cultural ultimately, but its cultural aspects are specialized, as are its objective aspects. Interest may be deepened on the whole, but it is no longer diffused; the need for thought and purpose may be no less than before, but the thought and purpose are of a confined character. The intensification of economic life that is implied is in itself all to the good, but the community must lose something of culture unless corresponding with this intensification there is an expansion of leisure and a specialized use of leisure for the purposes of culture. Certain expressions that have come into common use would seem to be significant of the needs and dangers of an industrial society highly advanced on the technical side. Thus we speak of the "cultured" classes and the "leisured" classes. For the attainment of culture, leisure is essential today as it was not in the past in quite the same sense, "culture" being broadly defined. I need not say that a "progress" that meant the "specializing out" of leisure for the sole enjoyment of one class would not commend itself to any reasonable person; and I do not discern any danger of "progress" of this sort; but there is some danger lest the growing importance of leisure generally, and of a proper use of leisure, should not be fully realized. Tangible things force themselves upon our attention as the more intangible do not, and some of us who have an economic bent of mind get into the way, in consequence, of thinking too much of the quantity of external wealth produced and too little of the balance between internal and external wealth. In ultimate terms, to those who care to put it that way, all wealth is life, as Ruskin insisted. There hardly appears to be any risk of a general underrating of external goods, but there is some risk of an underrating of the new needs of the life lived outside the hours devoted to production – which should themselves be, not a sacrifice to real living, but a part of it – and of an underrating of the dependence even of productive advance upon the widespread enjoyment and proper use of adequate leisure and an adequate income.
Let me now summarize my main conclusions, and humanize them by restoring the moral and social elements from which our premises were to some extent abstracted. I have hitherto spoken of progress in such terms that the critic would have some excuse for charging me with narrowness of vision. Progress is not summed up in improvements in productive methods that reduce the cost of things, nor in these improvements combined with the application to production of ideas that render work pleasanter and more educative. Nor is it wholly, or in bulk, summed up even if we add improvements in distribution (resulting in a more satisfying sharing of wealth) and a greater responsiveness of production to the needs of the community. The essentials of what most of us really understand by progress are to be found only in the world of consciousness – in the spiritual constituents of the universe. I mean something we cannot exactly define if we are not philosophers – and hardly then – but something implying a full living, with understanding of life and its surroundings, including its ethics, and a living with volitional powers strong enough to enable us to follow our lights. As all this is actually, though vaguely, desired in some degree by humanity generally, it is no doubt covered by the satisfactions measured in demand, but the admission of its reflection on one plane cannot be regarded as its adequate inclusion in our social philosophy.
The most important aspect of the question of the length of the working day consists in its relation to the most intimate constituents of progress. Let us call progress in this sense "culture" – a term, perhaps the best of the single terms available, to convey my meaning. Now the world appears to be so designed that culture has on the whole a proportionately important place in the most primitive economic conditions. The hours of labor in such conditions may be long, but work is not so continuously absorbing that social intercourse during work is impossible, while variety of experience, contact with nature, and the calls made on initiative afford that intimacy with life as a whole, and that evocation of moral forces, which must be obtained in later stages of civilization largely through systematic education and books. I have argued above that each step in civilization brings intensified specialism. Work is by no means rendered non-cultural ultimately, but its cultural aspects are specialized, as are its objective aspects. Interest may be deepened on the whole, but it is no longer diffused; the need for thought and purpose may be no less than before, but the thought and purpose are of a confined character. The intensification of economic life that is implied is in itself all to the good, but the community must lose something of culture unless corresponding with this intensification there is an expansion of leisure and a specialized use of leisure for the purposes of culture. Certain expressions that have come into common use would seem to be significant of the needs and dangers of an industrial society highly advanced on the technical side. Thus we speak of the "cultured" classes and the "leisured" classes. For the attainment of culture, leisure is essential today as it was not in the past in quite the same sense, "culture" being broadly defined. I need not say that a "progress" that meant the "specializing out" of leisure for the sole enjoyment of one class would not commend itself to any reasonable person; and I do not discern any danger of "progress" of this sort; but there is some danger lest the growing importance of leisure generally, and of a proper use of leisure, should not be fully realized. Tangible things force themselves upon our attention as the more intangible do not, and some of us who have an economic bent of mind get into the way, in consequence, of thinking too much of the quantity of external wealth produced and too little of the balance between internal and external wealth. In ultimate terms, to those who care to put it that way, all wealth is life, as Ruskin insisted. There hardly appears to be any risk of a general underrating of external goods, but there is some risk of an underrating of the new needs of the life lived outside the hours devoted to production – which should themselves be, not a sacrifice to real living, but a part of it – and of an underrating of the dependence even of productive advance upon the widespread enjoyment and proper use of adequate leisure and an adequate income.
Sunday, August 16, 2009
China vs. the US: Class Warfare
In July, Chinese workers murdered beat an executive to death in protesting an immanent privatization of their steel mill.
Canaves, Sky and James T. Areddy. 2009. "Murder Bares Worker Anger Over China Industrial Reform." Wall Street Journal (3 August)
The state responded by halting the sale.
McGregor, Richard. 2009. "Killing of China Steel Plant Boss Halts Sale." Financial Times (26 July).
Now the money is being returned to the intended privatizer
Bradsher, Keith. 2009. "Bowing to Protests, China Halts Sale of Steel Mill." New York Times (16 August).
While not condoning violence, the role of the state is interesting here. China is not always known for respecting the interests of those who stand in the way of what we in the United States call economic progress. I would assume that a violent military response would occur here (unless the union would reorganize as a bank). Instead, the Chinese negotiated with the workers.
I assume that some sort of punishments will be meted out, but even so, I am amazed at what happened.
Here is the latest from the NYT
Canaves, Sky and James T. Areddy. 2009. "Murder Bares Worker Anger Over China Industrial Reform." Wall Street Journal (3 August)
The state responded by halting the sale.
McGregor, Richard. 2009. "Killing of China Steel Plant Boss Halts Sale." Financial Times (26 July).
Now the money is being returned to the intended privatizer
Bradsher, Keith. 2009. "Bowing to Protests, China Halts Sale of Steel Mill." New York Times (16 August).
While not condoning violence, the role of the state is interesting here. China is not always known for respecting the interests of those who stand in the way of what we in the United States call economic progress. I would assume that a violent military response would occur here (unless the union would reorganize as a bank). Instead, the Chinese negotiated with the workers.
I assume that some sort of punishments will be meted out, but even so, I am amazed at what happened.
Here is the latest from the NYT
A Chinese provincial government halted the privatization of a state-owned steel mill on Sunday, apparently capitulating to thousands of workers who protested last week and took an official as hostage. The protests, in Henan Province in central China, were the latest sign of increasing labor activism in China’s steel industry, the world’s largest and a cornerstone of China’s construction-dependent economy. Three weeks earlier, rioting workers beat to death an executive who had been overseeing the sale of another state-owned steel company, Tonghua Iron and Steel, in northeast China’s Jilin Province, to a private business. The privatization of Tonghua was immediately postponed after that death.
The newspaper China Daily reported on Saturday that the police had tried to break through the ranks of workers on Friday in the latest incident, at the Linzhou Iron and Steel Company in the city of Anyang. China Daily did not say whether the police had been successful. Government agencies at all levels have been reluctant to use overwhelming force against protesting workers.
The official Xinhua news agency said that the workers had decided on Saturday to halt their protests, which had attracted up to 3,000 participants at a time, after a government mediation team agreed to reconsider the takeover; Xinhua did not mention what became of the official who had been held hostage.
Xinhua said that the Fengbao Iron and Steel Company had already paid $26.5 million of the $38.1 million it bid at an auction to acquire Linzhou Steel, which has 2,995 workers. The $26.5 million will be refunded, Xinhua said, citing an unidentified local official.
The success of Linzhou’s steel workers in blocking privatization could embolden workers in other industries, experts on Chinese labor issues said on Sunday. “It is no longer possible to push through privatization regardless, without considering the workers’ interests,” said Geoffrey Crothall, a spokesman for the China Labor Bulletin, a labor rights advocacy group based in Hong Kong.
In a sign of high-level interest in the recent unrest, the government-sponsored All-China Federation of Trade Unions has posted a prominent series of commentaries at the top of its Chinese-language Web site under the heading, “Corporate restructuring: participation of the trade union is essential.
In halting the privatization of the Linzhou mill, Xinhua said, the province’s government and its Communist Party committee issued a decision that, “Issues regarding the future of Linzhou Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. and benefits of its workers should be decided by its workers’ congress.” Chinese law has long required that privatizations be approved by the affected company’s workers’ congress. But local government officials and company managers have frequently been able to rig the approval until now by running the congresses themselves, Mr. Crothall said.
The global economic downturn has severely hurt the steel industry, which may be feeding labor unrest in the sector. Chinese steel exports were down 15.4 percent in the first half of this year. The Chinese government is also locked in a series of disputes with Australia over iron ore imports for steel production, the most notable of which led to the arrest of four Rio Tinto executives on accusations of bribery and trade secret infringement during price negotiations with Chinese steel makers. Rio Tinto has strongly denied any wrongdoing.
On Thursday, faced with a glut of steel-making capacity and many small steel companies vying to buy iron ore, Beijing officials ordered a three-year moratorium on the construction of any new steel mills or the expansion of existing mills.
But Beijing has had less success in its efforts to force a consolidation of existing steel mills, a step that might strengthen their bargaining power with the handful of multinationals that dominate the global iron ore business. Local and provincial government agencies have been wary of losing control of businesses that are often vital to their economies, and many workers are opposed.
Yet many older, less efficient steel mills are deeply troubled. The Linzhou mill is 40 years old and has not been operating since March because its sales fell, it ran short of cash and it failed to meet environmental standards.
... during the big shift toward private ownership from 1997 to 2001 [at] least 30 million workers at state-owned enterprises were laid off then, but local protests did not spread.
Talk (about fiscal policy) Is Cheap
Paul Krugman makes an interesting observation about Germany’s fiscal rhetoric and policy:
In other words, the Finance minister may be silly enough to advocate fiscal restraint during a recession but at least their actual policies avoided Herbert Hoover economics. In our country, the Republicans are also advocating Herbert Hoover economics but we are lucky enough to have smarter heads running fiscal policy today.
But consider this – Republicans also say they are for long-run fiscal restraint, which might be a very good thing if we actually had been practicing it for the past 28 years. Also, Republican led governments pushed fiscal irresponsibility over this period.
there’s a dissonance between what Germany says and what it does: the Finance minister denounces Keynesianism, but at least according to the IMF Germany’s actual stimulus package is quite substantial
In other words, the Finance minister may be silly enough to advocate fiscal restraint during a recession but at least their actual policies avoided Herbert Hoover economics. In our country, the Republicans are also advocating Herbert Hoover economics but we are lucky enough to have smarter heads running fiscal policy today.
But consider this – Republicans also say they are for long-run fiscal restraint, which might be a very good thing if we actually had been practicing it for the past 28 years. Also, Republican led governments pushed fiscal irresponsibility over this period.
Saturday, August 15, 2009
Germany's "V"
by the Sandwichman
Barkley says, "the V bounce is happening. France and Germany actually grew in the second quarter." Paul Krugman posted the following graph:
You don't see the V? Just tilt your head 45 degrees to the right and it comes into view. Happy Laventine's day Barkvey!
Barkley says, "the V bounce is happening. France and Germany actually grew in the second quarter." Paul Krugman posted the following graph:
You don't see the V? Just tilt your head 45 degrees to the right and it comes into view. Happy Laventine's day Barkvey!
Hours of Labour 11
by Sydney J. Chapman (translated and condensed by the Sandwichman)
All advanced industrialism today feels the strain of an accumulation of forces tending to bring about a reduction of the working day and will continue to be. However, a firm limit is imposed on the reduction of hours by the steep interest and depreciation charges on machinery when it works only a fraction of the time for which interest must be paid. Buildings deteriorate in value at least as much when shut up as when they are occupied; machinery continues to wear out, and sometimes rapidly, when it is idle; and the reserve fund necessary because the market may contract at any time and because machinery may at any time be rendered obsolete, is independent of the length of the working day. Many inventions involve an extended use of capital per head. Interest and depreciation charges, on the one hand, discourage the use of some innovations that require heavier capital investment, and, on the other hand, prevent those applied from reducing hours so much as they otherwise would.
To what extent depreciation and interest charges discourage shortening of the hours of labor depends, of course, on the relation between wages and payments for capital in the expenses of a business, which varies by industry. A rough calculation, nevertheless, for a particular industry of the saving in hours that might be effected by the continuous running of plant may be relevant. In the industry for which I have obtained figures, interest and depreciation would be reckoned ordinarily at 10 percent on the capital, about half for each, while wages would be in the neighborhood of 12 percent. Now, it being assumed provisionally that the depreciation charge varies as the hours worked, that the rate of interest is a constant, that the equipment of the industry remains as before and labor tends neither to leave the industry nor to flood into it, and that other costs of production are not affected, we find that hours could be reduced from ten to eight without any loss of wages, were the continuous running of plant substituted for the ten hours' day.
Actually, of course, some of the gain would be taken in the form of higher wages. Further, it must be noticed that the assumptions made do not accurately correspond with fact, though they are satisfactory for the purposes of a first approximation. On the one hand they lead to an over-estimate of the advantages of continuous running, because twenty-four hours of work could not possibly be squeezed into a twenty-four hours' day, and because the cost of artificial light during night work is disregarded, as are also the costs connected with awkward points in organzation, with the sharing of responsibility for the proper treatment of machinery, and with the fact, universally experienced, that night-shifts are not so productive as day-shifts. On the other hand, they lead to an under-estimate of the advantages of continuous running, because the cost of depreciation, as we have seen, is not proportional to the daily hours of work, because the shorter hours would raise the efficiency of labor, and because the demand for capital would be reduced, as would also the demand for land for manufacturing purposes. The inevitable contraction of the demand for capital is a point to be emphasized. If working hours per day were raised from ten to twenty-four, then, the reaction on the efficiency of labor still being disregarded, the old output could be obtained with five-twelfths of the old capital; the consequence would be a fall in interest, an augmentation of the amount of the plant per head of the people working with it at one time, and, therefore, an increased output per head.
In view of its great economies, the shift system calls for very careful consideration. The magnitude of the advantages that the wage-earners might hope to derive from its more extensive application has been denied, on the ground both of theory and of experience of those businesses in which it has been tried. But theoretic objections of a fundamental nature will be found to reduce to false doctrine concerning the determination of wages; and it must be remembered that as the benefits accruing from the comparatively few cases in which the shift system is practiced are by competition spread over the whole community, the gain of any individual is cut down to a very small figure. It must not be supposed that the effect of its universal adoption would be equally negligible.
Without general recourse to shift systems I cannot see any immediate prospect of much additional leisure for the mass of the population. Shifts could be designed so that no one shift would be particularly disagreeable to work in, and, if all shifts did not offer equal advantages, the workers could be moved round, being assigned for so many weeks to each shift. The shifts for foremen, and the management generally, which would have to be strengthened, might be arranged to run over a portion of two workers' shifts, so as to cement the new work on to the old; and the connecting of the work of each shift with that of the shift that it followed could also be secured by arranging that the unit of labor should be a group of partners, consisting of one man from each shift, it being the duty of each man before commencing work to see his partner in the displaced shift and receive instructions from him.
Naturally, a shift arrangement could only be introduced gradually. Are the objections to shifts of such gravity as to counteract their immense economies? The fact that objections were decisive in the past is no proof that they would be today in England, or even in industrial Canada. Conditions have been revolutionized in the last fifty years. Improvements in artificial lighting and in intra-urban transportation alone have swept away a mass of the unfavorable conditions that used to be associated with night work. And two or three shifts of approximately seven hours each, or three or four shifts of approximately six hours each – I state a not immediate attainable ideal – are very different in their effects upon social life, exclusive of those associated with the shorter period of toil for each workman, from two shifts of some ten or eleven hours each. With the shorter shift in use, arrangements could be made without much difficulty for all workers to get most of their sleep in the night, if they so wished, and to enjoy most of their leisure in daylight. But it is not my intention in this address to make a practical proposal or argue points of detail. I merely present certain theoretic corollaries that have incidentally been derived from our analysis of conditions determining the length of the working day. In conclusion, I may quote Dr. Marshall's final judgment that were shift systems more extensively adopted "the arts of production would progress more rapidly; the national dividend would increase; working men would be able to earn higher wages without checking the growth of capital, or tempting it to migrate to countries where wages are lower: and all classes of society would reap benefit from the change."
Next
All advanced industrialism today feels the strain of an accumulation of forces tending to bring about a reduction of the working day and will continue to be. However, a firm limit is imposed on the reduction of hours by the steep interest and depreciation charges on machinery when it works only a fraction of the time for which interest must be paid. Buildings deteriorate in value at least as much when shut up as when they are occupied; machinery continues to wear out, and sometimes rapidly, when it is idle; and the reserve fund necessary because the market may contract at any time and because machinery may at any time be rendered obsolete, is independent of the length of the working day. Many inventions involve an extended use of capital per head. Interest and depreciation charges, on the one hand, discourage the use of some innovations that require heavier capital investment, and, on the other hand, prevent those applied from reducing hours so much as they otherwise would.
To what extent depreciation and interest charges discourage shortening of the hours of labor depends, of course, on the relation between wages and payments for capital in the expenses of a business, which varies by industry. A rough calculation, nevertheless, for a particular industry of the saving in hours that might be effected by the continuous running of plant may be relevant. In the industry for which I have obtained figures, interest and depreciation would be reckoned ordinarily at 10 percent on the capital, about half for each, while wages would be in the neighborhood of 12 percent. Now, it being assumed provisionally that the depreciation charge varies as the hours worked, that the rate of interest is a constant, that the equipment of the industry remains as before and labor tends neither to leave the industry nor to flood into it, and that other costs of production are not affected, we find that hours could be reduced from ten to eight without any loss of wages, were the continuous running of plant substituted for the ten hours' day.
Actually, of course, some of the gain would be taken in the form of higher wages. Further, it must be noticed that the assumptions made do not accurately correspond with fact, though they are satisfactory for the purposes of a first approximation. On the one hand they lead to an over-estimate of the advantages of continuous running, because twenty-four hours of work could not possibly be squeezed into a twenty-four hours' day, and because the cost of artificial light during night work is disregarded, as are also the costs connected with awkward points in organzation, with the sharing of responsibility for the proper treatment of machinery, and with the fact, universally experienced, that night-shifts are not so productive as day-shifts. On the other hand, they lead to an under-estimate of the advantages of continuous running, because the cost of depreciation, as we have seen, is not proportional to the daily hours of work, because the shorter hours would raise the efficiency of labor, and because the demand for capital would be reduced, as would also the demand for land for manufacturing purposes. The inevitable contraction of the demand for capital is a point to be emphasized. If working hours per day were raised from ten to twenty-four, then, the reaction on the efficiency of labor still being disregarded, the old output could be obtained with five-twelfths of the old capital; the consequence would be a fall in interest, an augmentation of the amount of the plant per head of the people working with it at one time, and, therefore, an increased output per head.
In view of its great economies, the shift system calls for very careful consideration. The magnitude of the advantages that the wage-earners might hope to derive from its more extensive application has been denied, on the ground both of theory and of experience of those businesses in which it has been tried. But theoretic objections of a fundamental nature will be found to reduce to false doctrine concerning the determination of wages; and it must be remembered that as the benefits accruing from the comparatively few cases in which the shift system is practiced are by competition spread over the whole community, the gain of any individual is cut down to a very small figure. It must not be supposed that the effect of its universal adoption would be equally negligible.
Without general recourse to shift systems I cannot see any immediate prospect of much additional leisure for the mass of the population. Shifts could be designed so that no one shift would be particularly disagreeable to work in, and, if all shifts did not offer equal advantages, the workers could be moved round, being assigned for so many weeks to each shift. The shifts for foremen, and the management generally, which would have to be strengthened, might be arranged to run over a portion of two workers' shifts, so as to cement the new work on to the old; and the connecting of the work of each shift with that of the shift that it followed could also be secured by arranging that the unit of labor should be a group of partners, consisting of one man from each shift, it being the duty of each man before commencing work to see his partner in the displaced shift and receive instructions from him.
Naturally, a shift arrangement could only be introduced gradually. Are the objections to shifts of such gravity as to counteract their immense economies? The fact that objections were decisive in the past is no proof that they would be today in England, or even in industrial Canada. Conditions have been revolutionized in the last fifty years. Improvements in artificial lighting and in intra-urban transportation alone have swept away a mass of the unfavorable conditions that used to be associated with night work. And two or three shifts of approximately seven hours each, or three or four shifts of approximately six hours each – I state a not immediate attainable ideal – are very different in their effects upon social life, exclusive of those associated with the shorter period of toil for each workman, from two shifts of some ten or eleven hours each. With the shorter shift in use, arrangements could be made without much difficulty for all workers to get most of their sleep in the night, if they so wished, and to enjoy most of their leisure in daylight. But it is not my intention in this address to make a practical proposal or argue points of detail. I merely present certain theoretic corollaries that have incidentally been derived from our analysis of conditions determining the length of the working day. In conclusion, I may quote Dr. Marshall's final judgment that were shift systems more extensively adopted "the arts of production would progress more rapidly; the national dividend would increase; working men would be able to earn higher wages without checking the growth of capital, or tempting it to migrate to countries where wages are lower: and all classes of society would reap benefit from the change."
Next
Friday, August 14, 2009
A Journalist Out of His Depth
by the Sandwichman
"It is characteristic of journalists to be long on social commentary and perception and short on conceptual analysis, and [John] Rae is no exception."
Who the heck was John Rae? The Scottish journalist was a key figure in originating the lump of labor myth, as it pertains to shorter working time. He didn't use the term lump of labor but instead decried the
Intuitively, Rae's reasoning may seem persuasive until one realizes that Rae is assuming that the increased productivity will have no effect on cost, price, purchasing power of the workers or effective demand. An American economist, Charles Beardsley made short shrift of Rae's conclusions.
Nevertheless, Rae's rhetorical riposte to shorter hours as a remedy to unemployment got incorporated into employer objections to the eight-hour demand of unions while his empirical observations about productivity were noted by Sydney Chapman. The irony being that the 'dead' rhetorical part of his analysis has survived, handed down from textbook lore to blackboard dogma, while the 'living' empirical part has perished from the memory of mainstream economists!
So I was delighted to come across the following discussion by Aaron Fuller (2003) of Rae's characteristic "shotgun" style as deployed on another topic, Henry George's economics.
"It is characteristic of journalists to be long on social commentary and perception and short on conceptual analysis, and [John] Rae is no exception."
Who the heck was John Rae? The Scottish journalist was a key figure in originating the lump of labor myth, as it pertains to shorter working time. He didn't use the term lump of labor but instead decried the
"gross but evidently very seductive economic fallacy, which leads so many persons to think that they will all increase the wealth they individually enjoy by all diminishing the wealth they individually produce..."Rae's argument was not that shorter hours of work diminished per capita output. On the contrary, Rae argued that shorter work time could not relieve unemployment because it would increase output per worker and thus obviate the need to hire more workers.
Intuitively, Rae's reasoning may seem persuasive until one realizes that Rae is assuming that the increased productivity will have no effect on cost, price, purchasing power of the workers or effective demand. An American economist, Charles Beardsley made short shrift of Rae's conclusions.
Nevertheless, Rae's rhetorical riposte to shorter hours as a remedy to unemployment got incorporated into employer objections to the eight-hour demand of unions while his empirical observations about productivity were noted by Sydney Chapman. The irony being that the 'dead' rhetorical part of his analysis has survived, handed down from textbook lore to blackboard dogma, while the 'living' empirical part has perished from the memory of mainstream economists!
So I was delighted to come across the following discussion by Aaron Fuller (2003) of Rae's characteristic "shotgun" style as deployed on another topic, Henry George's economics.
Rae's three-part critical examination of George's ideas is presented much like a set of "even-if" arguments encountered in the formal argumentation of a legal brief. He first rejects George's ideas because they are inconsistent with the empirical evidence—poverty is not increasing with progress. But, he contended, even if poverty were increasing, a second reason to reject George's ideas, independent of the empirical evidence, is George's alleged theoretical error and confusion. Finally, he maintained that even if the empirical evidence and the analytical arguments were on George's side, a third independent reason to reject George is that his solutions to the problems he identifies are either incorrect or inadequate. Such a scattered array of independent arguments is sometimes called the "shotgun" approach to argumentation. Potentially deadly at the close quarters of journalistic and legal persuasion where the form of the argument may be more important than its contents, it is less effective at the longer range of analytical scholarship where logical and factual consistency weigh more heavily than persuasiveness. Rae's journalistic shotgun approach to criticism, composed of scattered independent arguments, did little serious analytical damage to George's analyses. But serious analytical damage may not have been Rae's intent; instead, he may have been trying to persuade his readers that George was a dangerous agitator who, like the socialists discussed elsewhere in Contemporary Socialism, threatened to disrupt British institutions.
Fears of Inflation
Jack Healy reports on the current lack of inflation:
One would not expect inflation given the enormous slack in this economy even with a significant fiscal stimulus which of course has yet to eliminate this slack. And why is Mickey Levy trying to tell us we have a very large long-run inflation problem? I just checked here for the Federal Reserve’s most recent reporting on nominal and real interest rates on 20-year government bonds. The former is 4.37% and the latter is 2.24%. So the market is expecting a long-term inflation rate around 2%. That’s a very large problem?
Consumer prices in the United States did not budge last month, easing, for now, concerns that the record deficit and huge new government spending would spur inflation. “It could be a very large long-run problem,” said Mickey Levy, Bank of America, chief economist. “But in the near-term, it’s not a problem at all.” The drift in prices suggests that enormous slack remains in the American economy, even as the recession bottoms out and some industries jump-start production. There are 14.5 million unemployed people in the United States, retail sales are sluggish, and many businesses and factories are still running at less than full capacity. The Labor Department reported on Friday that its consumer price index was unchanged from June on a seasonally adjusted basis, and that prices this summer were 2.1 percent lower than last July, when soaring oil costs drove gasoline prices to $4 a gallon and lifted the cost of food and other products.
One would not expect inflation given the enormous slack in this economy even with a significant fiscal stimulus which of course has yet to eliminate this slack. And why is Mickey Levy trying to tell us we have a very large long-run inflation problem? I just checked here for the Federal Reserve’s most recent reporting on nominal and real interest rates on 20-year government bonds. The former is 4.37% and the latter is 2.24%. So the market is expecting a long-term inflation rate around 2%. That’s a very large problem?
To V or Not to V? Is That the Question?
by the Sandwichman
The Sandwichman is not 'optimistic' about a 'V' shaped recession. Ultimately the economy is not a numbers game. The numbers are epiphenomena. That is to say secondary symptoms, mere concomitants. Divining numbers from numbers is a fool's pass time.
The policy responses to the recession so far have not addressed the fundamental imbalance in the economy, which is the concentration of income shares and market power at the top of the pyramid.
Debt can be useful for pump-priming to the extent that it makes available in the present purchasing power that is expected to materialize in the future. But to the extent that a more prosperous future fails to materialize, accumulated debt becomes a drag on present consumption. The humus of broken promises leaves a barren soil for sowing new ones.
The homeostatic key to re-balancing incomes, consumption and labor supply is, in a word, leisure. Leisure is distinct from idleness in that it is valued free time. Unemployment is not leisure because no unemployed person would pay to stay unemployed longer.
The distinctive property of leisure as leisure that distinguishes it from ('other') commodities is that you cannot hoard it or accumulate it beyond the 24-hour per day per person allotment. This also explains why capital is jealous of leisure.
The depreciation of leisure that underpins the current economic crisis has been of long duration. We are looking at about a half a century of log jam. Even if there is one last band-aid in the first aid kit, it won't measure up to the bleeding.
'V' my ass.
The Sandwichman is not 'optimistic' about a 'V' shaped recession. Ultimately the economy is not a numbers game. The numbers are epiphenomena. That is to say secondary symptoms, mere concomitants. Divining numbers from numbers is a fool's pass time.
The policy responses to the recession so far have not addressed the fundamental imbalance in the economy, which is the concentration of income shares and market power at the top of the pyramid.
Debt can be useful for pump-priming to the extent that it makes available in the present purchasing power that is expected to materialize in the future. But to the extent that a more prosperous future fails to materialize, accumulated debt becomes a drag on present consumption. The humus of broken promises leaves a barren soil for sowing new ones.
The homeostatic key to re-balancing incomes, consumption and labor supply is, in a word, leisure. Leisure is distinct from idleness in that it is valued free time. Unemployment is not leisure because no unemployed person would pay to stay unemployed longer.
The distinctive property of leisure as leisure that distinguishes it from ('other') commodities is that you cannot hoard it or accumulate it beyond the 24-hour per day per person allotment. This also explains why capital is jealous of leisure.
The depreciation of leisure that underpins the current economic crisis has been of long duration. We are looking at about a half a century of log jam. Even if there is one last band-aid in the first aid kit, it won't measure up to the bleeding.
'V' my ass.
Thursday, August 13, 2009
Will Dr. V Bounceback (Jim Morley) Prove Right?
I am increasingly of the more optimistic view that we may see a strong recovery of GDP growth in the near future in the US, if not a full V, then a U with a short bottom followed by a strong upswing. I am not usually a fan of WSJ polls of forecasters, but most of them are looking for at least a sort of V, see Menzie Chinn at http://www.econbrowser.com for link and discussion, including about debt ratios and implied multipliers.
I do not have a link, but did see recently that the much-less closely followed Case-Shiller index of housing price-to-rent ratios has now returned to long-term historical averages (partly driven by rising rents, ugh). Thus I think we have hit bottom on housing prices in the US, despite the likely continued pressure from more foreclosures to come. I do think Morley's inventory adjustment mechanism will be weaker now than in the past, and consumers will be saving more, thus weakening the multipliers, but there will be some of this inventory adjustment effect that bounces back more from deeper falls. More important to me is that the main mass of the spending fiscal stimulus (and not just in the US but elsewhere, with some other countries also showing signs of turning around) is yet to hit, with only about 10% of it out there (that figure including the weak tax cuts). The main spending stimulus will come next year, which should help put the boost in if the economy really does turn around.
I do not have a link, but did see recently that the much-less closely followed Case-Shiller index of housing price-to-rent ratios has now returned to long-term historical averages (partly driven by rising rents, ugh). Thus I think we have hit bottom on housing prices in the US, despite the likely continued pressure from more foreclosures to come. I do think Morley's inventory adjustment mechanism will be weaker now than in the past, and consumers will be saving more, thus weakening the multipliers, but there will be some of this inventory adjustment effect that bounces back more from deeper falls. More important to me is that the main mass of the spending fiscal stimulus (and not just in the US but elsewhere, with some other countries also showing signs of turning around) is yet to hit, with only about 10% of it out there (that figure including the weak tax cuts). The main spending stimulus will come next year, which should help put the boost in if the economy really does turn around.
Further Decline of Economic Blogging?
I note that Brad Setser has announced that he will no longer be blogging. This is not due to disillusionment with blogging, but his taking a job with the National Economic Council. Nevertheless, this is a loss as he has had the best coverage of a variety of international financial issues, especially regarding reserve balances and China, since he started initially five years ago while still working with Nouriel Roubini. He will be missed.
Another that I suspect may be a disillusionment has been the lack of any postings since June 18 at the high quality http://rodrik.typepad.com, where he has at times in the past questioned whether blogging is a good use of time for a top flight academic economist. Perhaps he has decided not for himself, although without getting around to telling all of us, or maybe he is just on vacation or very busy.
Another that I suspect may be a disillusionment has been the lack of any postings since June 18 at the high quality http://rodrik.typepad.com, where he has at times in the past questioned whether blogging is a good use of time for a top flight academic economist. Perhaps he has decided not for himself, although without getting around to telling all of us, or maybe he is just on vacation or very busy.
Why Deficits Have Not Increased Interest Rates: Brad DeLong Makes Me Go Huh?
Brad DeLong makes an interesting observation:
If Brad wanted to mock the standard new classical belief that we are always near full employment so any significant fiscal stimulus would drive up interest rates, this observation would be a nice rebuttal along the lines of the old fashion Keynesian notions that we are both below full employment and are in a liquidity trap. But what he writes seems to combine two very different propositions as if they were the same thing:
If all of the fiscal stimulus had been in the form of tax cuts (what the Republicans advocated), Ricardian equivalence would hold that none of it would have been consumed, which would mean no outward shift of the IS curve. Of course, interest rates did not increase as the national savings schedule was unaffected. That what the first sentence in this passage says - but then the last sentence does something else. It talks about what would happen if fiscal policy did lower the national savings schedule and hence shift out the IS curve under new classical thinking.
To be fair, much of the Obama fiscal stimulus was in the form of higher government purchases (note some of us wanted all of it in the form of higher purchases) which would shift outward the IS curve. That this occurred with no increase in interest rates strikes me as evidence that we are both below full employment and are in a liquidity trap. I suspect this is what Brad is trying to say here.
it is astonishing. Between last summer and the end of this year the U.S. Treasury will expand its marketable debt liabilities by $2.5 trillion--an amount equal to more than 20% of all equities in America, an amount equal to 8% of all traded dollar-denominated securities. And yet the market has swallowed it all without a burp
If Brad wanted to mock the standard new classical belief that we are always near full employment so any significant fiscal stimulus would drive up interest rates, this observation would be a nice rebuttal along the lines of the old fashion Keynesian notions that we are both below full employment and are in a liquidity trap. But what he writes seems to combine two very different propositions as if they were the same thing:
The standard Chicago "Ricardian equivalence" argument is that government deficits have no effect on nominal aggregate demand because private savings rise dollar-for-dollar with the government's deficit. The magnitude of the tax cuts associated with the stimulus package are running at about $25 billion per quarter--an extremely small share of the rise in Treasury borrowings. Otherwise, Chicago says, supply-and-demand are supposed to rule--and a sharp increase in Treasury borrowings is supposed to carry a sharp increase in interest rates along with it to crowd out other forms of interest sensitive spending.
If all of the fiscal stimulus had been in the form of tax cuts (what the Republicans advocated), Ricardian equivalence would hold that none of it would have been consumed, which would mean no outward shift of the IS curve. Of course, interest rates did not increase as the national savings schedule was unaffected. That what the first sentence in this passage says - but then the last sentence does something else. It talks about what would happen if fiscal policy did lower the national savings schedule and hence shift out the IS curve under new classical thinking.
To be fair, much of the Obama fiscal stimulus was in the form of higher government purchases (note some of us wanted all of it in the form of higher purchases) which would shift outward the IS curve. That this occurred with no increase in interest rates strikes me as evidence that we are both below full employment and are in a liquidity trap. I suspect this is what Brad is trying to say here.
Hours of Labour 10
by Sydney J. Chapman (translated and condensed by the Sandwichman)
It would seem, therefore, that at least two reasons can be derived from economic theory for state intervention in the matter of the hours of labor, if it is assumed that the state can discover what is best for the country. One is to correct the tendency of people engaged in industry to agree upon an amount of sacrifice to money-making, which means a large future loss, involving the next generation, for a small present gain; the other is to fortify, if needful, the resistance of workers to the disposition of some employers to secure a greater product at the expense of the workers' convenience. This conclusion would, however, be too hasty a deduction.
Economic matters are settled, not merely by the self-regarding forces that we have hitherto emphasized, but also by social conceptions, embodied in public opinion and class notions of what is right and proper that defy expert analysis and any accurate evaluation as influences. These social conceptions, which are not deliberately framed on a rationalistic basis, but proceed insensibly as it were from the needs of human life, are less intermixed with religious elements now than they used to be, but are none the less powerful. Resting on the seventh day is not at present a religious observance to the extent it was in the past, but it has not universally been found necessary to supplement the declining religious sanction with a legal sanction. How far progress that runs counter to tendencies determined solely by self-regarding forces may be left to the operation of these incalculable motives that sway every community can be settled only by careful observation. It is sufficient now to recognize their existence, and to point to the reductions of the hours of labor in recent years.
I do not propose to consider here the merits of legislation for establishing standards for the hours of labor, except to observe, first, that Government interference aimed at securing reasonable hours for adult males in all the diversified industries of a country would entail elaborate, elastic, and frequent legislation and would no doubt be accompanied by many grave errors; and secondly, that a prima facie case can be made out for the regulation of the hours even of adult males by authoritative boards or by statute, when labor is weakly combined and hours are evidently sweated hours, and evidence is forthcoming that they are detrimental to health or vigor. Nor do I propose to consider whether it might not be better to suffer for a time present ills in the hope that there would grow up in the community an adequate power of self-regulation, possibly accompanied by valuable social consequences that otherwise might never have been elicited. I am hopeful that public opinion, directed by economic and ethical enlightenment will in the future become an increasingly effective factor in progress, apart from its expression in law. Even to-day, in view of the dependence of producers on demand, neither employers nor trade unions can afford to brave for long public sentiment, though unorganized, when it is aroused. Public sentiment in the years ahead may be expected to respond more sensitively to incidents in its surroundings that offend against social conceptions of what is right and proper. The cases of children, young persons, and women, which bring in special considerations, must be ruled off from the subject matter of this address.
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It would seem, therefore, that at least two reasons can be derived from economic theory for state intervention in the matter of the hours of labor, if it is assumed that the state can discover what is best for the country. One is to correct the tendency of people engaged in industry to agree upon an amount of sacrifice to money-making, which means a large future loss, involving the next generation, for a small present gain; the other is to fortify, if needful, the resistance of workers to the disposition of some employers to secure a greater product at the expense of the workers' convenience. This conclusion would, however, be too hasty a deduction.
Economic matters are settled, not merely by the self-regarding forces that we have hitherto emphasized, but also by social conceptions, embodied in public opinion and class notions of what is right and proper that defy expert analysis and any accurate evaluation as influences. These social conceptions, which are not deliberately framed on a rationalistic basis, but proceed insensibly as it were from the needs of human life, are less intermixed with religious elements now than they used to be, but are none the less powerful. Resting on the seventh day is not at present a religious observance to the extent it was in the past, but it has not universally been found necessary to supplement the declining religious sanction with a legal sanction. How far progress that runs counter to tendencies determined solely by self-regarding forces may be left to the operation of these incalculable motives that sway every community can be settled only by careful observation. It is sufficient now to recognize their existence, and to point to the reductions of the hours of labor in recent years.
I do not propose to consider here the merits of legislation for establishing standards for the hours of labor, except to observe, first, that Government interference aimed at securing reasonable hours for adult males in all the diversified industries of a country would entail elaborate, elastic, and frequent legislation and would no doubt be accompanied by many grave errors; and secondly, that a prima facie case can be made out for the regulation of the hours even of adult males by authoritative boards or by statute, when labor is weakly combined and hours are evidently sweated hours, and evidence is forthcoming that they are detrimental to health or vigor. Nor do I propose to consider whether it might not be better to suffer for a time present ills in the hope that there would grow up in the community an adequate power of self-regulation, possibly accompanied by valuable social consequences that otherwise might never have been elicited. I am hopeful that public opinion, directed by economic and ethical enlightenment will in the future become an increasingly effective factor in progress, apart from its expression in law. Even to-day, in view of the dependence of producers on demand, neither employers nor trade unions can afford to brave for long public sentiment, though unorganized, when it is aroused. Public sentiment in the years ahead may be expected to respond more sensitively to incidents in its surroundings that offend against social conceptions of what is right and proper. The cases of children, young persons, and women, which bring in special considerations, must be ruled off from the subject matter of this address.
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Wednesday, August 12, 2009
"Technological Unemployment" Redux
by the Sandwichman
A while ago, an anonymous commentator on this blog made the sage observation that the phrase "technological unemployment" is an unfortunate one and a distraction from the real issue -- "a feint to blame on technology what is simply a matter of economic policy."
The Sandwichman agreed with the point but was resigned to continue using the phrase. No longer. Last week in a Washington Post op-ed, Gregory Clark demonstrated the utter infelicity of the idea behind the phrase. In Clark's fevered imagination, robots were on the brink of permanently displacing human labor of the more ordinary sort and the only solution was to increase taxes on the "winners" to support the "losers".
In this case, the Sandwichman upholds the objection. Clark commits the fallacy! Perhaps he got his future scenario from the Flight of the Conchords send up:
Technology doesn't destroy jobs. What technology does is make possible and make necessary either increased consumption, increased leisure or both. Unemployment results not from a quantity of jobs deficit but from an adjustment deficit. Unemployment results, that is to say, from a failure to establish a new income, consumption and work time regime commensurate with the new production potential offered by the technological advance.
Furthermore, adjustment is no more "automatic" than is technological change. Hello? Has anyone ever heard of "patents"? Or of government financial subsidies to research and development. On the contrary, adjustment should be considered an inherent part of the reciprocal process of technological innovation. Why it is not treated as such by so-called economists is a question 26,000,000 unemployed and underemployed Americans deserve an answer to.
A while ago, an anonymous commentator on this blog made the sage observation that the phrase "technological unemployment" is an unfortunate one and a distraction from the real issue -- "a feint to blame on technology what is simply a matter of economic policy."
The Sandwichman agreed with the point but was resigned to continue using the phrase. No longer. Last week in a Washington Post op-ed, Gregory Clark demonstrated the utter infelicity of the idea behind the phrase. In Clark's fevered imagination, robots were on the brink of permanently displacing human labor of the more ordinary sort and the only solution was to increase taxes on the "winners" to support the "losers".
So, how do we operate a society in which a large share of the population is socially needy but economically redundant? There is only one answer. You tax the winners ... to provide for the losers.Clark's dystopian musings evoked a colossal harrumph from the usual free marketeer suspects such as Will Wilkinson and Tim Worstall, including the charge that Clark committed a lump of labor fallacy.
In this case, the Sandwichman upholds the objection. Clark commits the fallacy! Perhaps he got his future scenario from the Flight of the Conchords send up:
The distant future, the year 2000...O.K., let's reboot this untechnological unemployment misnomer.
The future is quite different to the present.
Yes, what with there being no more stairs and all.
And most importantly, no more humans.
Finally, robotic beings rule the world.
The humans are dead,
The humans are dead.
We used poisonous gases
And we poisoned their asses.
The humans are dead.
(Yes they are dead.)
The humans are dead.
(I confirm they are dead.)
It had to be done
(They look like they`re dead)
Technology doesn't destroy jobs. What technology does is make possible and make necessary either increased consumption, increased leisure or both. Unemployment results not from a quantity of jobs deficit but from an adjustment deficit. Unemployment results, that is to say, from a failure to establish a new income, consumption and work time regime commensurate with the new production potential offered by the technological advance.
Furthermore, adjustment is no more "automatic" than is technological change. Hello? Has anyone ever heard of "patents"? Or of government financial subsidies to research and development. On the contrary, adjustment should be considered an inherent part of the reciprocal process of technological innovation. Why it is not treated as such by so-called economists is a question 26,000,000 unemployed and underemployed Americans deserve an answer to.
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