One Quibble with Brad DeLong’s Platform for the Bipartisan Technocrats

Let me endorse almost all of Brad’s platform for the bipartisan technocrats which is what he says Robert Rubin should be saying. It is classic Rubinomics endorsing long-term fiscal restraint with short-term fiscal stimulus:

Recovery: when every fired local, state, and federal worker takes a private sector job down as well and when the U.S. government can borrow at today's absurdly-low terms, it is criminal stupidity not to pull government spending forward into the present and push taxes back into the future (all within the ten-year PAYGO rule, of course). Since the macroeconomic situation is worse now than it was ever projected to get when the first Recovery Act was passed and since the U.S. government can borrow on better terms now than it could at the time of the first Recovery Act, it is time for a second Recovery Act--fifty percent federal government purchases and aid to the states, fifty percent tax cuts--somewhat larger than the first was.

Accelerating government purchases is a no-brainer (except to those political fools who govern us by saying “no” to anything that comes from the Obama White House). Federal revenue sharing is another no-brainer.

My quibble is with Brad’s suggestion that half of the 2nd Recovery Act should be half from tax cuts. Why? Well in the standard Keynesian model, the impact effect from a dollar of tax cuts is dampened by the marginal propensity to consume as at least some of the tax cut is saved even by borrowing constrained households. For households that are not borrowing constrained, pushing taxes back has no effect on consumption demand today. In other words, the more of the supposed fiscal stimulus that comes from tax cuts – the less bang for the buck we get. Was not this one of the problems with the first Recovery Act?

Alfred Nobel's Family Disassociates Itself from the Nobel Prize for Conventional Economics

http://rwer.wordpress.com/2010/10/22/the-nobel-family-dissociates-itself-from-the-economics-prize/

Does The 1920-21 Recession Really Prove That Laissez Faire Saves Us From Recessions?

A major meme among those championing a "do nothing" policy in the face of the recession since 2008 has been how short, if sharp, the 1920-21 recession was. We hear from various sources that prices and wages were flexible, and that President Harding did nothing, with the economy just magically bouncing back all on its own. In contrast, Herbert Hoover is blamed by this crowd for having big business and labor leaders getting together in 1929 to hold the line on wages, thus supposedly bringing about the Great Depression. The problem with all this is that the story about what happened in 1920-21 is largely wrong.

It was indeed an odd recession, with 1920 being the year of maximum demobilization of troops from WW I putting pressure on the labor market, and with a series of inventory adjustments from the end of the war also hitting. This led to the largest one year decline in the price level in US history, somewhere between 13 and 18%, depending on one's source. But in contrast to the story that gets handed out, there was no comparable decline in wages, according to the one source I could find, the National Industrial Conference Board. Wages rose slightly, and did so again in 1921, the worst year of the recession, when the unemployment rate peaked in July of that year. It is true that finally in 1922, wages fell by 8% before returning to rising in the following year, but the turnaround had come already in late 1921.

Now it is true that there was no stimulus from fiscal policy to pull the economy up, this part of the story about Harding being true. As nominal GDP declined from $88.4 billion in 1920 to $73.6 billion in 1921 and then $73.4 billion in 1922 (but real GDP rising in that year as deflation continued), federal spending declined from $11.4 billion in 1920 to $10.5 billion in 1921 and $9.3 billion in 1922.

However, there was another element at work, largely ignored by those touting the policies of Harding in all this, monetary policy. Indeed, Friedman and Schwartz were critical of what went on at that time, ascribing it to inexperience on the part of the Fed policymakers, who had only gotten their operation going in 1913. So, the Fed started raising its discount rate in late 1919, with it reaching 7% in June, 1920, this a year of major deflation. Big surprise the economy tanked. They started changing course in July, 1921 the month of the highest unemployment rate, lowering by a half point per month until it reached 4.5% in November, 1921. So, Harding may not have had a stimulative fiscal policy, but he certainly was in office when the Fed responded with a stimulative monetary policy, which played a key role in ending this recession, one in which real wages had soared rather than declining as the price level plunged, in contrast to the stories being spread about now.

Understanding Excess Supply (The Non-Algebraic Version), Round Two

Nick Rowe, over at Worthwhile Canadian Initiative, has offered an alternative explanation for excess supply. For the full treatment, see his blog, but the basic idea is this:

Suppose a firm faces a downward-sloping demand curve, as it would under monopolistic competition. (What makes it competitive is that the lack of barriers to entry and exit brings long run economic profits to zero, but that isn’t important here.) The firm sets output where MR=MC, going up to the demand curve to peg the price. At this price, since the firm makes a margin above MC, it would willingly sell additional units if it turns out there are more buyers than it had initially forecasted. This eagerness to sell more “will look very much like excess supply”, according to Nick.

What say I?

1. First, much depends on what we mean by excess supply. I understand this in the ex post sense that, when forecasts are replaced by what actually transpires, most firms are producing at price-quantity points that are not validated by actual quantities demanded. To put it differently, the pricing decisions of such firms, which would have maximized immediate profits (margin times units sold) at a more rightward-situated demand curve, are less-than-maximizing at the demand curve that actually materializes. Excess supply is not just a matter of sellers wanting to sell more; it is oversupply, as demonstrated by the existence of price-quantity alternatives that would have been chosen if the firm had known with certainty what its demand curve was going to be and had priced/produced for that demand curve. To put it a third way, uncertainty about the position of its demand curve can cause a firm to err in either of two directions: it can base its decisions on a demand curve that proves to be to the left of the true curve, or to the right of it. Systematic excess supply says that firms predominately make the second sort of choice. That’s how I would frame the problem: how do we explain this bias, so clearly visible in the real world?

2. Nick’s downward-sloping D solution, off the bat, raises the issue of monopoly itself. The pure monopolist is in Nick’s position, setting a profit-maximizing price and then hoping that an unexpected bounty of consumers materializes. This in turn implies that pure monopoly is effectively a situation of excess supply, even though it is commonly viewed as generating supply restriction relative to perfect competition. I don’t want to use a definition of excess supply for which pure monopoly is the prime exemplar.

3. Another issue is that, to generate its appearance of excess supply, the model constrains a firm facing a downward-sloping demand curve to alter its supply at more frequent intervals than its price. This strikes me as, at best, arbitrary. If pricing and output choices are simultaneous, the appearance of excess supply vanishes from the model.

4. If we were to compare the downward-sloping demand curve hypothesis to my consumer-satisficing alternative, an interesting prediction would be that excess supply would be more prevalent in a more competitive economy in my model and in a more monopolized one in Nick’s. (If consumers face fewer alternative sellers, the force of satisficing in generating repeat sales would be weaker.)

5. In my original post, I did not actually address the pricing side of the firm’s decision, only the output. As it happens, I think pricing is a lot more complex than economics usually portrays it. My limited knowledge of the marketing literature tells me that there are many pricing models to choose from, depending on circumstances and market strategy. There are times when the best idea is to price as low as possible, subject to a cash flow constraint, in order to prioritize market share. There are times when you want to price fully to market, maximizing net revenues myopically, since you are in a late stage of your product’s life cycle. And there are the majority of situations that lie between these extremes. I don’t know what a general theory of pricing would look like, but I know I don’t want to be tied to a mechanistic formula based on MC, MR and D, the first two of which are not often calculated in practice. (How many firms do activity-based accounting?)

Constant Capital and the Crisis in Contemporary Capitalism: Echoes from the Late Nineteenth Century

"Constant Capital and the Crisis in Contemporary Capitalism: Echoes from the Late Nineteenth Century" looks at the current crisis in light of how economists showed a superior understanding of the way the economy worked during the late nineteenth century.

http://users.ntua.gr/jea/tua/journl/jea_volume1_issue1_pp34_41.pdf

Comments would be very much appreciated.

An Open Letter to the President

This letter was sent to the President, who failed to heed the warning, which turned out to be correct.

"You have made yourself the Trustee for those in every country who seek to mend the evils of our condition by reasoned experiment within the framework of the existing social system. If you fail, rational change will be gravely prejudiced throughout the world, leaving orthodoxy and revolution to fight it out. But if you succeed, new and bolder methods will be tried everywhere, and we may date the first chapter of a new economic era from your accession to office."

I wish I had the foresight to have written this letter, but it was sent to the new president in 1933. The author was John Maynard Keynes. Although the letter is old, it is absolutely on target in predicting, "If you fail, rational change will be gravely prejudiced throughout the world."

Wake up Obama before you do more damage by imagining that cooperation with the Right rather than leadership is the way forward.

http://newdeal.feri.org/misc/keynes2.htm

By the way, in 1938 Keynes also warned the president that because of the 1937 austerity, "the present slump could have been predicted with absolute certainty."

Brad DeLong reprinted that letter.

http://delong.typepad.com/egregious_moderation/2008/12/john-maynard-ke.html

Understanding Excess Supply (The Non-Algebraic Version)

I have just taught the theory of the supply curve at the principles level for the umpteenth time, and my conscience is in open rebellion. This business with the horizontal demand curve and setting supply equal to marginal costs is simply rubbish; it denies some of the most important, and obvious, facts about how capitalism actually works.

At the level of an individual firm, the theory obscures what ought to be the starting point for analysis—that in a capitalist economy the normal state of affairs is that firms set production at a level that requires them to chase consumers any way they can, and that the usual result is that some offerings go unsold. Across the entire economy the level of activity is nearly always demand-constrained, not supply-constrained.

Consider the relationship between buyers and sellers at the level of individual enterprises. From observers like Alec Nove and Janos Kornai, we have come to recognize that the prevalence of buyers’ markets is what distinguishes capitalism; in the state-managed systems of pre-1989 socialism, the seller was king. This suggests that excess supply is the most likely state of affairs, excess demand the least likely. An exact equality between demand and supply at the market-determined price is essentially impossible.

Of course, demand is not determinant. It is best represented as a subjective frequency distribution, to which sellers would adjust their production plans. Suppose, to keep things simple, this is a normal distribution. (I don’t think this assumption changes anything important.) Suppose also that marginal costs are symmetric around the mean of expected demand—that the increase of MC for one unit more is equal to its decrease for one unit less. This equalizes the direct financial cost of over- and underproduction, another convenience for our analysis. (If MC increases at an increasing rate, incidentally, this would be a reason for a bias toward underproduction, and therefore excess demand, ceteris paribus; so it’s not the answer we’re looking for.) Now let the seller maximize profit by making an ex ante decision about how much to supply for this uncertain demand.

What we would expect to see is an equal incidence of ex post excess demand and excess supply. But this is not how it is.

Let’s add a couple of new elements: first, suppose that consumers are not utility maximizers, gathering all information about product quality, prices and suppliers costlessly and then making the optimal purchase, but satisficers. They have benchmark price and quality points, and they select the first seller who meets them. Second, consider a sequential model where, in each period, consumers begin their search with the seller they transacted with in the previous period, so, if the seller continues to meet the buyers’ price and quality points, the customer is still theirs. This fits with the literature in marketing, which stresses that a sale should always be seen as the opening to future sales and therefore worth a much greater investment than it would justify from a myopic perspective.

This new element has the effect of biasing the seller’s choice of a production level: it is more expensive to lose out on a sale than to produce or stock an extra item for which there is no ex post demand. Producers in general set their output to the right of the mean of expected demand, and excess supply is the norm.

This is not quite eureka. It works for the special case of constant variable costs, but there is more work to do to incorporate upward-sloping MC and the effect that raising the selling price (due to being further out on the MC curve) has on the proportion of consumers (whose price benchmarks are also stochastic) who will continue to satisfice. What we get, in the end, is a case for generalized excess supply that depends on the relationship between the parameters governing the two forms of uncertainty—the size of the market (the number of desired purchases) and the market share for any single firm (the proportion of buyers who regard a particular selling price as acceptable)—as well as the seller’s marginal cost structure. For further complication one can also relax the assumption that buyers always return if their satisficing conditions are met; this probability could also be governed by a parameter. (Note that one useful result of this model is that it relaxes the so-called law of one price in a way that is consistent with real-world data.)

Such a model would provide microfoundations for demand-constrained macroeconomics. Working this out is of less interest to me, but it should be clear that there is a certain amount of equilibrium slack in such a system. What would the dynamics look like, however? Would chronic excess-suppliers of this sort respond differently to aggregate demand shocks, compared to the Walrasian firms that populate existing general equilibrium models?

During the next two years economists (at least those in the US) will be freed from having to think about policy and can shift their attention to the theoretical foundations of their discipline.

One Person's Green Infrastructure Is Another's "High Speed Pork"

"High Speed Pork" is the heading on a column in yesterday's WaPo by the non-economist economics commentator Robert J. Samuelson, who is not related to Paul A. Samuelson or even the game theorist Larry Samuelson. He has decided that high speed rail projects in the US are not worth the money and should be cancelled. Drawing on a Congressional Research Service study, he argues that even the most beneficial of the 12 under consideration, between LA and SF in CA, is not worth it in terms of diverting either air or auto traffic, with the real problem of auto traffic being commuting, according to him, although it occurs to me that in the future such lines might also be used for freight, thus possibly taking some of the burden of trucking. He also argues that the green externalities are trivial, and that the only foreign lines making money are Tokyo-Osaka and Paris-Lyon.

My guess is that overly high discount rates are being used for these calculations. I see many other countries building these, including China and into areas not all that heavily populated, and I see oil prices and externality costs rising in the future. I think investing in these projects is a good idea for the long term, with the US behaving abysmally shortsightedly on these matters, egged on by bozo RJS.

At a personal level an old friend of mine in Wisconsin has been heading up the effort to build these there for a long time, starting under Republican Governor Tommy Thompson and going through the past 8 years of Dem Governor Jim Doyle. A likely outcome of today's election is that all this is going to go down to waste as the likely GOP winner, Scott Walker, has declared his total opposition to these projects. So, adios to this, although they did manage to get a line built between Chicago and Milwaukee. But I fear a lot more of this cancelling in the future is going to go down in the next couple of years as a result of today's election.

Why Capitalism Cannot be Tamed

A little more than a year ago, I posted a note using football as a metaphor for the futility of effective regulation.

http://michaelperelman.wordpress.com/2009/09/13/the-futility-of-financial-regulation-lessons-from-science-and-professional-football/

Some people dismissed the football metaphor. The Wall Street Journal today has a story about how people design new psychotropic drugs to get around regulation. It may be that these new drugs are more dangerous than banned drugs. In all likelihood, they can design these drugs faster than the government can make regulations.

How in the world can regulators get ahead of financial industry or tax lawyers, even if the lobbyists were not writing the regulations or the tax codes.


Whalen, Jeanne. 2010. "In Quest for 'Legal High,' Chemists Outfox Law." Wall Street Journal (30 October).
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704763904575550200845267526.html?mod=WSJ_World_LeadStory

This Is What Accounting Identities Look Like

I have been periodically raging against the ignorance of those who would slash fiscal deficits without regard to fundamental accounting identities. Such “serious” people somehow think that public and private debt levels can be lowered simultaneously, without a substitution of foreign assets in domestic portfolios (a current account surplus). It does not occur to them that one person’s debt is another’s asset—too confusing, I guess.

What this means is that, if the private sector is collectively paying down its debts, and the government tries to pare its deficits at the same time, either there is an increase in net exports to finance all of this, or it just doesn’t happen. That’s how it is with identities. Unlike other kinds of rules, they are not made to be broken.

Which brings us to this morning’s news about public finances in Europe: despite the earnest efforts of the austerians, fiscal deficits are not declining. Rather, tax receipts are going down, so that the ex post identities remain in force. As long as the private sector continues to deleverage, further efforts to produce “responsible” fiscal deficits will just lead to lower tax revenues and further spending cuts, in a downward spiral of pointless misery.

It reminds me of a bumper sticker that was popular a few decades ago: “Gravity. Not just a good idea—it’s the law.”

You Wouldn’t Know that Banking Is a Business

I was glumly reading this morning’s New York Times article about Spain, where bankruptcy law holds borrowers fully liable for their outstanding mortgage principle (plus interest and legal costs) even after their properties are foreclosed, when I came across this striking paragraph:

Several opposition parties in Parliament have been pressing for amendments to the country’s foreclosure laws, including letting mortgage defaulters settle their debts with the bank by turning over the property. But the government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero has opposed such a major change in lending practices. Government officials say Spain’s system of personal guarantees saved its banks from the turmoil seen in the United States.

So like the US, where Obama has refused to impose a foreclosure moratorium, despite massive fraud, in order to shore up the banking system. After all, we need these banks to remain sound and solvent if we are to emerge from the financial crisis, right?

Just one thing, though: aren’t the banks private, profit-making businesses? What is the implication for the rational allocation of resources, not to mention social justice, of ginning the rules so that one industry can enjoy greater profits at the expense of everyone else? And we’re not talking about struggling startups here: financial profits have simply metastasized in the 00s, driving income inequality and rewarding the very activities that put modern economies at extreme risk.

If banks truly are public utilities, providing an indispensable service that requires frequent infusions of public support—subsidies, bailouts, favorable regulatory dispensations—they should be publicly owned. No risk, no profit.

Deleterious Doodling About The Deficit: What Else Is New? Department

In today's Washington Post business section, Lori Montgomery has a big article on "A renewed focus on spending," starting with how the GOP is making noises about cutting spending to cut the deficit without raising taxes, while not mentioning anything too serious, although Boehner supposedly might be open to cutting some loopholes in the tax code, thereby de facto raising taxes, if Grover Norquist will let him (assuming as most think that the GOP will take control of the House after next week's election), and if anybody thinks elimination of the tax deduction for mortgage interest is remotely on the table in a period with a terrible housing market, there is a bridge in Brooklyn for sale to them. Then most of the article lugubriously goes on about all the efforts at supposed bipartisanship on the Deficit Commission.

Yet again, we read about all this agreement to "stabilize social security finances" by raising future retirement ages, because "The current Social Security program will not survive based on upon current rules." Well, beating a drum beaten often here, this latter is so much baloney. However, the rest of it is even worse. We get scare stories about the deficit of the last two years, when about half of this is due to the recession and the rapidly disappearing stimulus package, while the other half is due to the Bush tax cuts and increased defense spending due to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which will hopefully wind down in the not too distant future.

Raising future retirement ages does a great big doodley-squat nothing about any near term deficit, although Lori Montgomery and other reporters somehow fail to point this out in their so-called reporting. So, we suffer from an ongoing deterioration of discourse on this subject as the same old groups and politicians push the same old nonsense formuli for solving a problem that will hopefully mostly take care of itself, with almost no offsetting commentary, although undoing the tax cut part of the deficit is not going to happen if the GOP takes over the House.

French Pension “Reform” and the Life Expectancy Canard

Angela Doland reports on a bill passed by the French parliament:

France's parliament granted final approval Wednesday to a bill raising the retirement age from 60 to 62, a reform that has infuriated the country's powerful unions and touched off weeks of protests and strikes. The 336-233 vote in the National Assembly was a victory for conservative President Nicolas Sarkozy, who has stood firm despite the protests - a stance that has resulted in his lowest approval ratings since he took office in 2007 … Unions see retirement at 60 as a cornerstone of France's generous social benefit system, but the conservative government says the entire pension system is in jeopardy without the reform because French people now have longer lifespans - an average of nearly 85 years for women and 78 for men, according to newly released figures from statistics agency Insee.

I am not an expert on the French retirement benefits debate but this claim sounds like a canard that proponents of Social Security benefit cuts in the US have often made. If life expectancy is longer because fewer children die prematurely, then it has little to do with the solvency of any retirement benefit program. The issue at hand should be the remaining life expectancy when people reach age 60.

The url's for my videos

A friend asked if I would collect the urls for my videos. Here they are, beginning with the most recent.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8PsurH6pxQg

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6h9xpmM14BU

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3w6hRP6oiYE

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h8blnkRNq2A

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2hNt_qc-RvM

http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/8702391http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/8850114

The Ironies of the Commodity: My New Video

I just posted a new video regarding the ironies of the commodity, taking up from the respective analysis of Marx and Smith and the behavior of business.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8PsurH6pxQg