Former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin died at age 96 on Nov. 30, curiously just as the worst outbreak of demonstrations to happen in China since 1989 happened, probably now come to an end, as China both suppresses them, arresting some people based on phones and visual surveillance, as well as some loosening in certain locations of the zero covid policy. Jiang came to power initially in the immediate wake of Tienanman Square in 1989, reportedly pulled up the ranks by retired elders, the unofficial but powerful "Sitting Committee" of the Politburo. Someone with a record as a somewhat opportunistic technocrat, it was initially thought he would be weak, but he remained in power until 2002, and continued to hold the Chairmanship of the Military Commission until 2004, while somewhat weaker Hu Jintao had become General Secretary of the Party and also President.
Indeed, in his efforts to centralize power totally on himself, the networks of those linked to other powerful figures he needed to put down were probably more allied to Jiang than to Hu. If there was a serious alternative to Xi, it was probably Jiang more than Hu, although obviously Jiang had become very old and ill.
But his death does pose a difficult moment for Xi. Apparently the state funeral will be this coming Tuesday, Dec. 6. There has been a history of political trouble following the deaths of former leaders, with the Tienanman Square uprising following the death of former leader Hu Yubang. It is not that Jiang was all that liberal, indeed was probably less so than his successor, Hu. But many are indeed making unfavorable comparisons between him and Xi, with his regime being remembered for being more open and free and tied to the rest of the world, with China joining the WTO during his time, as well at the period experiencing solid and unbroken economic growth. China has become very isolated, even more so with the covid locdowns that have become the focus of recent demonstrations.
Probably Xi will be able to get through this without too much upheaval, especially with the demonstrations against the lockdowns apparently shut down. Nevertheless, it is reported that this funeral has many people talking more openly about unhappiness with the current regime.
Barkley Rosser
The memorial service has happened. Apparently Xi Jinping went out of his way to highly praise Jiang Zemin, giving a 51 minute address at the service, nearly the same amount of time that Jiang gave at the memorial service for Deng Xiaoping. Of course, Xi emphasized elements of Jiang's record that presaged what Xi has been doing, thus making the event into a way to reaffirm his own rule and policies.
ReplyDeleteOne outcome the NY Times noted is that this is really the end of the power of the retired group of leaders, often called "the Sitting Committee," especially given the humiliation of Hu Jintao and the removal of anybody associated with him from the top ranks of the Party. Hu also participated in the service for Jiang reportedly.
http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/chapters_preview/35/2iie2628.pdf
ReplyDeleteSeptember, 1998
Restoring Japan's Economic Growth
By Adam S. Posen
Fiscal Policy Works When It Is Tried
If the current Japanese stagnation is indeed the result of insufficient aggregate demand, what should be the policy response? Fiscal stimulus would appear to be called for, especially in a period following extended over-investment that has rendered monetary policy extremely weak. Yet the statement is often made that fiscal policy has already been tried and failed in Japan. Claims are made of variously 65 to 75 trillion yen spent in total stimulus efforts since 1991, even before the currently announced package. Both the Japanese experience of the late 1970s of public spending as a ''locomotive'' to little-lasting domestic benefit, and the worldwide praise for government austerity in the 1990s, have predisposed many observers to dismissing deficit spending as ineffective, if not wasteful. Could there really have been this much stimulus effort having so little effect?
The reality of Japanese fiscal policy in the 1990s is less mysterious and, ultimately, more disappointing. The actual amount injected into the economy by the Japanese government—through either public spending or tax reductions—was 23 trillion yen, about a third of the total amount announced. This limited quantity of total fiscal stimulus was disbursed in insufficiently sized and inefficiently administered doses, with the exception of the 1995 stimulus package. That package did result in solid growth in 1996, demonstrating that fiscal policy does work when it is tried. As on earlier occasions in the 1990s, however, the positive response to fiscal stimulus was undercut by fiscal contraction in 1996 and 1997. On net, the Japanese fiscal stance in the 1990s was barely expansionary, and it is the net injection of stimulus into the economy that determines the minimum result. In fact, the repeated reversals of fiscal direction and revelations of gaps between announced and implemented policies make even this near-zero net injection an overstatement....
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/01/people-should-be-reading-adam-posen/
ReplyDeleteDecember 1, 2008
People Should be Reading Adam Posen
By Paul Krugman
Everyone's looking back to the 1930s for policy guidance — and that's a good thing. But we don't have to go back that far to see how fiscal policy works in a liquidity trap; Japan was there only a little while ago. And Adam Posen's book, * especially on, "Fiscal Policy Works When It Is Tried," is must reading right now.
* http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/chapters_preview/35/2iie2628.pdf
September, 1998
Restoring Japan's Economic Growth
By Adam S. Posen
https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/its-baaack-japans-slump-and-the-return-of-the-liquidity-trap/
ReplyDeleteJune, 1998
It's Baaack! Japan's Slump and the Return of the Liquidity Trap
By Paul Krugman
http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/jpage.html
ReplyDeleteDecember, 1999
A Special Page on Japan
By Paul Krugman
The state of Japan is a scandal, an outrage, a reproach. It is not, at least so far, a human disaster like Indonesia or Brazil. But Japan's economic malaise is uniquely gratuitous. Sixty years after Keynes, a great nation - a country with a stable and effective government, a massive net creditor, subject to none of the constraints that lesser economies face - is operating far below its productive capacity, simply because its consumers and investors do not spend enough. That should not happen; in allowing it to happen, and to continue year after year, Japan's economic officials have subtracted value from their nation and the world as a whole on a truly heroic scale.
The fault does not, however, lie merely with those officials. Japan has also been badly served by the economics profession, both in Japan and outside. The great majority of economists - including those who specialize in issues of economic stabilization and growth - seem oddly uninterested in Japan's plight, as if the failure of conventional macroeconomic policy in the world's second largest economy were a subject of merely parochial interest, with no lessons for the rest of us....
The comments were only because there might be interest, since the matter was raised. I do not wish to ever be a bother, and am sorry if this proves annoying. Do not hesitate to delete the comments, if annoying.
ReplyDeleteAnd now it is being reported that indeed China is engaging in a more substantial relaxation of its Covid restrictions.
ReplyDeleteThe proper response would of course have been "thank you."
ReplyDeleteThe Economist of Dec. 3 has an obituary at its end of Jiang Zemin. It contained something I had not known about previously. Apparently there is a position in the Chinese Communist Party whose English translated name is "core" or maybe that should be "Core." Apparently it is assigned by these Party Congresses.
ReplyDeleteAnyway, apparently Jiang Zemin held this position all through the entire ten year period that Hu Jintao was General Secretary of the Party and President of the nation, although Jiang held on to the position of Chair of the Military Commission for the first two years when Hu held those other two postions.
Not only that, but Jiang continued to hold this position for the first five years of Xi Jinping holding all three of those other positions. It was only during the 19th Party Congress in 2017 that finally Xi was given this position that had been held up to that point by the then-91 year old Jiang.