Friday, September 12, 2014

(Other things being elsewhere...) "It’s a ceteris paribus thing,"

Paul Krugman:
"It’s a ceteris paribus thing, just like supply and demand."
Hans Albert, "Model Platonism: Neoclassical economic thought in critical light."  Journal of Institutional Economics (2012):
"T. W. Hutchison... called attention to the significance of ceteris paribus clauses as a form of alibi..."
I'm eagerly awaiting the delivery from interlibrary loans of Hutchison's The Significance and Basic Postulates of Economic Theory (1938). I'm neither a philosopher of science nor an economic methodologist. It's just that I like to have a good idea of "the literature" before I barge in with my two cents worth.

But I am thinking that recognizing ceteris paribus as an "alibi" is very important. Let me explain: "alibi" means elsewhere but it doesn't necessarily specify where else. It could be anywhere else. To prove an alibi, one must present a convincing narrative that offers specifics. The catch-all ceteris paribus clause invoked by economists comes closer to the lame excuse sense of alibi. Alibi assumptions immunize hypotheses against critique and falsification by empirical evidence.

While awaiting Hutchison's book, an observation in a 1935 "Note on Tautologies and the Nature of Economic Theory" caught my attention. Hutchison didn't reject tautologies. They have a role to play in logic and "pure" theory. What Hutchison objected to was "certain claims for deductive theory which... appear excessive." Specifically, Hutchison cited "a failure to distinguish between implication and inference" as giving rise to such excessive claims:
"This distinction may be summed up by saying that implications take the form 'if p, then q', and inferences the form 'since p, therefore q'. The one shows formal connections, the other states conclusions about the real world. An inevitable implication is a tautology, and can, by its nature, no more prognosticate anything than can the multiplication table. An inference, on the other hand, requires some data to be known in order to establish a 'since'."
The IS-LM "ceteris paribus thing" is an "if p, then q" thing -- a tautology -- not a "since p, therefore q" thing. One cannot draw conclusions about the real world from it.

Thursday, September 11, 2014

London Sharks the Lump

Proof that economic journalists don't need to know any economics: Peter Coy is Bloomberg Businessweek's economics editor:
"Those who say that London sucks the vitality out of other cities are committing what economists call the lump-of-labor fallacy: that the amount of work to be done is fixed, so if one person gets a job then someone else is unemployed. The truth is that the rich young City traders everyone loves to hate are buying stuff made throughout the U.K."
Note to Mr. Coy: the real truth is that... according to the fallacy claim's implicit criteria, whatever anyone said about anything could be shown to be committing the lump-of-labor fallacy. You have committed the lump-of-labor fallacy by accusing others of committing the lump-of-labor fallacy!

Wednesday, September 10, 2014

Those fat monkeys

Because... Marat/Sade.
Those fat monkeys covered in banknotes
Have champagne and brandy on tap
They're up to their eyeballs in franc notes
We're up to our noses in crap
Those gorilla-mouthed fakers
Are longing to see us all rot
The gentry may lose a few acres
But we lose the little we've got
Revolution, it's more like a ruin
They're all stuffed with glorious food
They think about nothing but screwing
And we are the ones who get screwed

Durbin-Schumer Inversion Proposal

Bernie Becker reports on an interesting proposal in the Senate:
Schumer’s bill takes aim at a maneuver known as earnings stripping, a process by which U.S. subsidiaries can take tax deductions on interest stemming from loans from a foreign parent. The measure comes as Democrats continue to criticize companies, like Burger King, that have sought to shift their legal address abroad … Schumer’s bill would cut in half the amount of interest deduction that companies can claim, from 50 percent to 25 percent. It also seeks to limit companies that have already inverted from claiming the deduction in future years, requiring IRS on certain transactions between a foreign parent and U.S. company for a decade.
Had Walgreen decided to move its tax domicile to Switzerland, this proposal would limit the amount of income shifting that might take place after the inversion. But consider companies like Burger King and AbbVie. They are already sourcing the vast majority of their profits overseas. The reason that the effective tax rates are about 20 percent and not in the teens is that they have to pay taxes on repatriated earnings. An inversion would still eliminate the repatriation taxes and alas the horse has left the barn as far these two companies and their aggressive transfer pricing. The proposal is a very good one but Congress should still encourage the IRS to conduct transfer pricing reviews of what companies such as these have done in the past.

Supply Created its own Demon (other things being equal)

What Sandwichman learned on his summer vacation

Back in July, I had a 10,000 word draft addressing the question: why do defunct ideas persist? I was concerned with a specific complex of doctrines in economics that relate to the argument commonly known as Say's Law. My working hypothesis was that the doctrines made sense to those who propounded them because they rationalized and legitimated a repertoire of beliefs and behaviors, not necessarily because they were otherwise coherent, persuasive or empirically supported.

During the course of the series, the original ten or twelve posts have expanded to more than 30 and the word count has probably doubled. I'm not sure to what extent this material documents the "repertoire of beliefs and behaviors" underlying the rationalization. It has, however, probed deeper into the provenance and peculiarity of the doctrinal complex than I had anticipated. The paradoxical nature of the Say's Law - wages-fund -- lump-of-labor triad turns out to be even more convolutedly paradoxical than I had realized. Historically, the lump-of-labor was present at the creation -- of political arithmetic -- but in a more plausible form.

I chose von Kempelen's automaton chess player as the emblem for this series because it symbolizes the hoax, humbug and credulity pervasive in economic discourse on technology and employment. Even a hoax can generate genuine accomplishments. These days a machine can be programmed to simulate playing a game of chess. It can even win. But it still can't play.

The analytical device of ceteris paribus may also be thought of as arising from the operation of what John Pemberton and Nancy Cartwright call a "nomological" machine:
"Because of the way they originate, [ceteris paribus] laws are both local and fragile: they hold just where and when the relevant machine is working correctly. The successful identification and use of such laws cannot be achieved by uncontextual general principles alone, but requires messy contextual knowledge..."
Cartwright's nomological machine functions the way that Big Blue simulates the playing of chess. Each anticipated move and countermove has to be explicitly programmed into it. The general economic laws and ceteris paribus clauses of contemporary economics, however, operate more like von Kempelen's automaton. The theoretical mechanism is for show and the actual moves are executed ad hoc by a human economist concealed within the apparatus.

In his Theses on the Philosophy of History, Walter Benjamin told the story of the chess-playing automaton and concluded with the speculation:
"One can imagine a philosophical counterpart to this device. The puppet called 'historical materialism' is to win all the time. It can easily be a match for anyone if it enlists the services of theology, which today, as we know, is wizened and has to keep out of sight."
That could be updated today to read 'neo-liberalism' in place of 'historical materialism.' The theology enlisted by the neo-liberal puppet is a conservative, authoritarian theology not the messianic, redemptive mysticism that Benjamin imagined.
***********************************
A PDF of an earlier draft of the entire series can be downloaded from SCRIBD. The following table of contents lists both the designated SCIOD posts and related posts that weren't formally labeled as such. This is the initial posted draft of what will presumably end up as an articulated hypertext.
  1. Supply Creates Its Own Demon (SCIOD): The Serial!
  2. You Don't, Say!
  3. Marc Andreessen and "Textbook Luddism"
  4. Say's Law sank without trace.
  5. Pantins' Pantomime
  6. One Lesson, Ad Nauseum
  7. A Neglected Point in Connection with Crises -- N. A. L. J. Johannsen
  8. Paper Mechanisms
  9. The Automatic Left-handed Loom
  10. Chariots of the Ludds
  11. Petty Foggery and Political Arithmetick
  12. Theory of the Lump of Labour: "not as simple as it has been supposed to be"
  13. Paradox Laws
  14. Liar's Paradox
  15. Barkley Rosser Cuts Gödel's Mustard
  16. Supply Creates Its Own Demon
  17. Making Sense of Brad DeLong's "Making Say's Law True in Practice"
  18. The Pathos of Aggregate Demand Management
  19. A Trick! of the Clumsiest Description!
  20. The Frankenstein Factory
  21. Common Pools and Wage Funds -- A Reply to Simon Wren-Lewis
  22. Robots, again?
  23. The Secret Basis of Glut
  24. This Magazine of Untruth
  25. Autor's Alibi and the Lump of Jackson Hole
  26. The Fund-a-mental Thing's Supply As Time Goes "Bye!"
  27. Economists: Lawyers? Shysters? Touts?
  28. Graunt Work
  29. Lump of Labor Day Special: Advanced (Elementary) Concepts in Mathematics
  30. Continuation of Brassey by Chapman
  31. Euclidean Rhapsodies
  32. Beggars, Cranks and Feather Beds
  33. Ceteris paribus, Dr. Jekyll tans his own Hyde

Tuesday, September 9, 2014

SCIOD 14: Ceteris paribus, Dr. Jekyll tans his own Hyde

"In too many cases one is unsure of exactly what restraints are being imposed and by what authority the exercise is legitimated. Fittingly, the history of ceteris paribus is a history of studied ambiguity." – Joseph Persky
Let us not worry about too many cases. Let's focus on the paradigmatic case. Persky identified Alfred Marshall's role in "spreading the word" of ceteris paribus:
"It is very likely that Alfred Marshall picked up his use of ceteris paribus from Cairnes. Although he doesn't cite Cairnes in his methodological discussions of the phrase, Marshall does use the following quotation from Cairnes in a discussion of the wages-fund theory: 'the rate of wages, other things being equal, varies inversely with the supply of labour.' 
"Whatever its origins, the fact remains that Marshall was the one to popularize ceteris paribus."
The phrase was actually 'other things being the same,' which appears eleven times in Cairnes's Some Leading Principles of Political Economy: Newly Expounded (caeteris paribus appears six times and 'other things being equal' twice). Notice that Marshall cited Cairnes "in a discussion of the wages-fund theory." More specifically, Marshall was criticizing Cairnes's attempt to "resuscitate" the wages-fund theory, in which Cairnes avoided the old pitfalls "only by explaining away so much which is characteristic of the doctrine." Apparently, though, Marshall must not have noticed that it was precisely the infernal ambiguity of the ceteris paribus device that enabled Cairnes to explain away the pitfalls in the doctrine. Marshall went on to promote the use of the ceteris paribus "pound" in static analysis.

Persky's article mentions the methodological critique of ceteris paribus by twentieth century philosophers of science and cites Daniel Hausman's introduction to those arguments. A subsequent ceteris paribus "industry" has blossomed in philosophy in which "hardly a year passes without the appearance of at least a few articles on this topic in major journals." Although it would be an exaggeration to call it a consensus, there are cogent arguments "that extant attempts to save ceteris paribus laws from vacuity are massive failures." In a recent article, T. V. Carey has proposed Galileo's method of successive approximation as a "partial solution to the ceteris paribus problem."

While the philosophers are busy resolving the methodological difficulties raised by ceteris paribus, I would like to turn my attention to the political consequences of this magical clause. Cairnes's attempt to revive the wages-fund doctrine was a response to William Thornton's apparently decisive repudiation of it in On Labour Its Wrongful Claims and Rightful Dues; Its Actual Present and Possible Future. The wages-fund doctrine had lent pseudo-scientific legitimation to fierce partisan polemics against trade unionism.

Cairnes's response encompassed both defense and attack. It is in his defense of the wages-fund doctrine that the passage cited by Marshall appears. In a later chapter on trades unionism, Cairnes attacked a statement by Thornton to the effect that "the quantity of industrial work to be done is… 'at any give time a fixed quantity.'" Cairnes objected to this assumption vehemently:
"...I must make bold to say that, within the range of economic reasoning, no more profound fallacy finds a place than is contained in this inference; nor, I must add, is there one more pregnant with practical consequences of a pernicious kind."
The review of Thornton's book in The Edinburgh Review for July 1869 took a more good-natured and humorous view of Thornton's gaffe:
"That the rate of wages is governed, as Adam Smith and his followers have conceived, by the proportion between the capital disposable for the payment of labour and the number of the recipients of that capital, is a notion that Mr. Thornton scouts with contempt, and he consigns the chimerical 'wages-fund' to the lowest limbo of unrealities. Yet, while attacking the name, we find him occasionally, under the pressure of facts, using language which virtually admits the thing, as when he says, 'that at any given time the whole quantity of work to be done is a fixed quantity, and the uttermost which employers can afford to pay for having it done is a fixed amount'; and in other places his language recognises the inevitable fact that employment must be limited by the amount of capital which at the time being sets it in motion, that amount being the thing to which Smith, McCulloch, Fawcett, and other writers have assigned the offensive name."
Thornton erred in "virtually admitting" the chimerical notion that he "scouts with contempt." Cairnes compounded error by not noticing that the "profound, pernicious fallacy" he bitterly denounced on page 251 of his book was none other than a restatement of the wages-fund doctrine he had stoutly defended back on page 174.

How is it possible that both Thornton and Cairnes could commit the identical errors while taking diametrically opposite positions on the question of the wages-fund? The answer lies in the ineluctable vagueness and ambiguity of the ceteris paribus clause. In the hall of mirrors (or 'kakeidoscope'*) where "other things remain the same," what "other things" are included in or excluded from the ceteris paribus pound is tacit as is exactly how they are "the same."

Adding intrigue to irony, Persky credited William Petty with introducing the term ceteris paribus into economic discourse. It is also quite possible the Petty wrote the earliest version of Thornton's "fixed quantity of work to be done." Except in Petty's version it was "a certain proportion of work to be done," not a fixed quantity. There is a world of difference between a fixed quantity and a certain proportion. No doubt part of the shape-shifting magic of ceteris paribus arises from its equivocation on whether it is quantities or proportions or both that are being the same.

Maybe ceteris vertigus (other things being dizzy) would be a better name.
-----------------------------------------
* "He diligently gathers all the pieces required for his purpose, shows them to us one by one, and announces triumphantly: All the materials are here, as you see for yourselves, gentlemen, each duly numbered and authenticated; and we expect to behold a likeness, though a glaring and composite one. But at the last moment he puts them in the kaleidoscope (or kakeidoscope) of his idiosyncrasy, gives some rapid twirls and flourishes, and no mortal can guess what strange shape they shall have taken when finally settled for exhibition."

Putin Gives Up Siberia To Get "Lugansk" Rather Than "Luhansk"

Or maybe you prefer "Novorossiya," ("New Russia") the name given to southeastern Ukraine when Russia conquered it from Turkish control under Catherine the Great, and which name has been revived to cover both of the self-declared republics in the oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk/Lugansk.  I note that what people call this latter is a sign of whether they view it as part of Ukraine, in which case they call it "Luhansk," or part of a Russia-leaning independent or autonomous state or even part of Russia outright, in which case they call it "Lugansk."  If the new ceasefire brought about by the Russian incursion into the southeastern corner of Ukraine that has pushed Ukrainian President Poroshenko into accepting a ceasefire holds, then, in effect, the "Lugansk" outcome will be frozen in place, de facto on the ground, if not generally accepted as such by the rest of the world, which is tightening economic sanctions on Russia further for this latest "incursion."

In any case, in today's Financial Times, Guy Chazam reports that "Sanctions help Russia overcome its China paranoia," which starts out by reminding readers that 45 years ago the USSR and China fought a hot war, if only briefly, in the far eastern Amur region.  Since sanctions began after Russia annexed Crimea, Putin has already signed a natural gas deal with China at a much lower price than he had previously been holding out for, although at the time it was advertized as this great breakthrough that showed how Russia did not need the West.  So now Chazam reports on a new set of deals in which the Chinese state-owned oil company CNPC is buying portions of Russian state-owned oil companies operating in eastern Siberia, most notably Vankor, a subsidiary of Rosneft.  The Chinese had previously been allowed to purchase Siberian coal and timber, but this is the first time the Chinese have been allowed to purchase "stakes in its [Russia's] oil and gas fields."

So, maybe this is not all of Siberia, and Putin has gained willingness of most of the Russian population to suffer the economic sanctions from the rest of the world (none of which openly supports its policy in Ukraine, although some quietly do so, such as China), with his poll ratings riding high at 85%, but it is not at all obvious that the gains, if there are any, from having more political control of the coal and steel complex of the Donbass, will outweigh these longer run costs  It has been a fairly hilarious idea that the EU has somehow been champing at the bit to add yet more out-of-date coal and steel producing capacity to the surplus amounts already bogging down existing EU members.

BTW, that Putin justifies taking effective control of the Donbass by invoking the name it was given when Catherine the Great took control of it should give pause to those who insist that the expansion of NATO in 1999 to include Poland and the Baltic states was part of a plot by western countries.   In fact Poland began requesting to join NATO as early as 1996, largely as a result of watching what Russia was then doing in Chechnya, which of course makes Putin's complaints about the Ukrainian government shelling Donetsk look like the rank hypocrisy it is.  It was Catherine the Great who took control of Warsaw and most of central and eastern Poland also in the late 1700s when that nation was partitioned between Russia, Prussia, and Austria, holding on to it until the end of World War I, with the Baltic states having been conquered earlier by Peter the Great, although they also gained independence at the end of World War I, only to be retaken by Stalin during World War II, that former Soviet leader whom Putin is reported to admire, along with (hack, cough) Peter the Great and Catherine the Great.  That Russia is now invading and annexing territory of neighbors and justifying it on the basis of actions carried out under Catherine the Great only shows that the Poles and the Balts had very good reason to want to join NATO (and I am one who would have been fine with NATO dissolving when the Warsaw Pact did, but, it did not...).

Barkley Rosser

Interest Rates Go Nominally Negative In Europe

While I have only seen it reported in small print deep in an article in the Financial Times, evidence of the newly expansionary monetary policy by the European Central Bank is now visible in the reappearance of the peculiar phenomenon of negative nominal interest rates, most prominently for two-year government notes in Ireland, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland, and Germany.  I am mystified why when we see this phenomenon it seems to be most prominent at the two-year time horizon, which means that there is a V-shaped yield curve out there, also something plenty peculiar.  When we saw negative nominal interest rates in the US economy a few years ago briefly, they also seemed to be concentrated at the two-year time horizon.

In any case, given the stagnant state of the eurozone economy, I guess this must be viewed as being a Good Thing, at least for now.

Barkley Rosser

Sunday, September 7, 2014

Financing the Reforestation Hype

Today’s New York Times has a great article on the funding of Washington think tanks by foreign governments.  It seems that some of the “objective expertise” provided by these outfits is simply special interest pleading in pseudo-academic clothing.  The treatment of Middle Eastern policy is especially interesting.

But the article opens with a surprising example, the payment of $5 million by the government of Norway to the Center for Global Development, whose mission, according to its website, is to “to reduce global poverty and inequality”.  Sounds good, but the fine print is what counts here.  The specific purpose of Norway’s contribution was to enlist the Center in a lobbying campaign for a doubling of US funds in support of global reforestation as a means to combat climate change.

This caught my attention because a few months ago I posted a critique of the notion that planting or not cutting trees could offset fossil fuel burning as a way to forestall the buildup of greenhouse gases.  The scientific basis for forestation as climate change mitigation is full of holes, but there is more action on that front than any other aspect of carbon policy.  How to explain this?

Money.  Norway doesn’t want its oil to become a stranded asset.  Their idea of carbon policy is to drill and burn and then plant a bunch of trees.  They are willing to pay pliable “experts” to convince the rest of us that this makes sense.  And with billions of dollars in the balance, other fossil fuel interests, forest investors and countries eager to sell offsets to them all have a stake in this game.  Weak arguments backed by lots of money win out against strong ones with few sponsors.  This is a problem in virtually every area of economics.

And, in case you were wondering, which I’m sure you weren’t: no one paid me to write this.

Reforming the Economics Curriculum: Some Initial Perspectives on Fresh Start versus CORE

The first fruits of the CORE project are now available for sampling, and of course I had to taste it for myself.  This is an international initiative that, using INET (Institute for New Economic Thinking) funding, brought together 25 economists to mold a set of open-access resources that would put a new spin on undergraduate teaching.  They are collectively producing a sort-of textbook, The Economy, which is free for one and all.

So how does CORE compare to my own textbooks (here and here) that have a parallel goal?  Since only the first two chapters are up on the CORE website it’s too soon to tell, but here are my first impressions:

1. CORE wants to overcome the conventional distinction between micro- and macroeconomics.  I regard the split as mostly useful and representative of the way the profession organizes and thinks about itself.  I think it’s OK to spend one term on micro and another on macro, although I admit that there are topics in each that benefit enormously from exposure to the other.  I can see the value of CORE’s approach too.

2. CORE is “big theory”.  It’s about the vast sweep of history, the nature of economic development, the roles of competition and cooperation, participation and hierarchy, and all that.  What I’ve read so far is quite stimulating, and many students will be excited by it.  My approach is much more applied.  While I spend a bit of time contextualizing economics in a manner similar to CORE, for the most part my attention is much more on the nuts and bolts of how economics is used and abused in everyday problem-solving.  Compared to CORE, I think my texts better lend themselves to the use of case studies, research projects on specific policy questions and the use of online data sources to see how well theory matches current reality.  (I’m more of an applied economist than most of the CORE people I’m familiar with.)  The balance between social theory and practical tool-building is a difficult question, however, and there's no single right answer.

3. CORE has a message.  Or, to be more precise, it has many messages, and it is written to tell students how they should think about a variety of topics.  (I agree with most of what I have read so far, but this is not the point.)  I have gone out of my way, on the other hand, to distance my texts as much as possible from my own positions on disputed economic questions.  I am more concerned to promote critical thinking—developing the student’s ability to make analytical assessments of competing arguments, increasing her tolerance for ambiguity—than promulgating “correct” thinking.  (I do break down from time to time, especially in the macro volume when I become exasperated.  You’ll see what I mean.)  I don’t want to say that CORE is doctrinaire; certainly it is far less authoritarian in its approach than the typical textbook.  But its tone is distinctly different from mine.

4. CORE wants to redefine not only the teaching of economics but also its subject matter.  The Economy appears to leave out a lot of what traditional textbooks cover and most economists still think are important pieces of the discipline.  In effect it says, here’s what economics should look like today.  My books are, at least on the surface, far more modest.  They take the topic elements of the mainstream of the profession as given and devote themselves to reformulating how they are framed, organized and presented.  More or less the entirety of the conventional economic sequence can be found in the Fresh Start books, and this can’t be said for CORE.  On a deeper level, however, one of the main intentions behind my books is to demonstrate that you can keep the pieces the same, but reframing them and placing them in the context of more recent developments change how you view economics as a whole.  But I should also emphasize again that the books are not preachy about this, since the goal is critical thinking, not a new catechism.

5. CORE has high production values.  It looks great and finds a nice balance between narrative and pastiche.  (Most introductory textbooks are too pastiche-y for my taste; mine probably err on the side of excessive narrative.)  There are lots of elegantly executed graphics.  They obviously drew on some pretty serious talent.  I can hardly claim to be in that company.  I think my texts look OK, and they have been vetted for clarity and effectiveness by many cohorts of guinea pigs students, but you can’t help but notice that far fewer resources went into their creation.

All of these observations are provisional, since CORE has just begun unspooling.  I may come back in a week or two with a completely different assessment.  We shall see.

Also, I don’t want to convey the impression that I am arguing that my approach is “right” and CORE’s isn’t.  There isn’t a single right approach, nor even necessarily a best way of implementing any single approach.  The conventional textbook market is better served by offering instructors a choice of materials, and the movement to reset the undergraduate curriculum has a similar interest in diversity.  If anything, the need is greater because there is less clarity about the way forward.  I should add that, from the start (and we’re talking now about 2003 when I began the actual writing), I regarded my books as stepping stones on the way to new thinking about the teaching of economics and not the final word.  I’m looking forward to reading more of the CORE materials and seeing how they approach the same puzzles I had to grapple with.

ps: For those interested in acquiring an exam copy of either of my textbooks (or actually purchasing one for that matter), be advised that Springer takes about a month to ship physical copies.  If time matters, go for the e-version.

UPDATE: I'm wrong.  There are ten chapters of The Economy available for online reading (but not downloading).  I'll have to plunge into the whole thing and see if my initial impressions have to be revised.

Saturday, September 6, 2014

Explaining the "other things equal" clause to Nick Rowe

At Worthwhile Canadian Initiative, Nick Rowe writes:
"Those of us who teach Intro Economics know we have to spend some time carefully explaining the "other things equal" clause, and why it matters. Because the students won't get it unless we explain it. We tend to take it for granted that the silent "other things equal" clause is understood, but it might not be understood by all."
Other things being equal, there's been a raging debate in philosophy of science over the past couple of decades regarding the legitimacy of "CP-laws" -- that is to say "laws" hedged by a ceteris paribus clause. The 'other things equal' clause may be headed in the same direction of a Santa Claus, something we let children believe in that we know doesn't exist. 

Anyway, there's a hilarious exchange in the 19th century between William Thornton and John Cairnes where they each respectively denounce and uphold and uphold and denounce seemingly "contrary" principles that are in fact simply different statements of the same principle. The secret to the debacle is the kakeidoscopic versatility of their respective ceteris paribus clauses. 

Just yesterday, I posted "Ceteris paribus, Dr. Jekyll tans his own Hyde" at Ecological Headstand. It's scheduled to publish on EconoSpeak next Tuesday as the penultimate installment in the supply-creates-its-own-demon series. But rather than send readers clicking all over the place, I'll just paste it again below:

"In too many cases one is unsure of exactly what restraints are being imposed and by what authority the exercise is legitimated. Fittingly, the history of ceteris paribus is a history of studied ambiguity." – Joseph Persky
Let us not worry about too many cases. Let's focus on the paradigmatic case. Persky identified Alfred Marshall's role in "spreading the word" of ceteris paribus:
"It is very likely that Alfred Marshall picked up his use of ceteris paribus from Cairnes. Although he doesn't cite Cairnes in his methodological discussions of the phrase, Marshall does use the following quotation from Cairnes in a discussion of the wages-fund theory: 'the rate of wages, other things being equal, varies inversely with the supply of labour.' 
"Whatever its origins, the fact remains that Marshall was the one to popularize ceteris paribus."
The phrase was actually "other things being the same," which appears eleven times in Cairnes's Some Leading Principles of Political Economy: Newly Expounded. Notice that Marshall cited Cairnes "in a discussion of the wages-fund theory." More specifically, Marshall was criticizing Cairnes's attempt to "resuscitate" the wages-fund theory, in which Cairnes avoided the old pitfalls "only by explaining away so much which is characteristic of the doctrine." Apparently, though, Marshall must not have noticed that it was precisely the infernal ambiguity of the ceteris paribus device that enabled Cairnes to explain away the pitfalls in the doctrine. Marshall went on to promote the use of the ceteris paribus "pound" in static analysis.

Persky's article mentions the methodological critique of ceteris paribus by twentieth century philosophers of science and cites Daniel Hausman's introduction to those arguments. A subsequent ceteris paribus "industry" has blossomed in philosophy in which "hardly a year passes without the appearance of at least a few articles on this topic in major journals." Although it would be an exaggeration to call it a consensus, there are cogent arguments "that extant attempts to save ceteris paribus laws from vacuity are massive failures." In a recent article, T. V. Carey has proposed Galileo's method of successive approximation as a "partial solution to the ceteris paribus problem."

While the philosophers are busy resolving the methodological difficulties raised by ceteris paribus, I would like to turn my attention to the political consequences of this magical clause. Cairnes's attempt to revive the wages-fund doctrine was a response to William Thornton's apparently decisive repudiation of it in On Labour Its Wrongful Claims and Rightful Dues; Its Actual Present and Possible Future. The wages-fund doctrine had lent pseudo-scientific legitimation to fierce partisan polemics against trade unionism.

Cairnes's response encompassed both defense and attack. It is in his defense of the wages-fund doctrine that the passage cited by Marshall appears. In a later chapter on trades unionism, Cairnes attacked a statement by Thornton to the effect that "the quantity of industrial work to be done is… 'at any give time a fixed quantity.'" Cairnes objected to this assumption vehemently:
"...I must make bold to say that, within the range of economic reasoning, no more profound fallacy finds a place than is contained in this inference; nor, I must add, is there one more pregnant with practical consequences of a pernicious kind."
The review of Thornton's book in The Edinburgh Review for July 1869 took a more good-natured and humorous view of Thornton's gaffe:
"That the rate of wages is governed, as Adam Smith and his followers have conceived, by the proportion between the capital disposable for the payment of labour and the number of the recipients of that capital, is a notion that Mr. Thornton scouts with contempt, and he consigns the chimerical 'wages-fund' to the lowest limbo of unrealities. Yet, while attacking the name, we find him occasionally, under the pressure of facts, using language which virtually admits the thing, as when he says, 'that at any given time the whole quantity of work to be done is a fixed quantity, and the uttermost which employers can afford to pay for having it done is a fixed amount'; and in other places his language recognises the inevitable fact that employment must be limited by the amount of capital which at the time being sets it in motion, that amount being the thing to which Smith, McCulloch, Fawcett, and other writers have assigned the offensive name."
Thornton erred in "virtually admitting" the chimerical notion that he "scouts with contempt." Cairnes compounded error by not noticing that the "profound, pernicious fallacy" he bitterly denounced on page 251 of his book was none other than a restatement of the wages-fund doctrine he had stoutly defended back on page 174.

How is it possible that both Thornton and Cairnes could commit the identical errors while taking diametrically opposite positions on the question of the wages-fund? The answer lies in the ineluctable vagueness and ambiguity of the ceteris paribus clause. In the hall of mirrors where "other things remain the same," what "other things" are included in or excluded from the ceteris paribus pound is tacit as is exactly how they are "the same."

Adding intrigue to irony, Persky credited William Petty with introducing the term ceteris paribus into economic discourse. It is also quite possible the Petty wrote the earliest version of Thornton's "fixed quantity of work to be done." Except in Petty's version it was "a certain proportion of work to be done," not a fixed quantity. There is a world of difference between a fixed quantity and a certain proportion. No doubt part of the shape-shifting magic of ceteris paribus arises from its equivocation on whether it is quantities or proportions or both that are being the same.

Maybe ceteris vertigus (other things being dizzy) would be a better name.

Thursday, September 4, 2014

SCIOD 13: Beggars, Cranks and Feather Beds

Indeed? Wealth is everything, men are absolutely nothing? What? Wealth itself is only something in relation to taxes? In truth, then, there is nothing more to wish for than that the king, remaining alone on the island, by constantly turning a crank, might produce, through automata, all the output of England. -- J. C. L. S. de Sismondi, Nouveaux principes d'économie politique
The image of Sismondi's hypothetical king cranking out all of England's production recalls J. M. Clark's remark about armchair theorists grinding out misleading results. Sismondi has been portrayed at times as yet another kind of crank. For example, in their textbook, Labor Economics, Pierre Cahuc and Andre Zylberberg magically transformed Sismondi's sarcastic criticism of Ricardo into a "fantastic prediction" stemming from Sismondi's far-fetched "notion that technological progress destroys jobs."

Not all economists disdain cranks, though. In a 1934 BBC radio address, Keynes affirmed his allegiance with the heretics, "descendants of a long line of heretics who, overwhelmed but never extinguished, have survived as isolated groups of cranks." Four years earlier, in volume 2 of his Treatise on Money, Keynes declared his "strong sympathy with the school of writers of which Tugan-Baranovski was the first and the most original, and especially with the form which the theory takes in the works of Tugan-Baranovski himself, and of two American amateur-economists (cranks, some might say), Rorty and Johannsen."

Beggars occupy a lofty, strategic, albeit overlooked, station in the canon of political economy. It is, after all, "the beggar, who suns himself by the side of the highway," who supplies the conclusive illustration of Adam Smith's principle that the rich "are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants." As mentioned above, in Petty Foggery and Political Arithmetick, beggars also were fodder for John Graunt's skepticism about proposals for employing them productively. Likewise, Charles Davenant, in An essay upon the probable methods of making a people gainers in the ballance of trade, discoursed optimistically on the prospects of putting beggars to work.

Featherbedding (sometimes feather-bedding) erupted onto the lexicon of American slang in the late 1930s and escalated to a full-scale moral panic by 1943. Prior to 1938, there was no occurrence of the term in the Washington Post, the New York Times or the Wall Street Journal. Just before U. S. entry into World War II, the National Association of Manufacturers adopted outrage over "time paid but not worked" as one focus of a multi-pronged anti-union propaganda campaign. Other quarry included the union shop, absenteeism, union finances, strikes and the 40-hour work week.

At the beginning of February 1943, Barron's magazine published an article whose title alleged "'Featherbedding' hampers the war effort." Reader's Digest printed a condensed version in March. Congressional committees held hearings and even the Assistant Attorney General for the Roosevelt administration, Thurman Arnold, added his voice to the chorus of denunciations of featherbedding by organized labor. Senator Sheridan Downey of California described the Reader's Digest article as unfair and misleading, pointing out that:
… there are approximately 500 railroad engineers and firemen who have what we call a fast blue-chip run. The article in the Reader's Digest discussed that particular group of 500 men as though its members worked under conditions typical of those of hundreds of thousands of other railroad workers.
Featherbedding was defined by its detractors as one of the multifarious, nefarious union restrictions on output (motivated, allegedly, by a false belief in a fixed amount of work to be done). Arthur Ross noted sardonically that the evils of featherbedding were "customarily illustrated" by a "Chamber of Horrors" whose exhibits "remain about the same from year to year and from decade to decade." Labor lawyer Henry Kaiser called it "folklore."

Over the years, labor leaders and their sympathizers repeatedly disavowed the intention to restrict output. Four decades before the World War II featherbedding flap arose, the U. S. Commissioner of Labor launched an investigation into claims publicized by the National Association of Manufacturers that union work rules imposed restrictions on output. The 932-page Special Report of the Commissioner of Labor. Regulation and Restriction of Output found that union regulations affecting changes in work organization, methods or materials only resulted in "restrictions of output" when compared to some hypothetical level that might presumably be attained if employers could impose their efficiency plans at will – assuming the employers' schemes were well-founded (which often they weren't).

David F. Schloss – who, in 1891 coined the expression, "the theory of the lump of labour" – reviewed the Labor Commissioner's report in the Economic Journal for December 1905 and concurred with its conclusion that "the question of restriction of output in Great Britain is not as simple as it has been supposed to be."

Some 60 years after the U. S. Labor Commissioner issued his report on alleged restriction of output, Ivar Berg and James Kuhn critically examined economists' definitions and use of the featherbedding term:
Most employers and many economists define and use the term "featherbedding" in such a way as to condemn work rules and practices without a full consideration of all the facts. The condemnation rests upon a definition that assumes causes and consequences highly questionable in the light of work experience. 
Because the charge of featherbedding embarrasses unions and puts workers on the defensive, one can understand why employers use it whenever it is to their bargaining advantage. But why some economists should use the term to play the employers' game is harder to understand. Not being involved in the heated encounter between union and employer, economists might be expected to be wary of so value-laden a word as "featherbedding" and to examine its meaning and implications carefully. Often, however, they define and use "featherbedding" in a way indistinguishable from employers. 
These definitions of featherbedding assume, first, that only workers and union work practices lead to "featherbedding"; second, that these practices are wasteful and inefficient; and third, that since they are wasteful, emotion, not reason, prompts workers to "featherbedding." None of these assumptions is self evident except to those who affirm what they set out to prove. 
Few observers of business would be so bold as to assert that only workers engage in featherbedding practices, since many employees—managers as well as workers—try to minimize their expenditure of effort and to increase their leisure and privileges on the job. If "featherbedding" is peculiarly a worker and union activity, then its essence inheres not in the activity itself but rather in an employer's (or economist's) judgment. Only as employers object to some employee practices and ignore others can an outside observer determine what featherbedding is.

Wednesday, September 3, 2014

Advantage Ordo-Liberalism

At least in Hesse, Uber won’t be able to offer its peer-taxi service due to a ruling by a court in Frankfurt.  No, they weren’t objecting to the absence of an umlaut; rather to the fact that Uber doesn’t require that drivers have licenses or that they have to pick up anyone who needs a ride.  To understand this, note that (1) taxi drivers, like just about everyone else in Germany, go through apprenticeships that certify their mastery of the relevant skills, and (2) it is illegal for taxi companies to refuse service to anyone willing to pay for it.  The court ruled that if Uber wants to compete it has to meet these same criteria.

No doubt we will be hearing a lot in the coming days about how backward and inefficient, monopolistic even, the Germans are, and how they need to be rescued by Anglo-Saxon entrepreneurialism.  Not from me though.  I’m with the German court: the ordo part is not expendable.

The most important stipulation is the obligation to provide universal service.  If laissez-faire means that some people or parts of town won’t be served, scratch laissez-faire.  But maintaining a high level of skill is also valuable.  Maybe in only one ride in ten I’ll need a driver who knows obscure destinations and how to get to them, or how to avoid a particular traffic tie-up, but when I need it I really need it.  Guaranteeing that drivers are safe is obviously essential.  And there is a social interest in maintaining a living wage and professional respect for service providers of all sorts.  Obviously this is a question of balance, finding the right mix of competition and regulation, but the uber approach, like its name (with an umlaut) implies, puts the first over the second unconditionally.

If Uber’s take on taxi service is technologically superior, let them demonstrate this by competing on an equal social basis.

Tuesday, September 2, 2014

The Last Of The Wobblies

Two days ago my deep friend of a half century, William ("Billie") J. Grogan "blew his brains out," as it was first reported to me earlier today.  He was retired, living on a farm in Wisconsin north of Madison, where he was born of an engineering prof dad, just outside of "Daneco," as he called it (Dane County, which includes Madison), where he viewed them as being too regulatory and telling him what to do on his uber-green farm, very much up on the latest enviro tech and deep study of local ecology (his farm was a masterpiece of endangered species habitat, some of them quite obscure and seriously endangered), sitting on the divide between  the Rock and Wisconsin river watersheds, both tributaries of the mighty Mississippi.

The most immediate cause of his choosing to take his own life, by gun, apparently with the full understanding of his loving wife, a daughter of a participant in the Manhattan Project, who herself holds a PhD in Hindu dance, was that he had been in deep physical pain for many years, and finally simply, as the friend who reported this to me quoted his widow, "He just could not take the pain anymore."

He was a rebel against his academic ancestry, and had a long and complicated work career that involved real industrial worker experience, including at the now defunct Gisholt Machine Factory on East Washington Avenue in Madison, where a long time ago he was in a serious work accident that deeply injured him, causing pains that contributed to his suicide. After a long series of other work experiences his final job was as the IT guy in the physics department at the UW-Madison, where he even helped me out a decade ago in getting a highly technical paper in proper form for publication.

So, what about this Wobblie connection?  For many decades, and until the last time I asked him, he was an actual card-carrying member of the Industrial [I earlier incorrectly said "International"] Workers of the World, the IWW, or "Wobblies."  It seemed like a private joke.  I would occasionally ask to see his membership card, and he would pull it out, all in red, with dues paid up.  He was a notorious Irish wisecracker, who would regularly make up phoney stories about his various idiosyncratic experiences and exploits, many actually real, although you would never know which. But on this matter he never joked.

So, the IWW was founded in 1905, a "universal" (syndicalist) union to be of all workers, who also abjured all governments and were therefore anarchist. They had a violent rep in those days and were strong in isolated labor groups such as lumberjacks, often ethnically, such as the heavily Finnish lumberjacks of Northern Wisconsin, one of whom, the late Gus Hall, would end up as General Secretary of the US Communist Party for many decades.  But, no, Billie was not of that persuasion.

So indeed the Bolshevik Revolution/Coup was the moment of bifurcation for the IWW.  A substantial chunk became the major real working class/labor foundation of the US Communist Party.  The remnant that did  not join the Party became a rump that never really caused any serious future trouble to the Establishment, to be frank and honest. But it was this more idealistic anarchist group that my old friend adhered to most seriously for many decades, even paying his dues.

I can attest, as I followed his long ideological and intellectual meanderings, to the extent one could decipher them (he often spoke cryptically, some of it utter nonsense and some of it profoundly insightful and forward looking), that he retained his anarchist leanings along with his pro-labor leanings.  The former led him to locate in a place where he was minimally regulated (ant taxed) by local government, accurately knowing more about the local ecology than they did.  But I know that his past experiences as an industrial worker who suffered injuries on the job not properly covered for health insurance and all that, left him strongly supportive of the labor movement more broadly, and very much opposed to the increasing inequalities of income and wealth in America.

I may be out of line here in making this observation, as I have not spoken with his widow whom I both deeply love and respect, but, I do not think that it is an accident that this long-term member of a group that barely exists, maybe sort of in New York and Denver at least (latest google check), did himself in on the eve of Labor Day.  While the main motive for his suicide was his serious personal health problems, I think that probably the precise date of his doing himself in was not simply random. I know that he had been planning this for some time, and I honor his memory by noting what I suspect somebody would notice: that this old Wobblie, maybe not the last, but definitely one of the last, that the condition of the working class in the United States of America is not good.  On his death I report this, to honor my old friend as best I can.

Barkley Rosser

Later Addition: When I wrote this last evening, I was listening to a vinyl record Billie recommended to me nearly a half century, John Fahey's "The Transfiguration of Blind Joe Death," which I always associated with him.  The curious figure on the front of Blind Joe Death Transfiguring looks rather like him when he was being more obscure than usual, :-).

SCIOD 12: Euclidean Rhapsodies

"It is fairly obvious," John Maurice Clark, explained to Irving Fisher, Frank Knight and other participants in a 1920 American Economic Association seminar, "that there are systems of economics with axioms fully as far removed from each other as the geometries of Euclid and the non-Euclideans..."

Non-Euclidean geometry was topical in 1920. On May 29, 1919, a total eclipse of the sun could be viewed from Brazil and Africa and provided the opportunity to test a prediction of Einstein's theory of general relativity about the displacement of light from a star as it passes the sun. The conclusions from those observations were hailed as "the most important result obtained in connection with the theory of gravitation since Newton's day."

Clark's paper, "Soundings in non-Euclidean Economics," was not the first foray into this particular metaphor, nor would it be the last. In his inaugural lecture as Professor of Political Economy at Cambridge, "Economic science in relation to practice," Arthur Cecil Pigou quoted extensively from Bertrand Russell's Principles of Mathematics regarding the relationship between the Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries, which "are equally true," and realistic science, which can only be decided, "so far as any decision is possible, by experiment and observation." 

In 1920, Pigou recycled his 1908 non-Euclidean ruminations -- and the Russell quote -- in The Economics of Welfare, arguing that Russell's distinction was "applicable to the field of economic investigation. It is open to us to construct an Economic Science either of the pure type represented by pure mathematics or of the realistic type represented by experimental physics."

In The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money Keynes also employed the geometrical metaphor, comparing classical theorists (Professor Pigou among them!) to:
Euclidean geometers in a non-Euclidean world who, discovering that in experience straight lines apparently parallel often meet, rebuke the lines for not keeping straight as the only remedy for the unfortunate collisions which are occurring.
Of course it was not literally the axioms of Euclidean geometry that classical economic theorists clung to but rather the doctrine, taught by them "from the time of Say and Ricardo..." that "supply creates its own demand..."
-- meaning by this in some significant, but not clearly defined, sense that the whole of the costs of production must necessarily be spent in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, on purchasing the product.
As it informs a theory of employment --"practically without discussion" -- that doctrine suggests what Keynes described as "two fundamental postulates," that: "1. The wage is equal to the marginal product of labour" and "2. The utility of the wage when a given volume of labour is employed is equal to the marginal disutility of that amount of labour."

Clark was more prolific in cataloging the axioms of the "Euclidean" economic orthodoxy. Originally, he listed six propositions and expanded that to eight in a revised version published in 1924. In both versions, it was the final proposition that Clark dwelt on: "Capital, including machinery, consists of instruments of production utilized by human beings for the production of wealth."

In contrast to this standard assumption, Clark suggested "the alternative proposition that human beings are instruments of production utilized by machines for the machines' increase and biological development." Instead of the operationally pointless speculation about whether machines might development consciousness and enslave humans, Clark offered the more realistic question, "how many and how important and far-reaching are the things the machines have done to us which we did not intend nor foresee, compared to the things we specifically employed them to do?" I have condensed Clark's own answer to his question, while indicating ... the ellipses:
Machines may be conceived as making bargains with man in which they offer him things he very much desires, and in exchange bind him to serve and maintain them, to eliminate the unfit among them and promote their racial progress, and to alter his own social and political arrangements in whatever ways may be necessary in keeping pace with the increasingly complex social organization of the machines themselves, and in keeping the children of man faithful to the service the machines require.… By such methods they have succeeded in imposing on man many things he never bargained for, some of which he finds extremely unwelcome.… 
They are responsible for the "industrial cycle," and as long as their own overhead costs are covered in periods of depression, they have not assumed full responsibility for the corresponding overhead costs of human beings.... 
As for their methods of maintaining control: some classes they bribe with large rewards, other classes, largely technicians, and technical-scientists, do not need to be bribed: their minds are captured by the material they work in.… 
What I have called Euclidean Economics, in general, serves the interests of the machines. It directs attention to the bribe they offer, and away from the conditions they exact. It has countenanced the machines in neglecting to assume the burden of human overhead costs, and in this, as in other matters, by insisting on putting man on a higher level than machines in respect to freedom, it has sometimes put him on a lower level in respect to care for his material needs.… 
The machines tend to confine discretion in industry to the few whom they take into their confidence, while the bulk of labor has largely lost the power to make any constructive contribution to the technique of industry. The job belongs to the machine, and labor feels little responsibility for it. Labor's state of mind and conduct shows the consequences of this, and many laborers appear to alternate between the slave-morality of getting as much as possible and giving as little, and the spasmodic need of exerting power of some sort. 
Two points are worth emphasizing. First, Clark's brief mention of overhead costs obliquely alludes to his monumental forthcoming work on the economics of overhead costs. Second, the complicity of what Clark called Euclidean Economics with the interests of the machines implicates that economics as one of the machines to the extent that it "grinds out" conclusions from premises. 

Clark did indeed use the language of machinery to describe economic theory in a 1948 note to Wesley Mitchell:
"In dealing with the evolutionary character of the mechanisms, I sometimes think 'theory' of the abstract sort is a device for converting usefully enlightening ideas about behavior and motivation into paper mechanisms whereby armchair theorists can grind out misleading results."
By this time, however, he was not only referring to the "Euclidean" ideas of classical economists but equally to the "more orthodox than the master" school that had grown up around Keynes. In a 1941 letter to Keynes, Clark had also referred to a "mechanism," in this case, "the 'income flow analysis' of which yours is the most noted presentation..." Clark was concerned that this Keynesian school risked succumbing "to the dangers of too-undiscriminating application from which classical economics suffered." In his reply, Keynes concurred with this view.

Reviewing a 1949 essay by Paul Samuelson on the mathematics of income determination,  Clark again reiterated his concerns about "what happens to the Keynesian theory when it is simplified by isolating the central mathematical formula and its corollaries from the context of factors that do not lend themselves to this treatment, and which Keynes handled in 'literary' fashion." Clark summed up his misgivings about Samuelson's approach in the following terms:
The upshot seems to be that investment cannot be treated as a simple rising function of current income alone, without doing violence to the essential facts; and that a more realistic (and dynamic) treatment inevitably introduces instability. Even without allowing for this, equilibrium comes to depend on the intersection of two lines which are so nearly parallel that the determinateness of the outcome becomes dubious (current graphic representations sometimes grossly exaggerate the angle of intersection). Samuelson saves himself by a concluding sentence, emphasizing "the violence done to complex reality by the simplified statistical abstractions of this paper." But is such a vague and general last-moment caveat sufficient? (emphasis added)
In noting "the intersection of two lines which are so nearly parallel," the "simple mathematical device" Clark criticized was Samuelson's graphic exposition of investment and consumption. He could as easily have been talking about matters having to do with a distinction between Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries, which, after all, "are equally true" (and equally non-realistic).