Missing: the strange disappearance of S. J. Chapman’s theory of the hours of labour (11)

The days are gone…, Part II

In Value and Capital, Hicks's treatment of work and leisure is laconic. It appears virtually as an aside in his discussion of the difference between the consumer's demand, if it is assumed to be fixed in terms of money, and what happens if the consumer is also a seller with a fixed stock of some commodity, who might hold back some of that commodity for his own consumption depending on the market price. "Thus a fall in wages," Hicks wrote,

may sometimes make the wage-earner work less hard, sometimes harder; for on the one hand, reduced piece-rates make the effort needed for a marginal unit of output seem less worth while, or would so, if income were unchanged; but on the other, his income is reduced, and the urge to work harder in order to make up for the loss in income may counterbalance the first tendency (p. 36).

The salient detail to note about Hicks's 'wage-earner' is that he is being paid by piece-rates, not on an hourly wage. That is to say, his income presumably varies in proportion to his output, not as a function of the number of hours he spends on the job or the number of hours of leisure he sacrifices to do so. The possibility that he may "work less hard" could thus mean either that he would exert less effort or that he would reduce the amount of time he worked. Or it could mean some combination of the two.

The dichotomy of working harder or less hard also introduces a certain ambiguity into exactly what is being traded-off, particularly if the wage-earner's hours at work remained unchanged. In the latter case, working less hard could be interpreted as a way of making work time more enjoyable (or less painful) and thus would be a backdoor re-introduction of the rejected pain-cost theory of value.

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Abstract: Sidney Chapman's theory of the hours of labour, published in 1909 in The Economic Journal, was acknowledged as authoritative by the leading economists of the day. It provided important insights into the prospects for market rationality with respect to work time arrangements and hinted at a profound immanent critique of economists' excessive concern with external wealth. Chapman's theory was consigned to obscurity by mathematical analyses that reverted heedlessly to outdated and naïve assumptions about the connection between hours and output. The Sandwichman is serializing "Missing: the strange disappearance of S. J. Chapman's theory of the hours of labour" on EconoSpeak in celebration of the centenary of publication of Chapman's theory. (To download the entire article in a pdf file, click on the article title.)

Who Will Speak Out to Stop the Bailouts?

Here is the problem in a nutshell: our economic well-being depends crucially on the provision of finance for all sorts of useful purposes—to move goods, launch new enterprises, retool old ones, pay college tuition, buy things like houses and cars that would otherwise take decades of savings. Most of the financial system is privately owned and operated for profit. The profit paradigm of the past generation was based on a systematic bias toward risk, a bias built into all limited liability institutions but compounded by deregulation and hubris. Now the system is reeling under the weight of trillions of dollars in losses. This has led to a seizing up of credit supply and has turned a typical recession into a potential economic abyss.

In the spirit of London Banker, let’s keep our eye on the ball. The financial losses incurred by banks, hedge funds, insurance companies and those who invested in them are their problem. The breakdown of the financial system is our problem. The bailout solutions being pushed in the US and elsewhere are based on the premise that we have to solve their problem first in order to deal with our own. Throw enough money at the financial sector, turn their red ink to black, and some day they will be willing to lend to the rest of us.

How to begin with what’s wrong with this?




1. This is a program for a systematic looting of the public. The 90+% of us who never enjoyed the profit bonanza of the last 20 years are going to pay through the teeth so that the rich get to stay rich. This is perfectly clear in the case of AIG, for instance. We hear about a $150B “investment” of public funds into this company, as if the money were going to, oh, upgrade their computer networks. The word is dishonest: this very large sum, which could do a lot of good things if spent intelligently, is going right through AIG to those it sold credit default insurance (asset swaps) to. Institutions leveraged themselves to the max in order to rake in profits by investing in high-risk, high-return mortgage-backed securities, insuring themselves against default risk by buying CDO’s from a company (AIG) that never had the capacity or intent to actually follow through if defaults became widespread. Seen in its entirety, the process was a scam. Now extraordinary amounts of public money are being transferred to the jilted investors who bought this insurance. We will never see this money again. The value of our public “investment”—80% of AIG’s ultimate capitalization—will be a few percent of what we have paid in, if the firm even survives.

2. By solving the problem of the financial institutions first, the bailout is making our problem worse. It isn’t just a question of banks who get public cash infusions not lending enough, although this is important. Finance that ought to be supporting the real economy is being diverted to the bailout. This sentence is in italics so you will read it two or three times. It is very, very, very important. You can see this in the Fed’s decision to pay competitive interest rates to attract excess bank reserves, which now amount to more than $400B. This is money that, in normal times, would amplify itself through the money multiplier and find its way to borrowers in the real economy. Now it finances the Fed’s acquisition of troubled assets at far above their market value—in other words, bailouts of private investors. Similarly, the Treasury has been selling hundreds of billions of dollars in new issues to finance the bailout, and much of the money it is sopping up would otherwise be available for normal lending.

2a. The corollary is that the world economy is sinking fast and deep. This will mean great hardship, especially in less developed countries were the margin between prosperity and penury is all too thin. It also means that the epicenter of financial crisis will shift toward sectors now being decimated by the downturn, particularly consumer credit and corporate debt. (A side note: this is the real fear about GM. Honda and Toyota can make our cars as energy-efficient as technology allows, and they can do this in their US plants. If GM is allowed to go belly up, however, it could trigger a run on a wide range of corporate debt.) Hence the bailouts, by soaking up credit and bleeding the economy, are adding to the losses that they seek to defray.

3. The resources available for these bailouts are not endless. You wouldn’t know this by following the discussion in the media. Commentators do complain about how expensive it all is, but there is no sense that a limit exists, and that we are at risk of reaching it before the financial system is repaired. But this is exactly what makes people close to the situation very nervous. The rest of the world is buying vast amounts of treasuries. The Fed takes this money and hands it to investors facing losses, receiving in return paper assets that might have value, maybe, sometime well into the future. If those holding treasuries should change their mind, this process cannot be run in reverse. The Fed is in no position to sell its damaged portfolio in order to buy back even a fraction of the huge overhang in public debt. Monetization—settling claims by simply creating new bank reserves—is not an option, because it would almost certainly trigger a run on the dollar, a threat for which no institutional antidote currently exists. What this all means is that the bailout strategy puts us in a race: will we reach our financial limit before the losses that paralyze the system are erased? It is extraordinary to me that this question is not being asked in public.

If these arguments are correct, the bailout agenda needs to be challenged. We are following a course of action that is indefensible from a social justice perspective and at best extremely risky on its own terms. An alternative exists: rapidly putting into place a public system that can make available the finance needed by the real economy. This would mean allowing a large swath of existing wealth-holders to be ruined. Such an option would be unthinkable to those who inhabit the existing world of finance: for them, repairing the system means first of all restoring the profits of investors. There is also a bit of class interest at stake, I would guess. For these reasons, it would take a mighty movement to change the way governments are responding to the financial crisis. I don't know where this will come from, but for starters it would be nice to see some real live public debate.

Work Less Insurgency

by the Sandwichman

Campaigning on a shoestring and with minimal coverage in the mainstream media, Work Less Party candidates for Vancouver City Council received 10% of the votes in the civic election Saturday.

SHAW, Chris.............Work Less Party......11237...10.8%
GREGSON, Ian.........Work Less Party......10493...10.1%
TRAMUTOLA, Geri...Work Less Party.......8619....8.3%
WISDOM, Timothy...Work Less Party.......7435....7.2%

In the election, there were ten council seats to be filled. The tenth-place seat was won with 44.2% of the votes. The lowest vote total for a major party candidate was 27.8%.

The centre-left coalition of Vision Vancouver and COPE swept 9 of the 10 seats on council. Three of the Work Less Party candidates garnered vote totals higher than the margin of victory between the sole NPA victor, Susan Anton, and Vision Vancouver's highest polling losing candidate, Kashmir Dhaliwal.

(Vote percentages were calculated based on total votes cast for all council candidates divided by ten, the number of council seats to be filled)

Chinese Fiscal Stimulus and the US Economy

It was almost two years ago when several of us were hoping for more Chinese domestic demand stimulus and less Chinese mercantilism. OK, we were also advocating US fiscal restraint on the hope that more US exports would make up for the reduced US domestic demand. In today’s environment, the smart call seems to be for a large US fiscal stimulus.

Ariana Eunjung Cha reports that the Chinese may be about to be consuming a lot more:

Long known for high saving rates, China’s middle-class consumers are starting to spend like their American counterparts ... Increasing consumer spending is a key goal of the $586 billion economic stimulus package unveiled Sunday by China’s leaders ... James E. Quinn, global president for New York-based Tiffany, said in an interview that Chinese customers are the “fastest-growing segment” of its business. “A lot of American customers have a complete wardrobe of jewelry, passed down from previous generations. That’s not the case in China. Chinese consumers are at the early stage of acquiring a sense of style and appreciation for design in jewelry.” U.S. companies have been so successful in China because “Chinese consumers have a ‘look up to the rich’ attitude and the United States is the world’s top developed country in their eyes,” said Gao Tao, a consultant for the International Brand Association in Beijing

But before we anticipate an export led boom, check out what Brad Setser has to say:

the non-petrol goods deficit is now moving in the wrong direction. It increased from $29.3b in June to $35.6b in August. Non-petrol exports fell by $9.9b over the last two months, while non-petrol imports fell by “only” $3.7 billion. The sharp fall in exports shows up clearly in a chart showing “real” non-petrol goods exports and imports.

The Chinese fiscal stimulus is certainly good news as it may soften the bleak news on US export demand, but we will still need to increase US domestic demand even if that means living with a large current account deficit for several more years.

Missing: the strange disappearance of S. J. Chapman’s theory of the hours of labour (10)

The days are gone…, Part I

Further questions concerning the coherence of the Walrasian leisure device, beyond those identified by Pagano, are raised by examining the context in which Walras first introduced it and the form it took in the John Hicks's influential Value and Capital (1939), which is cited by both Pencavel and Scitovsky (although disputed by Derobert) as the source of the now orthodox model. Walras introduced the argument in Elements of a Pure Economics as part of his definition of the role of the "services of persons" (i.e., labour) in his theory of production. There, Walras discusses "the pleasure enjoyed by the idler" as constituting the income of "those who do nothing but travel and seek amusement"(p. 214). Walras's use here of the word "income" is metaphorical. No money changes hands. The rewards enjoyed by Walras's idler are what normally would be considered intrinsic whereas income refers to an extrinsic reward. Thus Walras's usage of the term 'income' is not just metaphorical but more precisely ironic.

There is no indication in his treatment that Walras intended such pleasure of the idler to also include the after-hours (non-monetary) "income" of someone who was a worker for the other 8 or 10 hours a day. On the contrary, Walras explained that "the idler who has wasted today will waste tomorrow; the blacksmith who has just finished this day's work will finish many more..." (p. 215) Doing nothing for Walras thus would appear to be the specialized occupation – the vocation, so to speak – of the idler, not something the blacksmith or the lawyer does in the hours after he or she has finished the day's work.

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Abstract: Sidney Chapman's theory of the hours of labour, published in 1909 in The Economic Journal, was acknowledged as authoritative by the leading economists of the day. It provided important insights into the prospects for market rationality with respect to work time arrangements and hinted at a profound immanent critique of economists' excessive concern with external wealth. Chapman's theory was consigned to obscurity by mathematical analyses that reverted heedlessly to outdated and naïve assumptions about the connection between hours and output. The Sandwichman is serializing "Missing: the strange disappearance of S. J. Chapman's theory of the hours of labour" on EconoSpeak in celebration of the centenary of publication of Chapman's theory. (To download the entire article in a pdf file, click on the article title.)

The Bank of Michael Perelman

I am happy to announce that I have changed my name. As of now, you may address me as The Bank of Michael Perelman.

I am not greedy. If Secretary Paulson would grant me only a couple hundred million, I would not trouble him for one of the billion dollar bailouts.

Applying to Work for Obama Administration – Anonymous Blogging Preferred?

Jackie Calmes reports:

A seven-page questionnaire being sent by the office of President-elect Barack Obama to those seeking cabinet and other high-ranking posts may be the most extensive — some say invasive — application ever ... They must include any e-mail that might embarrass the president-elect, along with any blog posts and links to their Facebook pages.

Whether any of my blog posts might embarrass the president-elect or not, the name on my application isn’t going to be the name I blog under. Not that I’m a serious candidate for any of the high-ranking economic positions. But what about that other vowel-less economist blogger?

Missing: the strange disappearance of S. J. Chapman’s theory of the hours of labour (9)

The eclipse of work in neoclassical economics. Part III

In tracing the emergence and triumph within economic theory of the income-leisure trade-off model, Ugo Pagano (1986) gave an account of a compromise between English and Austrian marginalist circles about what could be regarded as the "ultimate standard of value": pain cost or opportunity cost. The English side of the debate, argued by F. Y. Edgeworth (1894), featured Jevons's calculus of pleasure and pain whereby, after a certain point, increased units of work time produced an increasing amount of pain or disutility while additional goods purchased with the income from those extra hours supplied diminishing increments of utility. At some point the increase in disutility from work matches the increment in utility from additional income and the worker will choose to stop working. The Austrian perspective, argued by Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk (1894), regarded cost as being wholly constituted by the sacrifice one had to make, given scarce resources, to be able to consume any particular bundle of goods. One had to allocate one's scarce resources between wants that were, in principle, unlimited. The Austrians considered the hours of work to be institutionally fixed by custom or law and thus any hypothetical pain or disutility of work was, for them, not a factor in the individual's utility calculus.

Eventually, a compromise between these two positions was achieved by adopting what Pagano referred to as a "leisure semantic device". This device originated in the work of Leon Walras (1954) and bridged the differences between English and Austrian approaches by finding a way of including work and leisure in the opportunity-cost equation. It did so by defining the "disutility of work" to consist solely in the fact that the worker had to sacrifice leisure time in order to obtain income. According to Pagano, the adoption of the device underlies modern economic theory's "almost complete ignorance of the difference between human labour and the other resources" (93).

According to this leisure device, labour can be divided into two parts, the first part of which is self-consumed as leisure. The second part is sold and used in the production of goods for other people. Pagano notes two advantages of the leisure device for treating labour: first, it enables the treatment of labour in the same way as other consumption goods and thus greatly simplifies the analysis. Second, because the amount of time available to each individual for working is constrained (there are only 24 hours in a day), the system does take into account – or at least seems to take into account – the fact that labour expended in production affects the welfare of individuals. The more time the individual works to obtain income, the less leisure time he or she is left with.

Despite those advantages, Pagano viewed that leisure device as very misleading because it assumes that workers are only affected by the total amount of labour time expended and not by the way in which that time is allocated to the performance of different tasks.

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Abstract: Sidney Chapman's theory of the hours of labour, published in 1909 in The Economic Journal, was acknowledged as authoritative by the leading economists of the day. It provided important insights into the prospects for market rationality with respect to work time arrangements and hinted at a profound immanent critique of economists' excessive concern with external wealth. Chapman's theory was consigned to obscurity by mathematical analyses that reverted heedlessly to outdated and naïve assumptions about the connection between hours and output. The Sandwichman is serializing "Missing: the strange disappearance of S. J. Chapman's theory of the hours of labour" on EconoSpeak in celebration of the centenary of publication of Chapman's theory. (To download the entire article in a pdf file, click on the article title.)

State/Local Fiscal Policy During the Great Depression

When I discussed government purchases during FDR’s first two terms as President, I opened with something from Paul Krugman. Alex Tabarrok graced our blog with this comment:

Here from HSUS is Federal Spending by year - note by 1934 spending had more than doubled in nominal terms.

Maybe I should acknowledge something else Paul had to say:

So I caught Governor Schwarzenegger on TV, talking fiscal crisis, and found myself thinking about fiscal stupidity. Economists may remember that the president of the European Commission once called the eurozone’s “stability pact,” which was supposed to set a rigid limit on budget deficits, the “stupidity pact” - because it would have forced tax hikes and spending cuts in the middle of a recession. Well, we’ve got our own stupidity pact: state and local governments operate under fiscal rules that lead to booming spending and tax cuts when the economy is strong and the reverse when the economy is weak. This is bad governance: services are cut precisely when people need them most. It’s also bad macroeconomics: it exacerbates the business cycle. Right now, we’re seeing a sharp drop in state revenues, which is going to lead to big cutbacks in spending and tax increases at exactly the wrong time.

While Alex is focused on Federal expenditures and revenues, my original graph looked at total government purchases. Expenditures include both purchases and transfer payments but looking at Federal figures omits what was happening at the state & local level. But let me give even more credit to Marmico who sent us to a series of Federal expenditures and revenues as percentages of GDP, which our first graph depicts for the 1930 to 1941 period. Expenditures (outlays) rose relative to GDP from 1930 to 1934 but this was more due to a drop in real GDP than skyrocketing real spending. Federal receipts (taxes) did rise as a share of GDP from 1932 to 1938 while outlays as a share of GDP fell from 1934 to 1938. Federal fiscal policy wasn’t exactly doing what Keynes would recommend in his 1936 General Theory until after the 1938 recession.

Our second graph – which represents the reason for this post – shows a historical example of what currently concerns Paul – falling state & local revenues (as a share of GDP) combined with the tendency for state & local governments to annually balance their budgets, which translates into reduced expenditures (as a share of GDP). And given the fact that state & local expenditures were often greater than Federal expenditures before World War II, the pro-cyclical nature of state & local fiscal policy could have easily dominated any timid attempt at countercyclical fiscal policy from the Federal government – even if FDR had more wisdom and courage to try what Keynes came to recommend.

Missing: the strange disappearance of S. J. Chapman’s theory of the hours of labour (8)

The eclipse of work in neoclassical economics. Part II

Pencavel (1986) concluded that, considering the consistency with which empirical research produces values that violate the model's predictions, "the scientific procedure is surely to regard the theory as it has been formulated and applied to date as having been refuted by the evidence" (p.95). Other criticisms point out that the income-leisure choice model "cannot provide any substantive analytical predictions on the course of labor supply by an individual or a group" (Altman, 2001, 199) and takes no account of the non-pecuniary benefits of working (Farzin and Akao, 2006).

Derobert (2001) questioned the pedigree of the model, noting the paradoxical disappearance of labour, documenting bibliographical anomalies in the model's transmission and finding that the model's formal consecration by Tibor Scitovsky (1952) was accompanied by a warning about its pitfalls – specifically, that regarding leisure as a commodity may lead us to mistakenly assume there is a "conflict between the efficient specialization among workers and the efficient distribution of leisure" (p. 107). "It is much safer," Scitovsky went on to explain,

as well as more natural, to look at the face of the medal and concentrate our attention on work and the burden it involves, rather than on freedom from work and the satisfaction this yields. We can, if we like, think of work as a negative commodity, of its burden as a disutility or negative satisfaction, and of the earnings received for work as a negative price... (p. 107).

Scitovsky's 'safer' and 'more natural' approach, however, would require abandoning the opportunity-cost value theory at the foundation of the income-leisure choice model, without which the model itself would cease to have any meaning.

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Abstract: Sidney Chapman's theory of the hours of labour, published in 1909 in The Economic Journal, was acknowledged as authoritative by the leading economists of the day. It provided important insights into the prospects for market rationality with respect to work time arrangements and hinted at a profound immanent critique of economists' excessive concern with external wealth. Chapman's theory was consigned to obscurity by mathematical analyses that reverted heedlessly to outdated and naïve assumptions about the connection between hours and output. The Sandwichman is serializing "Missing: the strange disappearance of S. J. Chapman's theory of the hours of labour" on EconoSpeak in celebration of the centenary of publication of Chapman's theory. (To download the entire article in a pdf file, click on the article title.)

Why Markets Fail

Markets fail for many reasons. With all the attention to the current financial crisis, the time has come to look at another part of market failure -- the reluctance to invest in long-lived plant and equipment. I'm not merely thinking about the deindustrialization of the US economy, but a more general reluctance.

The commitment of funds for fixed capital entails taking a risk. In the words of John Hicks, one of the earliest economists to win a so-called Nobel Prize, pointed to the obvious problem: "an entrepreneur by investing in fixed capital gives hostages to the future" (Hicks 1932, p. 183). Unfortunately, neither Hicks nor virtually any other economist has explored this fear of investment.

The most popular response to this reluctance to invest came from a very conservative Austrian economist, who once served as a socialist minister of finance, before landing at Harvard. Joseph Schumpeter was indeed one of the giants of 20th century economics. Here his reputation to his personal brilliance, as well as a willingness to learn from Karl Marx.

I have posted the rest of the piece as a pdf at

schumpeter

It was written to help me focus my thoughts for my talk in San Francisco tomorrow. Any comments will be appreciated.

Government Purchases: 1932 to 1941

Let’s return to the discussion of New Deal economics, that is the role of fiscal policy during the first two FDR administrations and look at the discussion from Alex Tabarrok:

Thus, an accurate portrayal of fiscal policy during the Great Depression - entirely consistent with Krugman - is that we had much greater spending, much greater taxes and not much economic stimulus.

Raising tax rates during a period when aggregate demand falls far short of potential GDP does seem silly but I have to challenge this notion that we tried a massive increase in government purchases. Using BEA data, I have provided graphs of real government purchases (G/Prices in terms of 2000$) and the ratio of government purchases to GDP (G/GDP). Before 1941, the increase in government purchases roughly mirrored the increase in GDP so this claim of “much greater spending” sounds a bit suspicious. Of course, government purchases did increase substantially starting in 1941 but then as the graph of output to potential output provided by Paul Krugman notes – that is when fiscal stimulus did restore full employment.

Update: Marginal Revolution reader Marmico challenges the notion that tax collections rose substantially during FDR’s first two terms providing us with this link. As Marmico notes:

Conflating high individual marginal tax rates with much greater taxes is bunk.

To be fair, Marmico’s graph shows only a subset of Federal tax revenues as a share of GDP so I have added a graph of total government revenue (Rev) relative to GDP.

Missing: the strange disappearance of S. J. Chapman’s theory of the hours of labour (7)

The eclipse of work in neoclassical economics, Part I

The approach to the analysis of individual labour supply that replaced Chapman's theory took no notice of the effects of technological change on fatigue or on the subjective experience of the worker. It treated labour itself as a residual of the individual's consumption preferences. According to the new orthodoxy of income-leisure choice, leisure is assumed to be a normal good. Work is something featureless that takes place in the weeds behind the billboard of consumption and disposable time. Because this commodity-leisure itself lacks any definitive quality other than not being work, work is reduced to the hollow double negative of 'not not-working'. There is no pain in this hollowed-out work, neither is there joy.

A chorus of criticism surrounds the income-leisure choice model. Spencer (2003, 2004) objected that the model ignores the qualitative dimension of both work and leisure, a dimension that was specifically addressed in the approaches of Jevons and Marshall. Philp, Slater and Harvie (2005) disputed the epistemological coherence of the model's microfoundations, concluding that, "the indifference curves which underpin labour-leisure preferences are themselves founded on axioms which have been shown to be problematic elsewhere in neoclassical economics" (p. 80). Jennings (2004) analyzed the dead metaphors that signify measurement in the labour supply model, pointing out that measurement already requires a metaphor but that unmeasurable homogenous units of labour are a metaphor for a metaphor – a catachresis (literally "wrong use"). She cited Barthes's criticism of such speech forms as foundational for mythologies that "falsely universalize by removing the historical referents of signifiers" (p. 137) and noted his warning about the disingenuous "depoliticization" inherent in such speech.

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Abstract: Sidney Chapman's theory of the hours of labour, published in 1909 in The Economic Journal, was acknowledged as authoritative by the leading economists of the day. It provided important insights into the prospects for market rationality with respect to work time arrangements and hinted at a profound immanent critique of economists' excessive concern with external wealth. Chapman's theory was consigned to obscurity by mathematical analyses that reverted heedlessly to outdated and naïve assumptions about the connection between hours and output. The Sandwichman is serializing "Missing: the strange disappearance of S. J. Chapman's theory of the hours of labour" on EconoSpeak in celebration of the centenary of publication of Chapman's theory. (To download the entire article in a pdf file, click on the article title.)

How to Deal with Housing: Speaking for Galbraith IV

Finally, I have a few suggestions regarding dealing with the current crisis associated with the decline of the housing bubble and the distress this is causing to individuals, especially those facing foreclosures or difficulties in paying their mortgages. I would support two proposals that have been floating around.

The first is that of foreclosure vouchers, a proposal due to David Colander. The idea is to have the government (Treasury? HUD?) distribute to taxpayers mortgage foreclosure vouchers, based on income, with lower income persons receiving larger vouchers. These can either be used to pay off a mortgage for those facing foreclosure or to buy a house that has been foreclosed. Otherwise, they can be sold in a secondary market. This will help those in most danger and may help to stabilize the housing market as well, although there will probably need to be some further declines in housing prices as they continue to remain some 10-30% above historical norms, if the Case-Shiller index is to be believed. While falling housing prices are creating many problems, ultimately lower housing prices will make it easier for younger and poorer people to buy houses without relying on exotic mortgages, which should be sharply limited.

Another idea is that of a shared appreciation mortgage (SAM), which have been used in the past as well as in the UK. In this case, a borrower gets a lower mortgage rate, but must share any appreciation of the value of their house with the lender. This may provide a way for renegotiating mortgages to make them easier to pay, while preserving the stability of the lending institutions as well. Apparently this sort of mortgage is technically available for use right now, but has been not used in recent years due to an IRS ruling against them because of problems keeping debt and equity separate for tax purposes. As has been noted by proponents, this rule could be changed "by the stroke of a pen" used by the Treasury Secretary.

As a final note, I point out that Canadian banks are currently rated the safest in the world and have been relatively unharmed during this current crisis. Their regulations are clear and straightforward, with the Canadians having a nationwide, branch banking system. So, it is possible to improve how the financial system works through appropriate rules and regulations.

Relax the Mark to Marketing Accounting Rule: Speaking for Galbraith III

The real source of the problem with mark-to-marketing accounting rules has been international, coming out of the Basel II rules that have only recently been fully adopted in the world's banks. In any case, banks must revalue their assets according to current market conditions, which in itself is not such a bad thing. However, the minimum capitalization rules in conjunction with this method of accounting aggravate downward spirals. If a bank's assets decline in value, it may be forced to sell some to raise its capitalization, which has a clearly negative multiplier effect on the markets in general.

The SEC has reportedly been considering some variation of this rule. I would suport a change that has been reported to have been adopted in Germany. Banks that declare a willingness to hold onto an asset to maturity, may value it at its original face value. Thus, promises to hold certain assets to maturity takes them out of being subject to the mark to marketing rule and stabilizes their capitalization, and hopefully, the financial markets more broadly.