Tuesday, February 3, 2009

Harding’s Alleged Small Government Economic Miracle



Jim Powell wants us to believe that reducing the size of the Federal government is the key to getting the economy back to full employment:

Which U.S. president ranks as America’s greatest depression fighter? Not the fabled Franklin Delano Roosevelt … America’s greatest depression fighter was Warren Gamaliel Harding. An Ohio senator when he was elected president in 1920, he followed the much praised Woodrow Wilson — who had brought America into World War I, built up huge federal bureaucracies, imprisoned dissenters, and incurred $25 billion of debt. Harding inherited Wilson’s mess — in particular, a post–World War I depression that was almost as severe, from peak to trough, as the Great Contraction from 1929 to 1933 that FDR would later inherit. The estimated gross national product plunged 24 percent from $91.5 billion in 1920 to $69.6 billion in 1921. The number of unemployed people jumped from 2.1 million to 4.9 million ... Federal spending was cut from $6.3 billion in 1920 to $5 billion in 1921 and $3.2 billion in 1922. Federal taxes fell from $6.6 billion in 1920 to $5.5 billion in 1921 and $4 billion in 1922.


Spencer spots a flaw in Powell’s reporting of GDP:

First, the 24% plunge in GDP he cites is nominal GDP, not real GDP. The drop in real GDP was about 5%, as compared to the 26% drop in 1929-33.


So with prices falling during this period, the decline in any real variable is less than the decline in the reported nominal variable, which should hold for those reported declines in government spending and tax figures. Alas, Spencer only tells us the qualitative direction of the general price level, which of course is a lot more informative than the disinformation from Mr. Powell. This source, however, lets us know that the CPI fell by 10.85% in 1921 and 6.1% in 1922. In real terms, Federal spending and taxes were still lower in 1922 than they were in 1920, but Powell’s abuse of nominal figures greatly exaggerates not only the size of the post World War I recession but also the size of the decline in Federal spending and taxes.

Then again, it is not unusual to see Federal spending and taxes fall after a major war. Our chart was created using information from this source and shows total government revenue in real terms (2000$) from 1902 to 1940. The size of the government during the years preceding World War I appears to be a lot smaller than the size of the government in 1922. And we should note that real Federal revenues rose for the rest of the 1920’s eclipsing real Federal revenues in 1920.

Spencer is right – Jim Powell has put forward a lot of disinformation in his National Review column. But that is nothing new for those who write for the National Review!

How the Five-Day-Week Prolonged the Depression!

by the Sandwichman

Hooray for Harold L. Cole and Lee E. Ohanian! They have raised, in an admittedly inept and backward manner, an issue that many Keynesians and New Deal apologists seem to have trouble acknowledging. (See also Brad DeLong and Eric Rauchway).
The goal of the New Deal was to get Americans back to work. But the New Deal didn't restore employment. In fact, there was even less work on average during the New Deal than before FDR took office. Total hours worked per adult, including government employees, were 18% below their 1929 level between 1930-32, but were 23% lower on average during the New Deal (1933-39). Private hours worked were even lower after FDR took office, averaging 27% below their 1929 level, compared to 18% lower between in 1930-32.

Even comparing hours worked at the end of 1930s to those at the beginning of FDR's presidency doesn't paint a picture of recovery. Total hours worked per adult in 1939 remained about 21% below their 1929 level, compared to a decline of 27% in 1933. And it wasn't just work that remained scarce during the New Deal. Per capita consumption did not recover at all, remaining 25% below its trend level throughout the New Deal, and per-capita nonresidential investment averaged about 60% below trend. The Great Depression clearly continued long after FDR took office.
The hours of work decreased during the New Deal! Think of that! People worked fewer hours at the end of the 1930s than they did when Roosevelt took office. Of course, Cole and Ohanian think that was a bad thing, just like they think high wages were a bad thing. They also seem to believe that the Depression would have ended sooner if the market had been left alone to work out its kinks. Yeah, right. I don't want to live through that experiment.

But we do know that one part of what did happen was that the hours of work were reduced. They weren't reduced as much as William Green's AFL wanted them to be or as much as the Black-Connery bill would have mandated -- to 30 hours a week. The reduction in hours was permanent -- a permanent withdrawal of superfluous labor power from the market. Wartime mobilization withdrew labor power from the market in another way, by putting 12 million men in uniform and sending them overseas.

But here's the point: recovery from the Depression was not just about public works and fiscal policy. It was also about enforcing a reduction of working time. Cole and Ohanian are on to something, even if their interpretation of it is ass backwards.

To put Cole and Ohanian's free market mindset into perspective, I've posted, below the jump, the introduction to the October 1926 issue of the Pocket Bulletin, Official Publication of the National Association of Manufacturers, which announced its theme on the cover as "Will the Five-Day-Week Become Universal? IT WILL NOT!"
The Five-Day-Work Week; Can It Become Universal?

Presidents of Numerous Large Establishments Employing Hundreds of Thousands of Men in Various Lines of Manufacture, Declare Tendency to Less Work and More Pay Will Leave Us Wide Open for European Onslaught

Will Henry Ford's five-day week, just put into operation in his plants, and now urged as ideal by labor leaders, be adopted generally by the industries of the country?

It will not!

For the following chief reasons:

1. It would greatly increase the cost of living.

2. It would increase wages generally by more than 15 per cent and decrease production.

3. It would be impracticable for all industries.

4. It would create a craving for additional luxuries to occupy the additional time.

5. It would mean a trend toward the Arena, Rome did that and Rome died.

6. It would be against the best interests of the men who want to work and advance.

7. It would be all right to meet a sales emergency but would not work out as a permanent thing.

8. It would make us more vulnerable to the economic onslaughts of Europe, now working as hard as she can to overcome our lead.

These are some of the conclusions drawn by the presidents of some of the largest industrial concerns in the country, members of the National Association of Manufacturers and employing thousands of workers in various phases of industry.

Mankind does not thrive on holidays. Idle hours breed mischief. The days are too short for the worthwhile men of the world to accomplish the tasks which they set themselves. No man has ever attained success in industry, in science, or in any other worthwhile activity of life by limiting his hours of labor.

Monday, February 2, 2009

Buy American: Is There a Trade-off Between Free Trade and Full Employment?

Paul Krugman gets partial credit for expounding on an argument made by Dani Rodrik (here and here):

The economic case against protectionism is that it distorts incentives: each country produces goods in which it has a comparative disadvantage, and consumes too little of imported goods. And under normal conditions that’s the end of the story. But these are not normal conditions. We’re in the midst of a global slump, with governments everywhere having trouble coming up with an effective response ... how would this change if each country adopted protectionist measures that “contained” the effects of fiscal expansion within its domestic economy? Then everyone would adopt a more expansionary policy — and the world would get closer to full employment than it would have otherwise. Yes, trade would be more distorted, which is a cost; but the distortion caused by a severely underemployed world economy would be reduced. And as the late James Tobin liked to say, it takes a lot of Harberger triangles to fill an Okun gap.


As we noted, Dani was assuming a fixed exchange rate model. I suspect Paul is also assuming a fixed exchange rate model:

And one part of the problem facing the world is that there are major policy externalities. My fiscal stimulus helps your economy, by increasing your exports — but you don’t share in my addition to government debt.


We also noted that Nick Rowe considered the implications of floating exchange rates:

Nick’s floating exchange rate version of the model, however, has the exchange rate automatically adjust such that the ultimate change in net exports is zero. In this case, the multiplier for fiscal policy is 5 and the multiplier for mercantilist policy is zero. In other words, a $200 increase in government purchases still achieves the goal of increasing real GDP by $1000. Lesson learned – floating exchange rates can achieve the same goal as Dani’s mercantilism. There is one difference, however, between the two approaches. Mercantilism often works by protecting the import competing sector. Under floating exchange rates, we are more likely to see increased employment in the export sector.


Let’s expound on this in three ways. First of all – the choice between floating v. fixed exchange rates plus protection (as we noted earlier) comes down to whether one wants the benefits of fiscal stimulus to accrue partly to the export sector v. whether one wants a lot of the benefits to accrue to sectors such as the steel industry. A lot of economists who argue against the Buy American provisions on the grounds of efficiency are implicitly favoring the export sector over the import competing sectors.

Secondly, some rightwing pundits fear that a dollar devaluation will prove inflationary. I think most economists would argue that the kind of real devaluation that Nick is referring to will have only a modest impact on the overall price index. Besides, the Federal Reserve seems to be more afraid of deflation that a little inflation.

The third point comes from several of the comments surrounding Nick’s contribution – that being that we may be in a Bretton Woods II era if the Chinese government maintains a fixed exchange rate. In other words, the lessons learned from Dani’s and Paul’s fixed exchange rate model are not as easily dismissed as applying to the current situation. Paul noted that if we had better international coordination of macroeconomic and exchange rate policies, we might not need protectionism. Alas, such coordination does not seem to be on the horizon.

Update: Nick Rowe adds more to this debate.

Sunday, February 1, 2009

The Source and Remedy of the National Difficulties

by the Sandwichman
How is it that notwithstanding the unbounded extent of our capital, the progressive improvement and wonderful perfection of our machinery, our canals, roads, and of all other things that can, either facilitate labour, or increase its produce; our labourer, instead of having his labours abridged, toils infinitely more, more hours, more laboriously...?
At the request of Michael Perelman, the Sandwichman is posting, below the jump, the 1821 pamphlet, The Source and Remedy of the National Difficulties, Deduced from Principles of Political Economy in a Letter to Lord John Russell. I've toyed with the idea of doing a point-by-point serialization so that people could digest and discuss the extraordinary logic and rhetoric of the piece. By my count, there's around 44 discrete "points" so such a serialization would be a vast undertaking. I think I'll wait and see how much popular clamor there is for such a serialization... 

Published anonymously in 1821, The Source and Remedy was, according to Frederick Engels, "saved from falling into oblivion," by Karl Marx, who, in published writings up to the time of Engel’s remark, had scarcely mentioned the pamphlet in a cryptic footnote in Volume I of Capital. Engels acclaimed the pamphlet as “but the farthest outpost of an entire literature which in the twenties turned the Ricardian theory of value and surplus value against capitalist production in the interest of the proletariat.” 

For his part, Marx declared in his unpublished notebooks that the pamphlet was an advance beyond Adam Smith and David Ricardo in its conscious and consistent distinction between the general form of surplus value or surplus labour and its particular manifestations in the form of land rent, interest of money or profit of enterprise. In commenting on the pamphlet, Marx returned several times to what he upheld as the "fine statement": "a nation is really rich if no interest is paid for the use of capital, if the working day is only 6 hours rather than 12. WEALTH IS DISPOSABLE TIME, AND NOTHING MORE." 

Marx noted that Ricardo had also identified disposable time as the true wealth with the difference for Ricardo, however, that it was disposable time for the capitalist that constituted such wealth, thus the ideal should be to maximize surplus value relative to total output. One of those citations occurs in Marx's Grundrisse, immediately after the following characteristically revolutionary proposition: "Forces of production and social relations -- two different sides of the development of the social individual -- appear to capital as mere means for it to produce on its limited foundation. In fact, however, they are the material condition to blow this foundation sky-high." 

Indeed, in his reinterpretation of Marx's critical theory, Time, Labor and Social Domination, Moishe Postone placed the issue of disposable time at the "essential core" of Marx's analysis in Capital. Although Postone didn't emphasize the pamphlet itself, he highlighted a passage from the same paragraph in the Grundrisse that concludes with the pamphlet's "fine statement."

Just how successful Marx was in saving the 1821 pamphlet from oblivion remains to be seen. Obviously, the pamphlet was spared from total oblivion or I wouldn't be writing this. A copy of it was included in the microfilm Goldsmiths-Kress Library of Economic Literature. Routledge republished it in 2005 as part of a ten-volume collection of Owenite Socialism : Pamphlets and Correspondence edited by Gregory Claeys (price?: 3891.66 Euros -- socialism ain't cheap y'know). 

Aside from the few references by Marx and Engels, there have been scattered mentions of the pamphlet but, to my knowledge, no sustained consideration, which seems odd considering the importance that Engels -- and in his manuscripts, Marx -- assigned to it. 

Perhaps one of the difficulties has been the anonymity of its authorship. That problem would appear to have been resolved by a disclosure in the biography of the 19th century editor and literary critic, Charles Wentworth Dilke, Papers of a Critic, written by his grandson, Sir Charles Wentworth Dilke. The younger Dilke reported having found an annotated copy of the pamphlet, acknowledging authorship, among his grandfather's papers. Subsequent authorities on Dilke and on the literary journal he edited for [30?] years, The Athaeneum, appear satisfied with the plausibility of this attribution, given Dilke's writing style, his proclivity for anonymous and pseudonymous publication, his political inclinations and his subsequent career. There doesn't appear to have been any concerted effort to either definitively establish or to refute Dilke's authorship. So Dilke qualifies as the leading and, so far, only candidate for authorship. 

If Dilke was indeed the author, this presents at least two rather significant bits of context to the pamphlet as well as several minor but intriguing ones. First, Dilke was an ardent disciple of William Godwin. The poet, John Keats, who was a close friend and next-door neighbor referred to him as a "Godwin perfectability man". He was said to have retained this political inclination throughout his life. Second, in his career as editor of the Athaeneum, Dilke campaigned famously against journalistic "puffery" -- the practice of publishers placing in literary journals, for a fee, promotional material for their books under the guise of independent reviews. Both of these contextual items could be significant for an interpretation of The Source and Remedy precisely because the pamphlet lends itself comfortably to a reading as a Godwinist tract (rather than a pre-Marxist one) but also to a reading as a polemic against yet another brand of puffery -- political economic puffery. As for "turning the Ricardian theory of value against capitalist production," such an intention would hardly seem to fit an essay that on its closing page counts among the great advantages of the measures proposed therein that "their adoption would leave the country at liberty to pursue such a wise and politic system of financial legislation as would leave trade and commerce unrestricted." 

The Source and Remedy of the National Difficulties appears to have had something to say somewhat distinct from the message Marx took away from it. In his various notes on the pamphlet, Marx seems to have paid closest attention to the first six pages of the 40-page pamphlet and to have glossed over the rest somewhat disparagingly or with an eye to the arresting quote. 

In his discussion of the pamphlet in Theories of Surplus Value, for example, the reader may wonder if Marx is actually still talking about the pamphlet after a few pages or has gone off on a tangent inspired by the pamphleteer having overlooked the impact of unemployment on wages. It has to be cautioned, though, that Marx's extended comments on the pamphlet appeared in manuscript notes that were published posthumously. They are not polished, fully thought out positions directly intended for publication. 

Although the first six pages are indeed interesting, in the context of the pamphlet as a whole their function is to set the stage for the crucial pair of questions that appear on page seven. That is, after deducing from principles of political economy that capital, left to its natural course, would soon do away with further accumulation, the author asks why that seemingly inevitable result has never happened and how it is that with all the presumably labor-saving wonders of modern industry, workers work longer hours and more laboriously than ever before. 

Dilke's answer was that government and legislation act ceaselessly to destroy the produce of labor and interfere with the natural development of capital. They do this indirectly by, on the one hand, maintaining "unproductive classes" at a constant proportion to productive laborers and on the other by enabling the immense expansion of "fictitious capital," based ultimately on protectionism and government finance. Government does these things so that it may raise an enormous level of revenues that it couldn't through direct taxation of the laboring population, because "it would have been gross, open, shameless, and consequently impossible." 

Instead, it makes the holders of this fictitious capital "particeps criminis" in a stratagem to exact a much-enlarged revenue. As partner in crime, the capitalist lays claim to a generous portion of the booty. Not surprisingly, war is a "powerful cooperator" in this relentless process of destroying the produce of labor and expanding the claims of fictitious capital. 

 As for the "natural" claims of surplus value exacted by the capitalist, Dilke viewed it as causing the laborer "no real grievance to complain of," a position at least apparently at odds with Marx's views of exploitation and almost certainly incompatible with Engels' assertion that the pamphlet turned Ricardian theory "against capitalist production." 

Not only was Dilke not opposed to capitalist production, he described it as leading to a Utopian condition of freedom if only it was left to unfold according to its nature. In his note, Marx objected that the pamphleteer had overlooked two things in coming to such a sanguine conclusion about the trajectory of capitalist accumulation. One was unemployment; the other Marx never got around to specifying. 

 Dilke's reasoning, although thought provoking, is far from airtight. He confesses in his closing pages that his argument "is not so consecutive, that the proofs do not follow the principles laid down so immediately as I could have wished. The reasoning is too desultory, too loose in its texture." Whether such regrets are heartfelt or simply an obligatory rhetorical gesture of modesty is hard to say. The subject matter itself is elusive and no treatment of it could be exempt some flaws. 

But, nevertheless, the case he presents is an original and important one that has as far as I know been overlooked by Marx and his intellectual heirs. The part of the argument that Marx appropriated to his own analysis -- the author's consistent reference to surplus value as the general form underlying profit, rent and interest was ultimately incidental to Dilke's main points that nature places a limit on accumulation and that the surpassing of those natural limits occurs only as a result of government intervention, which, in effect mandates excess exploitation of labor.

There is a problem that arises from Marx appropriating the (for Marx) correct premise of the pamphlet without first having systematically refuted the author's own deductions from it. What if Dilke's deductions were either equally or more plausible than Marx's? Rather than being a focal point of class struggle, might not surplus value then be "no real grievance to complain of?" Rather than underpinning a contradiction fated to blow the foundation of capital sky-high, might not the tension between "things superfluous" and disposable time have the potential to be adjusted like wing flaps to help bring capital in for a soft landing?

By things superfluous, I refer, first, to the unholy trinity of fictitious capital, unproductive labor and inconvertible paper money and second, to their commodified expression as luxury goods. What I am suggesting is that for Dilke it seems that the primary contradictions of capitalism (to use Marx's expression) lay not so much between capital and labor as between real and fictitious capital, productive and unproductive labor, convertible and inconvertible money, necessities and luxury goods. 

This internalizing of the contradictions recalls Solzhenitsyn's observation in the Gulag Archipelago that, "the line separating good and evil passes not through states, nor between classes, nor between political parties either, but right through every human heart, and through all human hearts." Might we not ask if it's not only the line between good and evil that passes through every human heart but also the line between labor and capital, proletariat and bourgeoisie? From the standpoint of the arguments presented in The Source and Remedy, a proletarian revolution would be entirely unnecessary. Ironically, the non-necessity of the revolution would arrive precisely at the moment in which such a revolution would have become possible.

Keeping Score

Your anonymous, absentee administrator is pleased to see site traffic here breach the daily thousand level. I thought it must be due to the recent Krugman link, but in fact there have been spikes in the past as well. If you check the Sitemeter link (bottom, right column), you can see a new plateau of 16,000 visitors a month was hit on September of 2008. This past month it was 26,000. In general the blog is doing pretty well for a group of deep thinkers. Of course, there is really nothing like it on the left. Among economics blogs of all political stripes, this was ranked 19th, ahead of 'Freakonomics' and other illustrious characters.

We should give a special shout-out to Diane Warth of Karmalised for help on the site management front.

Congratulations to all, and remember folks, the more you post the more readers you will get.

Milton Friedman and Paul Krugman on the Current Fiscal Policy Debate

Paul Krugman was gracious enough to say our discussion of Ricardian Equivalence exposed a higher-level fallacy with respect to some recent fiscal policy skeptics. Paul also extends the argument in a way that I suspect even Milton Friedman would approve:

suppose that the government introduces a new program that will cause it to spend $100 billion a year every year from now on. To pay for this, it will have to raise taxes by $100 billion a year, permanently — and if consumers take this into account, they might well cut their spending enough to offset the increase in government purchases. But suppose the government introduces a one-time, $100 billion program to repair bridges over the next year. The government will have to issue debt to pay for this, and will have to service that debt, requiring higher taxes — say, $5 billion a year. That’s a much smaller impact on consumers’ future after-tax income than the permanent program. So much less of the spending rise will be offset by a fall in consumer demand. (I’m not considering the effect of the spending in raising income, which would probably cause consumer demand to rise rather than fall.) So economic theory — Milton Friedman’s theory! — says that spending is a more effective form of stimulus than tax cuts.


This is also a very nice statement of the Barro-Ricardo equivalence proposition, which of course, is an extension of Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis.

Saturday, January 31, 2009

"From 2002 to 2008, the five biggest Wall Street securities firms [Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley] paid an estimated $190 billion in bonuses. Those companies churned out $76 billion in combined profits during the same period. Last year, the companies had a combined net loss of $25.3 billion, yet paid bonuses of roughly $26 billion."

Lucchetti, Aaron and Matthew Karnitschnig. 2009. "On Street, New Reality on Pay Sets In: Financial Firms Race to Reset Compensation Policies as U.S. Government Aims to Set Some Limits." Wall Street Journal (31 January): p. B 1.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123336341862935387.html?mod=todays_us_money_and_investing


Marx before Minsky

Previously, I made the case that the financial meltdown was basically a delayed response to the severe neglect of investment in plant, equipment, and infrastructure. I also explained the cause of this neglect.

http://radicalnotes.com/content/view/73/39/

Here, I'm going to discuss the financial side of the crisis, which, while secondary, is still important.

This crisis has been nicely described as a Minsky moment, but it may just as well be described as a Marx moment. Marx's term fictitious capital and the more conventional discounted present value are not entirely different, but Marx's expression emphasizes the fact that the future is both unknown and unknowable.


As Keynes explained very well, the future takes on an appearance of being known, but this knowledge is not knowledge at all. It is merely an extrapolation of the past.

There was a time when the returns from holding General Motors stock would have seemed very predictable, almost as much as an investment with Bernie Madoff.

Anticipating Hyman Minsky, Marx realized that over time people would become less risk averse and the risk-corrected discounted present values would start to rise. Extrapolating, this trend would be expected to continue.

What I did, many years ago, in Karl Marx's Crises Theory: Labor, Scarcity and Fictitious Capital (New York: Praeger, 1987) was to explain that this psychological phenomenon would tend to delink prices from underlying values. Expensive corporate headquarters would be built into the overhead costs of business. At the same time, as such capital values accumulate, measures of invested capital will increase, pulling down the rate of profit. Hunting for yields to maintain profit rates will set off bubbles, further promoting an even more speculative environment. Over time, this speculative psychology will eliminate the limited coordinating powers of the market and set the stage for a future crisis.

When the crisis comes, much of the fictitious capital will disappear, bringing prices more in line with underlying values.

In a sense, this part of Marx's crisis theory is not that far from Hayek's, but I think that Hayek may have taken this from Marx without attribution.

All this sounds very Minskyian. Of course, Minsky knew his Marx, just as he knew his Keynes. And Keynes, though never really studied Marx by his own confession, was surrounded by people who did.



Does Protection Have No Impact on Aggregate Demand?

Nick Rowe makes an argument against the “Buy American” provisions that I have made in the past:

Most (all?) economists agree that in a global recession, when each country wants to boost demand for the goods it produces, policies which steer demand to domestically-produced goods are individually rational (provided other countries don't retaliate), but collectively irrational when all countries do the same. I think most economists are wrong. It's not just collectively irrational, but individually irrational as well, at least for countries with flexible exchange rates ... In normal times, outside of a liquidity trap, an expansionary fiscal policy will put upward pressure on interest rates as the demand for money increases with higher income. Or the central bank raises interest rates to offset the increased demand to keep inflation on target. An increase in domestic interest rates will cause a capital account inflow, which causes the exchange rate to appreciate. The exchange rate appreciation will cause net exports to fall. The fall in net exports offsets the expansionary fiscal policy. Under imperfect capital mobility the offset will be partial. Under perfect capital mobility there will be full offset, for a small open economy. So in normal times, part or all of the increased demand from an expansionary fiscal policy will be lost due to a decline in net exports. Some or all of the extra demand just leaks out to foreign countries.


Nick then admits that if we are in a liquidity trap, the interest rate to capital account channel is cut off so a fiscal stimulus does not necessarily crowd-out net exports but then he writes:

A "buy domestic" policy will not shift demand towards domestic goods. If it did, so that imports fell and net exports increased, the current account surplus would merely cause the exchange rate to appreciate so that net exports fell to their original level. The current account must stay the same, because the capital account stays the same, because the interest rate differential stays the same, because interest rates stay the same.


Dani Rodrik, however, takes another view:

Yes it does. And not just in theory, but also in practice. The evidence comes from the 1930s, and from the work of Ben Bernanke himself (along with other scholars like Barry Eichengreen). The important finding is that countries that devalued their currencies by getting off the gold standard were able to recover more quickly, thanks in part to an increase in their net exports relative to countries that stayed on gold. Note that a currency depreciation amounts to a policy of combining import tariffs with export subsidies--hence the mercantilist intent and effect.


Dani also notes:

How much of a boost to economic activity will a fiscal stimulus provide? For those who believe that we have entered a Keynesian world of shortage of aggregate demand--me included--the answer depends on the Keynesian multiplier. The size of this multiplier depends in turn on three things in particular, the marginal propensity to consume (c), the marginal tax rate (t), and the marginal propensity to import (m). If c = 0.8, t = 0.2, and m = 0.2, the Keynesian multiplier is 1.8 (=1/(1-c(1-t)+m)). A $1 trillion fiscal stimulus would increase GDP by $1.8 trillion. Now suppose that we had a way to raise the multiplier by more than half, from 1.8 to 2.8. The same fiscal stimulus would now produce an increase in GDP of $2.8 trillion--quite a difference. Nice deal if you can get it. In fact you can. It is pretty easy to increase the multiplier; just raise import tariffs by enough so that the marginal propensity to import out of income is reduced substantially (to zero if you want the multiplier to go all the way to 2.8). Yes, yes, import protection is inefficient and not a very neighborly thing to do--but should we really care if the alternative is significantly lower growth and higher unemployment? More to the point, will Obama and his advisers care?


I guess Nick can come back and say Dani was assuming fixed exchange rates. So how is this all supposed to work out under fixed interest rates but floating exchange rates?

Our model is essentially:

Y = D(Y) + X(Y, e)

where Y = real GDP, D = domestic demand, X = net exports, and e is the real exchange rate. Let’s consider a hypothetical economy known as Obamia that has a domestic marginal propensity to spend = 0.8 and a marginal propensity to import = 0.2 and wants to increase real GDP by $1000 (think of America as one billion times the size of Obamia). Under fixed exchange rates and no trade protection, the multiplier is 2.5 so government purchases would have to be raised by $400 if no other policy tool was used. As real GDP rose increased by $1000, imports would increase by $200.

But suppose that the conservative part of Obamia balks at a large fiscal stimulus and its leaders reach some bipartisan compromise of having government purchases rise by only $200. Dani’s point is that if we adopt a mercantilist policy to increase the net export schedule by $200, then we can still achieve the real GDP goal.

Nick’s floating exchange rate version of the model, however, has the exchange rate automatically adjust such that the ultimate change in net exports is zero. In this case, the multiplier for fiscal policy is 5 and the multiplier for mercantilist policy is zero. In other words, a $200 increase in government purchases still achieves the goal of increasing real GDP by $1000. Lesson learned – floating exchange rates can achieve the same goal as Dani’s mercantilism. There is one difference, however, between the two approaches. Mercantilism often works by protecting the import competing sector. Under floating exchange rates, we are more likely to see increased employment in the export sector.

The House's Modern-Day Hoovers

Time to turn the microphone over to Colbert I. King:

The pain of this recession was apparently lost on Boehner and his House Republicans. Their public fretting over the future impact of deficits on today's children and grandchildren is disingenuous. In truth, what really gets them hot and bothered is the thought of government taking on more responsibility to fight this deepening recession, and the huge amount of public spending it will take to pull the economy out of the doldrums. It so happened that the Republican standard-bearer in the 1920s, Herbert Hoover, felt that way, too. Hoover's distaste for government, and his belief that business was the answer to the country's economic tailspin, got Democrat Franklin Delano Roosevelt elected president in 1932. In their slavish devotion to Hooverism, today's Republicans are repeating the mistakes that banished their party to the political wilderness in the '30s.

Friday, January 30, 2009

The Disastrous Toll of Fictitious Value

The world of fictitious value mesmerizes itself by using a strange language. Financial operations refer to their "shop," as if they were standing over a workbench shaping metal or wood. Then they talk about "value creation."

What does that mean? Suppose I start a private equity company. People give me money to create value. I can create this value by taking over a company with very little of my own money. I need a banking accomplice to give me a bridge loan and a compliant company management. Then I can "unlock" the firm's value.

Once source of untapped value is a pension fund. Workers can be granted stock in the company as compensation. I can take over the firm, then use the pension fund to pay for some of the money I own. I can load the firm up with debt and charge it exorbitant fees. Now I have begun to "unlock" value.

Next, I can fire lots of workers, including those whose pension fund financed my takeover. By doing so, I can show that I am creating efficiencies. Once I cook the books to make the firm look profitable and sell it to a unsuspecting public.

Should anyone be surprised that many of these companies have been going bankrupt? And the workers whose pensions were central to the process? Well, they have some pretty paper.

Ain't capital wonderful?

(Harrisonburg, Pay Attention) The Wonders of City Bike Systems

There is now a nice, green policy that is being followed in as many as 21 European cities that is not yet being followed in a single US one that I am aware of, having just googled a bunch on the matter. It is a city bike system, also sometimes generically called a "Velib" system after the very popular and famous one in Paris that began in 2007. However, while it is doing very well (see the Wikipedia entry for "Velib" about it), it has some oddities that may make it less desirable for cities in the US thinking of adopting such a system, it being run by a private company for the city.

Probably the oldest running, since the 1970s, and the best run is the one in Copenhagen, where nearly 40% of trips are now done by city bike. The city (actually through a non-profit organization) owns bikes that are kept in parking stands. In Paris they make you pay a subscription, and then you can access the bikes, which are locked up in their stands. In both the stands are all over the city, but in Copenhagen they are free. You just pull one out and ride it to another stand. Reduces traffic, improves health, reduces pollution, and any city in the US would look very cool and progressive and innovative if it were the first one in the country to do it. The bikes tend to be three speed and pretty tough with a good-sized basket in front. The biggest problems have been with car traffic, and in Copenhagen, with cars turning right and not paying attention to bikes coming up. Anyway, a nice link about the Copenhagen system.

Draft Submission to the White House Task Force on Working Families

by the Sandwichman

White House press release:
President Barack Obama today announced the creation of a White House Task Force on Middle Class Working Families to be chaired by Vice President Joe Biden. The Task Force is a major initiative targeted at raising the living standards of middle-class, working families in America. It is comprised of top-level administration policy makers, and in addition to regular meetings, it will conduct outreach sessions with representatives of labor, business, and the advocacy communities.
In response to the White House announcement, the Sandwichman is posting his Draft Submission to the White House Task Force on Working Families on EconoSpeak. This submission specifically addresses four of the major objectives for the Task Force, as elaborated in statements by President Obama and Vice President Biden, and in the theme for the first meeting of the Task Force on February 27, 2009 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania:

· ensuring that the benefits of economic growth reach middle-class, working families;
· improving work and family balance;
· restoring labor standards;
· focusing on "green jobs" that "use renewable energy resources, reduce pollution, conserve energy and natural resources and reconstitute waste."

The underlying argument of this submission is that it is time to reconsider and rehabilitate the "surprisingly apposite" founding philosophy of the American labor movement. "Sharing the work and sparing the planet" comprehensively addresses the issues of green jobs, labor standards, work and family balance and fairness in the distribution of the benefits of economic growth.

Real GDP and Its Components: 2008QIV versus 2007QIII

BEA released its advanced estimate for the last quarter of 2008 and the news was awful:

Real gross domestic product -- the output of goods and services produced by labor and property located in the United States -- decreased at an annual rate of 3.8 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008, (that is, from the third quarter to the fourth quarter), according to advance estimates released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. In the third quarter, real GDP decreased 0.5 percent.


While real GDP rose somewhat during the first two quarters of 2008, real GDP fell a bit during the last quarter of 2007. Real GDP was running at an annualized clip of $11,625.7 billion as of 2007QIII but real GDP for 2008QIV was reported to be only $11,599.4 billion.

I guess the silver lining was that both government purchases and net exports continued to improve. The improvement in real exports was tiny but imports fell – likely as a result of a weaker economy. Consumption demand fell by more than $90 billion – while investment demand fell by more than $190 billion. Maybe this will wake up a few Republicans in the Senate that we have indeed entered into a deep recession.

About Hedge Funds

· ‘Survivorship bias’
Hedge funds that die are not included in the index, and since the mortality rate among hedge funds is higher than among mutual funds, it produces a greater gap between the returns reported in the indices versus those earned by a typical investor. There are about 9000 funds. Half of them have a life span of three years. About one out of ten goes bust.


· Distortion of returns reported to hedge funds versus the typical investor
– associated with the higher mortality rate of hedge funds. Also the reporting for hedge funds is voluntary and they tend not to report bad results.

· Lack of auditing.
They represent a relatively small share of total financial assets but their relative share has increased significantly.

· Substantial leverage
Hedge funds have the ability to take on substantial leverage.

· Large potential impact on financial market conditions
The substantial leverage of hedge funds magnifies the potential impact on financial market conditions.

· Hedge funds play a large (inappropriate) role as an insurer for regulated institutions
"Hedge funds have become an important source of protection to regulated institutions by being large sellers of credit insurance in the rapidly growing market for credit default swaps . But highly-leveraged and unregulated hedge funds are not the ideal type of insurer!"

· Hedge funds are receiving money from Australian superannuation funds.
Because of the current great doubt experienced by the two major political parties about the virtues of the fiduciary habits of ordinary workers, they feel compelled to take their savings away. The money is placed in pension funds for their old age. Workers are not allowed to withdraw this money and especially they are not permitted any control over the way in which these dollars are invested. (Meanwhile we'll continue to tout the virtues of a 'free market' system).

..Superannuation fund trustees have traditionally not invested in hedge funds both because of the infancy of the hedge fund market in Australia and because of the legal obligations described above. Rather,superannuation trustees have tended to prefer to invest in fixed interest investments, cash, government bonds and property investment trusts.

Hedge funds have not been favoured areas of investment principally because of perceptions concerning:
• the volatility of returns;
• level of regulation;
• the perceived lack of transparency of hedge funds ;
• levels of management fees; and
• additional risks associated with the use of derivatives by hedge fund managers.

In order to make such investments, superannuation trustees need to give careful consideration to the legal restrictions imposed in the form of general trustee duties and the investment parameters imposed by their trust deed, investment plan and the SIS Act.

However, despite this traditional reluctance to invest in hedge funds, superannuation trustees in Australia are now starting to use hedge funds to diversify their investments. Hedge fund investment is providing superannuation trustees with a way of counter-balancing the decline in returns on investments in traditional products. Those trustees are also attracted by the relative low correlation between the performance of some hedge funds and that of the equity markets more generally. There is also a considerable degree of liquidity with hedge funds, something that real estate or other structured assets may not offer. Finally, the introduction of hedge funds for retail investors has made the product apparently more mainstream and therefore, for trustees, possibly less likely to result in fund member concern..."
Australia: Some Legal Issues relating to Superannuation Trustees as Hedge Fund Investors
By Tessa Hoser and Katherine Henzell, Blake Dawson Waldron
1 December 2002.

· One third of hedge fund capital comes from pension funds
One third of hedge fund capital comes from pension funds. “Pension funds reusing hedge fund investment to diversify their own risks, but a situation where almost one-third of the capital for institutions on the cutting edge of financial risks comes from institutions whose first priority is safe investments certainly bears watching”.
Rodrigo Rato, IMF Managing Director

· The insurance provided by hedge funds lacks integrity.

1. How can you collect on an insurance contract when no-one can agree on the amount of the losses??

2. Both the buyer and seller of CDS may trade their obligation in the OTC market. There is nothing to prevent the insurer from offloading his obligation to an unqualified or unreliable party, in the process irreparably damaging the value of the insurance originally purchased.

I would be interested to learn if anyone can shed light on a potential problem in financial markets larger by at least an order of magnitude greater than subprime + CDO s sold to the SIV s and other institutions that hold them. Dr. Roubini has put numbers on subprime and alt-A plus CDO s, of about 1.5 trillion, and we don't have good estimates yet for auto loan and credit card securitized debt. Dwarfing these numbers is the 30 to 40 trillion dollar (or more) value of credit default swaps (CDS) outstanding. These swaps are essentially insurance policies between 2 parties. The FIRST buyer, presumably, is one with an asset (bond or securitized debt) to hedge. The FIRST seller, presumably, is a party known to the buyer who is financially able to provide the contracted protection in the event being insured (default) in return for the fee collected. But if both sides of this equation may TRADE their obligation in the OTC market, what is to prevent the INSURER from offloading his obligation to an UNQUALIFIED party, damaging irreparably the value of insurance originally purchased. If the insured has no control over the assignment to a third party of the obligation, of what value is the insurance. You may recall that in the DELPHI automotive bankruptcy, with 2 billion in bonds outstanding, there were over 20 billion in CDS outstanding. If the presumed solvency of unregulated insurance providers has enabled careless debt instrument purchases, watch out.
Written by RHK on 2007-11-06 08:01:26

3. The Over the Counter (OTC) trade is opaque and allows for the creation of fictionalised capital.

· There’s been a dramatic acceleration in number and type of derivative instruments.
(But current accounting and regulatory practice – as of December 2007 - allow for the creation of huge amounts of imaginary capital that is opaque and not subject to appropriate credit ratings. With the possibility of firms upping their trade in derivatives to hide the day of reckoning that comes with insolvency. See the linked article on credit default swaps.)

Hedge funds (holding Russian corporate bonds with ‘put options’) are demanding either full payment of debt or much higher interest rates; up to 16% during 2008.

· The total number of hedge funds has grown dramatically.
In 2007 there existed about 9000 funds. Half of them have a life span of three years. About one out of ten goes bust.

· Hedge funds are ‘Program Trading outfits’. They make money by buying large baskets of stocks.
A hedge fund, like investment banks, are referred to as ‘Program Trading outfits’. They make money by buying large baskets of stocks and then will blow out of those positions when their computers are programmed to sell.

· The range of hedge fund returns is large and unprecedented.

· Hedge fund managers’ earnings are astronomical. are determined by the gains of their own capital in their funds and their share of their firm’s management and performance fees. Most funds charge a 5% management fee and a 44% performance fee)

Of the 200-plus funds that Permal invests in, the poorest performer in the year to date – from January through to November 15 – had reported a loss of 7 per cent, and the top performer had returned 70 per cent. [unsourced]

“…Combined, the top 50 hedge fund managers last year earned $29 billion. That figure represents the managers’ own pay and excludes the compensation of their employees. Five of the top 10, including Mr. Simons and Mr. Soros, were also at the top of the list for 2006….”
Wall Street Winners Get Billion-Dollar Paydays
By JENNY ANDERSON
Published: April 16, 2008
+

“Hedge fund managers, those masters of a secretive, sometimes volatile financial universe, are making money on a scale that once seemed unimaginable, even in Wall Street's rarefied realms. One manager, John Paulson, made $3.7 billion last year. He reaped that bounty, probably the richest in Wall Street history, by betting against certain mortgages and complex financial products that held them. Paulson, the founder of Paulson & Company, was not the only big winner. The hedge fund managers James Simons and George Soros each earned almost $3 billion last year, according to an annual ranking of top hedge fund earners by Institutional Investor's Alpha magazine, which comes out Wednesday. Hedge fund managers have redefined notions of wealth in recent years. And the richest among them are redefining those notions once again. Their unprecedented and growing affluence underscores the gaping inequality between the millions of Americans facing stagnating wages and rising home foreclosures and an agile financial elite that seems to thrive in good times and bad. Such profits may also prompt more calls for regulation of the industry…”
Hedge fund managers get billion-dollar paydays
By Jenny Anderson
Wednesday, April 16, 2008

· G8 finance ministers meet on the issues relating to hedge funds but fail to address the issues.

G8 finance ministers met on the issue of the lack of supervision of hedge funds but they failed to address the issue. (When?, Source?)