Thursday, February 5, 2009

Fiscal Stimulus: Are the Senate Moderates Consulting with Martin Feldstein?

The close of Martin Feldstein’s An $800 Billion Mistake had the right tone:

The problem with the current stimulus plan is not that it is too big but that it delivers too little extra employment and income for such a large fiscal deficit. It is worth taking the time to get it right.


Getting the most bang for the buck has been a theme of Keynesians on the left so I find it hard to disagree with Feldstein’s overall objective even if I differ with him on some of the details such as:

Instead, the tax changes should focus on providing incentives to households and businesses to increase current spending. Why not a temporary refundable tax credit to households that purchase cars or other major consumer durables, analogous to the investment tax credit for businesses? Or a temporary tax credit for home improvements? ... The largest proposed outlays amount to just writing unrestricted checks to state governments. Nearly $100 billion would result from increasing the "Medicaid matching rate," a technique for reducing states' Medicaid costs to free up state money for spending on anything governors and state legislators want. An additional $80 billion would be given out for "state fiscal relief." ... If rapid spending on things that need to be done is a criterion of choice, the plan should include higher defense outlays, including replacing and repairing supplies and equipment, needed after five years of fighting.


Fortunately, I don’t see a lot of push from those with any leverage to greatly increase DoD spending. There are proposals to give tax breaks for homeowners and car buyers, but I’m not sure if those will get very far either. But Steve Benen is reporting on what might be the ultimate Senate deal with this (draw mainly from some excellent reporting from the gang at Talking Points Memo):

it's not at all clear what kind of concessions were necessary to cross the 60-vote threshold. TPM, for example, obtained a staff paper circulated today with nearly $78 billion in cuts, with a lot less money for states, healthcare, and education. Did the Democratic leadership sign off on these cuts? (Maybe.)


Some of us have argued for more Federal revenue sharing but Feldstein said this was not a good idea and the Senate may go along. The states have balanced budget restrictions so they may have to cut spending, which is Hoover economics – right? Feldstein counters with:

Will these vast sums actually lead to additional spending, or will they merely finance state transfer payments or relieve state governments of the need for temporary tax hikes or bond issues?


I guess the states could raise taxes. Given that state and local taxation tends to be less progressive than Federal taxation, we’d see the partial realization of the goal of some conservatives – shifting the tax burden from the rich to the working poor. Not only does this go against what most progressives would see as good policy, it might also be bad macroeconomics if those facing the tax increases are borrowing constrained. In other words, even temporary tax increases on such households could reduce consumption. No, I don’t agree with the details of the Feldstein op-ed even if the Senate moderates seem to be falling in line. Ahem!

Then again – we can be thankful that the Senate moderates are not taking the advice of Jeffrey Miron.

Was last September's bailout dishonest?

"There was no credit crisis. What was happening was much more arcane: A few big institutions that had made bad bets were at risk of going bust, and that’s it. And if they had gone bankrupt, it wouldn’t have been the end of the world. In fact, there is huge excess capacity in financial services and there’s a need to focus on the healthy ones and let others fail. Meanwhile, business lending and consumer lending were still strong in September and October, and it’s still okay." [1]

"Maybe Bernanke and Paulson had information that they were not making public, but the available data simply did not support what they were saying....This was a lot like the run-up to the Iraq invasion in 2003. You had people in government saying: `We’re smart guys, trust us.’ But they were either wrong or they were lying." [2]

"Normally, when you’re going to spend a lot of money, you present the data and the economic theory to support it, yet here’s the biggest non-military government intervention in history since the Great Depression, and there was no evidence presented to support it, and no detailed economic argument made about what market failures this $700 billion was going to fix.....“If what we’re experiencing is a generic recession, all that money spent investing in the banks would be wasted, and that may be what this is: a generic recession.”" [3]

"With all the money that’s already been committed, it is going to be hard to get the stimulus money that is needed now,” she says. “Deficits are already so massive that at some point interest rates on long bonds are going to jump from 3% to 5%, and that will be good-bye mortgage markets." [4]


[1] Octavio Marenzi, founder of financial technology research and consulting firm Celent. As quoted in 'Follow the Money'
From the 2/1/2009 Issue of Treasury and Risk
By * Dave Lindorff
http://www.treasuryandrisk.com/Issues/2009/February%202009/Pages/Follow-the-Money.aspx

[2] V.V. Charri, an economist at the Minneapolis Fed. As quoted in 'Follow the Money'
From the 2/1/2009 Issue of Treasury and Risk
By * Dave Lindorff
http://www.treasuryandrisk.com/Issues/2009/February%202009/Pages/Follow-the-Money.aspx

[3] Patrick Kehoe, co-author of an article entitled: 'Facts and Myths About the Financial Crisis of 2008'. As quoted in 'Follow the Money'
From the 2/1/2009 Issue of Treasury and Risk
By * Dave Lindorff
http://www.treasuryandrisk.com/Issues/2009/February%202009/Pages/Follow-the-Money.aspx

[4] Yves Smith from the Naked Capitalism blog. As quoted in 'Follow the Money'
From the 2/1/2009 Issue of Treasury and Risk
By * Dave Lindorff
http://www.treasuryandrisk.com/Issues/2009/February%202009/Pages/Follow-the-Money.aspx


CBO Does Not Agree With Brian Riedl

I normally do not cite the Washington Times as a good source for economics but in this case it does seem they are getting what the CBO has to say correct in the following sense:

CBO, the official scorekeepers for legislation, said the House and Senate bills will help in the short term ... CBO said there is no crowding out in the short term, so the plan would succeed in boosting growth in 2009 and 2010.


It is true that the Washington Times also talked a lot about long-term crowding-out. Douglas Elmendorf writing for the CBO also notes long-term crowding-out:

Even if the fiscal stimulus persisted, however, the short-run effects on output that operate by increasing demand for goods and services would eventually fade away. In the long run, the economy produces close to its potential output on average, and that potential level is determined by the stock of productive capital, the supply of labor, and productivity … In contrast to its positive near-term macroeconomic effects, the Senate legislation would reduce output slightly in the long run, CBO estimates, as would other similar proposals. The principal channel for this effect is that the legislation would result in an increase in government debt. To the extent that people hold their wealth in the form of government bonds rather than in a form that can be used to finance private investment, the increased government debt would tend to “crowd out” private investment—thus reducing the stock of private capital and the long-term potential output of the economy. The negative effect of crowding out could be offset somewhat by a positive long-term effect on the economy of some provsions—such as funding for infrastructure spending, education programs, and investment incentives, which might increase economic output in the long run. CBO estimated that such provisions account for roughly one-quarter of the legislation’s budgetary cost. Including the effects of both crowding out of private investment (which would reduce output in the long run) and possibly productive government investment (which could increase output), CBO estimates that by 2019 the Senate legislation would reduce GDP by 0.1 percent to 0.3 percent on net.


This admission that a long-term fiscal stimulus that concentrated on government consumption rather than government investment would lead to long-term crowding-out follows what Elmendorf writes about the short-term effects:

CBO estimates that the Senate legislation would raise output by between 1.4 percent and 4.1 percent by the fourth quarter of 2009; by between 1.2 percent and 3.6 percent by the fourth quarter of 2010; and by between 0.4 percent and 1.2 percent by the fourth quarter of 2011. CBO estimates that the legislation would raise employment by 0.9 million to 2.5 million at the end of 2009; 1.3 million to 3.9 million at the end of 2010; and 0.6 million to 1.9 million at the end of 2011.


As we noted, Brian Riedl tried to argue short-term crowding-out, which the CBO quite clearly says will not be the case. Even the most ardent Keynesian would concede that long-term fiscal stimulus leads to long-term crowding-out. Only those pseudo-economists who were apologists for the Bush43 fiscal stimulus would try to deny this. In my view, the ideal fiscal stance would be short-term stimulus followed by long-term fiscal restraint once the economy approached full employment. This was the policy of the Clinton Administration as I understand it – it is what is being recommended to President Obama by his economic advisors.

I guess we should thank the author of this Angrybear post for bringing to our attention the Washington Times somewhat misleading account of what CBO said – even if Sammy refuses to recognize the critical distinction between short-term Keynesian effects versus long-term classical effects.

Wednesday, February 4, 2009

Revoke Krugman's Nobel Prize!

Yes, I know, not only has no Nobel Prize ever been revoked for anything, but they certainly do not do so for idiotic statements made by winners after they have won. However, as the first winner of the prize for international trade in 31 years, I find it appalling that Paul Krugman has come out for the "buy American" provision in the fiscal stimulus package now under consideration in the US Senate, a provision not supported by President Obama, and roundly denounced by pretty much everybody outside the US, a provision that would violate promises made in November in Washington not to engage in protectionist actions for "at least a year," with at its worst the nightmare possibility of a rerun of the trade war of the 1930s following the US Smoot-Hawley tariff that exacerbated the Great Depression. While some may dismiss such a possibility now, the standing of the US in the world on economic policy may have never been worse, given the role of the collapse of our sub-prime market in the current troubles, and with world merchandise trade dropping at an annualized rate of nearly 45% in November. This is not the time to be playing with such irresponsible fire.


I did agree that Krugman was deserving of the prize as the person who applied an innovative idea to both trade and to regional economics (aka "economic geography"), as the last winner for trade did also, Bertil Ohlin. However, I was unhappy that it was not shared, and this unhappiness appears to be spreading, with a recent posting at voxeu by Jota Ishikawa on the matter. He named a number of others, but had the two I think most deserved to share it upfront. One is Avinash Dixit, given that the model that Krugman applied is the Dixit-Stiglitz model of industrial organization. The other is Masahisa Fujita, who was the first to apply the Dixit-Stiglitz model to urban and regional economics in a not widely read journal, Regional Science and Urban Economics in 1988, three years before Krugman's paper in 1991 in the Journal of Political Economy the Nobel committee recognized (and in which Krugman failed to cite Fujita). Frankly, in this area Fujita's work has been far more innovative and of far higher intellectual quality than that of Krugman, and I also note that nobody east of India has ever received the prize.

I close by also whining again that Krugman has long gotten away with seriously misrepresenting the state of affairs in economic geography and urban and regional economics, claiming that until he came along the discussion of agglomeration was all verbal and non-rigorous. He has to this day never admitted the existence of or cited the work of such individuals as Peter Allen, Roger White, Gunter Haag, or Wolfgang Weidlich, who were doing mathematically rigorous such models, some of them with close resemblance to later work of Krugman's, thoughout the 1980s, even before Fujita's work, who is an economist. These people were even easier to ignore as they are mostly physicists with an occasional geographer thrown in (White) and published their work in such places as Environment and Planning A, Geographical Analysis, and the Journal of Regional Science, easy to ignore for a publicity hound like Krugman, and easy for a sloppy Nobel Committee to miss that clearly did not do its homework very well.

Gun Nuts Roll the Virginia Senate

As I predicted, Democrats are now kowtowing in fear to the jackboots of the National Rifle Association. While Democrats control the Virginia Senate, 21-19, yesterday that body passed a bill, 23-17. to allow people to carry concealed weapons into restaurants serving alcohol, although its backers say it is reasonable because they are not allowed to consume alcohol themselves and must inform somebody in the restaurant that they are packing heat. Goody. There is a bill still alive to close the "gun show loophole" that made it out of a committee, but everybody is forecasting it will not pass the whole Senate. As it is, this new bill will easily pass the GOP-controlled Assembly, although I do not know what Governor Kaine will do with it. In any case, all the hysterical gun rights advocates freaking out that everybody is out to take away their rights are way off base here in Virginia, as I forecast in an earlier posting on this subject. The gun nuts have won another one.

Defense Spending in 2010: Rightwingers Portray Increase as a Cut

Josh Rogin has an irony for us:

The Obama administration has given the Pentagon a $527 billion limit, excluding war costs, for its fiscal 2010 Defense budget, an Office of Management and Budget official said Monday. If enacted, that would be about $14 billion more than the $513 billion allocated for fiscal 2009 (PL 110-329), including military construction funds, and it would match what the Bush administration estimated last year for the Pentagon in fiscal 2010. But it sets up a potential conflict between the new administration and the Defense Department’s entrenched bureaucracy, which has remained largely intact through the presidential transition. Some Pentagon officials and congressional conservatives are already trying to portray the OMB number as a cut by comparing it with a $584 billion draft budget request compiled last fall by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for fiscal 2010.


I’ll concede that a 2.7 percent nominal increase is not a large increase. Whether this represents a real increase greater than 2.7 percent or less than 2.7 percent depends on whether we have deflation or inflation over the year. But what the Joint Chiefs of Staff had requested represented a 13.6 percent nominal increase.

Robert Kagan tried to argue:

Pentagon officials have leaked word that the Office of Management and Budget has ordered a 10 percent cut in defense spending for the coming fiscal year, giving Defense Secretary Robert Gates a substantially smaller budget than he requested.


The rest of Kagan’s op-ed claimed that President Obama wants to cut defense spending. I hear my boss wants to increase my pay by only 3 percent this year so maybe I should go into his office and request a 13 percent increase. That way – I can tell everyone he wants to cut my pay by 10 percent (as compared to my wish list).

If this had been a domestic spending program that got a 3 percent increase rather than a 13 percent increase and some liberal screamed “spending cuts”, one would think Tony Blankley would mock the liberal:

I have been told by sources at the Pentagon that they have been told to not expect full funding of all existing programs. And there is evidence that Obama has apparently been planning to force cuts on our military for some time.


Tony trusts his Pentagon sources? I guess he did not read Spencer Ackerman who first wrote:

Late last week, the White House Office of Management and Budget told the Pentagon to “substantial[ly]” restrain its planned fiscal 2010 budget, which the Bush administration beefed up by $60 billion over the 2009 budget before leaving office.


Spencer added:

Here’s where it helps to have Defense Secretary Bob Gates impose some discipline. Getting eight percent more, outside the costs of the wars (!), during a time of global economic distress is, you know, really generous. An OMB official told Rogin that the Bush-drafted request was a “wish list” for conceivable defense spending — a classy little sayonara to the incoming Obama team — not a realistic budget. Gates has been telling anyone who will listen that the budget is coming down, hard choices are going to have to be made, and people are going to have to stop whining and reconcile themselves to this new reality. So it’ll be interesting to see if he starts with this budgetary gem. But! I hear that he may send OMB a letter objecting to the $527 billion (outside of the wars!) ceiling.


Note that Spencer wrote this two days ago – and yet Kagan misrepresented the story yesterday, while Blankley misrepresented it today.

Heritage and the National Review Adopt the Treasury View

David Freddoso of the National Review interviews Brian Riedl of Heritage (not Cato - my apologies) in the The Case for No Stimulus:

The grand Keynesian myth is that you can spend money and thereby increase demand. And it’s a myth because Congress does not have a vault of money to distribute in the economy. Every dollar Congress injects into the economy must first be taxed or borrowed out of the economy. You’re not creating new demand, you’re just transferring it from one group of people to another. If Washington borrows the money from domestic lenders, then investment spending falls, dollar for dollar. If they borrow the money from foreigners, say from China, then net exports drop dollar for dollar, because the balance of payments must adjust. Therefore, again, there is no net increase in aggregate demand ... There is this notion that the redistribution of money from savers to spenders creates new spending. But that assumes that people store their savings in their mattresses. That may have been true in the 1930s, but today, people use their savings to pay down debts or invest. Or they put it into the bank, who in turn lends it to others to spend. Therefore, savings circulate through the investment side of the economy, which counts just as much in the GDP as the consumption side of the economy ... The government is going to have to raise interest rates in order to convince people to lend them the full amount they need. We’re already facing a deficit of $1.2 trillion this year, and 700 billion next year. We borrowed $700 billion for TARP, and now we’re going to borrow $800 billion for this stimulus package.


Hang on a second – Riedl notes that Keynesian insufficiency of aggregate demand may have existed in the 1930’s so that an increase in national savings does not automatically become investment demand but he argues for complete crowding-out ala the classical full employment model is the only relevant view for today’s economy. Has he been asleep for the past couple of years? Does he not know how far the employment-population ratio has declined or how low Treasury bill interest rates are? I know we should expect incredible stupidity from the National Review but this one really takes the cake!

Footnote: Thanks for Tom Bozzo for noting that Riedl is with Heritage and not Cato (I do get these two confused at time). It also seems that Tom's Angrybear colleague Sammy recognized Riedl's appropriate association even if Sammy did not realize (at first) that Riedl's argument was the discredited Treasury view.

Update: While I should thank Tom Bozzo for linking to this over at Angrybear, I am appalled by the critical comments from folks who have not been following this discussion of how Eugene Fama stumbled in his revival of the Treasury view. Apparently, my former colleagues at Angrybear do not read Brad DeLong who has even written a paper on this.

Tuesday, February 3, 2009

Iraq Update

Now that W. is out and a moderately calm set of provincial elections have been held in Iraq (although none in Kurdistan) that apparently will strengthen the hand of the current, pro-central-authority government, with declining, if not gone, violence more generally, it may well be that there will be little need to post much in the future on Iraq, and hopefully President Obama will be able to proceed with his plans to withdraw US troops over the next 16 months without a major catastrophe happening. While there continue to be loose ends, especially regarding the relationship between Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq and the matter of the distribution and control of oil revenues (see on this the ever informative Ben Lando at http://www.iraqioilreport.com), in many ways the situation may be finally reverting to what it looked like it might be when I wrote a column on the war on the day that Tikrit fell in April 2003, which was before all the unforeseeable screwups by the US from disbanding the Iraqi military to torturing prisoners at Abu Ghraib had happened to make truly royal mess of things. So, in this update at this time of transition, I shall go back to that moment when the war looked at its best to see how things stand. I forecasted three likely positives and three likely negatives of the war, with the latter outweighing the former in my view then and now, all of them having come true.


Positives:

1. The most important was to end the massive human rights violations by Saddam Hussein. This was followed by serious violations by others, although hopefully this is now subsiding, and this positive may finally be more seriously in place. on net after a lot of horrors.

2. Reduction of US military presence in Saudi Arabia, which had been sore point for al Qaeda. This was relatively trivial, but was achieved a long time ago.

2. Ending of international economic sanctions against Iraq. Also achieved a long time ago, but this was for a long time overshadowed by the general economic catastrophe that has engulfed Iraq since, now easing, although the recent fall in oil prices is not helping.

Negatives:

1. I forecast that the Christian population of Iraq would suffer discrimination and persecution by governments dominated by sectarian Shi'a. This happened, and today the Christian population of Iraq is about half what it was before 2003. Keep in mind that this has been one of the oldest Christian populations in the world, many of them speaking Aramaic, the language of Jesus himself, although one never hears about this from the Christian Right wingnut crowd.

2. I forecast that for the same reason the Christians would suffer, so would women generally. This does not seem to have occurred in Kurdistan, but there have been many problems in the rest of the country, with most observers saying that the status of women is generally worse off than before the war. Two sources are an older more detailed one, a report by the US ABA accessible at http://www.abanet.org/rol/publications/Iraq_status_of_women_update.2006.pdf, and a more recent but less detailed on by Women for Women International issued last year on International Womens' Day describing the status of women in Iraq as a "national crisis." A comment on that report is at http://www.womensmedia.cener.com/ex/030608.html.

3. And the worst was that I forecast that the US would lose support around the world and especially among Muslims as we would get bogged down and do bad things. I do not think I need to detail how accurate that forecast became.

Before ending this I want to address the matter of the "surge," which so many commentators have claimed was a "success" and how Obama and others should give credit to Bush for pushing it. I am sorry, but I do not buy it. The alternative was the in-place DOD plan to start drawing down troops back in 2006 that Bush turned around to increase troops there. As near as I can tell there were three bases for the claim of the surge bringing success.

The first was the turn of tribal sheikhs in al Anbar province against Al Qaeda in Iraq. However, this happened before the surge and was independent of it, other than the US giving the sheikhs arms. But this could have been done without the surge.

The second was the increase in rule by the central government in Basra in the South. The US role in this mostly involved bombing and little in the way of troops. Again, this could have been done without the surge.

Finally, there is the decline in violence in Baghdad. However, this was due to the ending of the neighborhood ethnic cleansing that had gone on for a long time, with the Shi'a-Sunni population ratio going from 2 to 1 to 3 to 1. The one area the surge might have helped slightly here was that to enforce this walls have been built between the neighborhoods, which damage the economy, but do help keep violence down. Apparently US troops helped with that, so maybe there we have one minor positive to be credited to the surge.

Retaliation – the Problem with Expenditure-Switching Policies

As I tried to present the discussion so far as to the Buy American provisions floating around Congress in their hotly debate ideas as to how to stimulate U.S. aggregate demand, Barkley reminds us that foreign governments might retaliate with their own expenditure-switching policies:

In 1930, the US passed the Smoot-Hawley tariff in order to preserve US jobs. This was a fixed exchange rate world under the gold standard. There was full bore reaction by other countries, most significantly the British Commonwealth ones, but others as well, and world trade declined sharply, certainly exacerbating the plunge into the Great Depression, although the degree of its role remains a matter of debate. However, I am unaware of any economist anywhere who argues that American jobs were saved by this catastrophic policy. Now there is a hard international political economic reality here that is being ignored. The just-ended Davos conference included fiercesome denunciations of the US for having triggered what is now the most widespread global recession ever. Merchandise trade declined in November at an annualized rate of 45%, while the big conference in Washington supposedly agreed on avoiding protectionism for at least a year, and in mid-January the US put a bunch of trade sanctions on the EU (no more Roquefort cheese to be had in the US anytime soon). Without doubt, such a stupid move by the US would this time also trigger massive reactions and the very serious danger of a full-blown trade war. No way this is going to help the world economy, much less the US one, although certain sectors might do better in the short run (Krugman's argument).


To be fair, Paul Krugman is hoping for more expenditure-adjusting policies:

Now ask, how would this change if each country adopted protectionist measures that “contained” the effects of fiscal expansion within its domestic economy? Then everyone would adopt a more expansionary policy — and the world would get closer to full employment than it would have otherwise.


Whether or not such a global scale movement towards autarky would induce more global fiscal stimulus is an issue I’ll leave to those smarter about these things than me, but I thought it was interesting that even Mitch McConnell understands what Barkley is saying:

I don't think we ought to use a measure that is supposed to be timely, temporary, and targeted to set off trade wars when the entire world is experiencing a downturn in the economy


While we are experiencing some improvement in our net exports, the reason has more to do with our falling demand for imports than it does with rising exports. Real exports fell during 2008QIV and it is not surprising to see why if one reviews the information in table 1.1 of the IMF’s World Economic Outlook. World output slowed in 2008 – particularly among the advanced economies. This slowdown is projected to continue during 2009. The growth in world imports/exports also slowed – particularly among the advanced economies.

Any attempt by the U.S. to increase its aggregate demand via expenditure-switching policies will reduce the net exports of our trading partners. Given that our trading partners are also likely to face insufficient aggregate demand during 2009, Senator McConnell’s concern about setting off a trade war appears to be a legitimate one.

Harding’s Alleged Small Government Economic Miracle



Jim Powell wants us to believe that reducing the size of the Federal government is the key to getting the economy back to full employment:

Which U.S. president ranks as America’s greatest depression fighter? Not the fabled Franklin Delano Roosevelt … America’s greatest depression fighter was Warren Gamaliel Harding. An Ohio senator when he was elected president in 1920, he followed the much praised Woodrow Wilson — who had brought America into World War I, built up huge federal bureaucracies, imprisoned dissenters, and incurred $25 billion of debt. Harding inherited Wilson’s mess — in particular, a post–World War I depression that was almost as severe, from peak to trough, as the Great Contraction from 1929 to 1933 that FDR would later inherit. The estimated gross national product plunged 24 percent from $91.5 billion in 1920 to $69.6 billion in 1921. The number of unemployed people jumped from 2.1 million to 4.9 million ... Federal spending was cut from $6.3 billion in 1920 to $5 billion in 1921 and $3.2 billion in 1922. Federal taxes fell from $6.6 billion in 1920 to $5.5 billion in 1921 and $4 billion in 1922.


Spencer spots a flaw in Powell’s reporting of GDP:

First, the 24% plunge in GDP he cites is nominal GDP, not real GDP. The drop in real GDP was about 5%, as compared to the 26% drop in 1929-33.


So with prices falling during this period, the decline in any real variable is less than the decline in the reported nominal variable, which should hold for those reported declines in government spending and tax figures. Alas, Spencer only tells us the qualitative direction of the general price level, which of course is a lot more informative than the disinformation from Mr. Powell. This source, however, lets us know that the CPI fell by 10.85% in 1921 and 6.1% in 1922. In real terms, Federal spending and taxes were still lower in 1922 than they were in 1920, but Powell’s abuse of nominal figures greatly exaggerates not only the size of the post World War I recession but also the size of the decline in Federal spending and taxes.

Then again, it is not unusual to see Federal spending and taxes fall after a major war. Our chart was created using information from this source and shows total government revenue in real terms (2000$) from 1902 to 1940. The size of the government during the years preceding World War I appears to be a lot smaller than the size of the government in 1922. And we should note that real Federal revenues rose for the rest of the 1920’s eclipsing real Federal revenues in 1920.

Spencer is right – Jim Powell has put forward a lot of disinformation in his National Review column. But that is nothing new for those who write for the National Review!

How the Five-Day-Week Prolonged the Depression!

by the Sandwichman

Hooray for Harold L. Cole and Lee E. Ohanian! They have raised, in an admittedly inept and backward manner, an issue that many Keynesians and New Deal apologists seem to have trouble acknowledging. (See also Brad DeLong and Eric Rauchway).
The goal of the New Deal was to get Americans back to work. But the New Deal didn't restore employment. In fact, there was even less work on average during the New Deal than before FDR took office. Total hours worked per adult, including government employees, were 18% below their 1929 level between 1930-32, but were 23% lower on average during the New Deal (1933-39). Private hours worked were even lower after FDR took office, averaging 27% below their 1929 level, compared to 18% lower between in 1930-32.

Even comparing hours worked at the end of 1930s to those at the beginning of FDR's presidency doesn't paint a picture of recovery. Total hours worked per adult in 1939 remained about 21% below their 1929 level, compared to a decline of 27% in 1933. And it wasn't just work that remained scarce during the New Deal. Per capita consumption did not recover at all, remaining 25% below its trend level throughout the New Deal, and per-capita nonresidential investment averaged about 60% below trend. The Great Depression clearly continued long after FDR took office.
The hours of work decreased during the New Deal! Think of that! People worked fewer hours at the end of the 1930s than they did when Roosevelt took office. Of course, Cole and Ohanian think that was a bad thing, just like they think high wages were a bad thing. They also seem to believe that the Depression would have ended sooner if the market had been left alone to work out its kinks. Yeah, right. I don't want to live through that experiment.

But we do know that one part of what did happen was that the hours of work were reduced. They weren't reduced as much as William Green's AFL wanted them to be or as much as the Black-Connery bill would have mandated -- to 30 hours a week. The reduction in hours was permanent -- a permanent withdrawal of superfluous labor power from the market. Wartime mobilization withdrew labor power from the market in another way, by putting 12 million men in uniform and sending them overseas.

But here's the point: recovery from the Depression was not just about public works and fiscal policy. It was also about enforcing a reduction of working time. Cole and Ohanian are on to something, even if their interpretation of it is ass backwards.

To put Cole and Ohanian's free market mindset into perspective, I've posted, below the jump, the introduction to the October 1926 issue of the Pocket Bulletin, Official Publication of the National Association of Manufacturers, which announced its theme on the cover as "Will the Five-Day-Week Become Universal? IT WILL NOT!"
The Five-Day-Work Week; Can It Become Universal?

Presidents of Numerous Large Establishments Employing Hundreds of Thousands of Men in Various Lines of Manufacture, Declare Tendency to Less Work and More Pay Will Leave Us Wide Open for European Onslaught

Will Henry Ford's five-day week, just put into operation in his plants, and now urged as ideal by labor leaders, be adopted generally by the industries of the country?

It will not!

For the following chief reasons:

1. It would greatly increase the cost of living.

2. It would increase wages generally by more than 15 per cent and decrease production.

3. It would be impracticable for all industries.

4. It would create a craving for additional luxuries to occupy the additional time.

5. It would mean a trend toward the Arena, Rome did that and Rome died.

6. It would be against the best interests of the men who want to work and advance.

7. It would be all right to meet a sales emergency but would not work out as a permanent thing.

8. It would make us more vulnerable to the economic onslaughts of Europe, now working as hard as she can to overcome our lead.

These are some of the conclusions drawn by the presidents of some of the largest industrial concerns in the country, members of the National Association of Manufacturers and employing thousands of workers in various phases of industry.

Mankind does not thrive on holidays. Idle hours breed mischief. The days are too short for the worthwhile men of the world to accomplish the tasks which they set themselves. No man has ever attained success in industry, in science, or in any other worthwhile activity of life by limiting his hours of labor.

Monday, February 2, 2009

Buy American: Is There a Trade-off Between Free Trade and Full Employment?

Paul Krugman gets partial credit for expounding on an argument made by Dani Rodrik (here and here):

The economic case against protectionism is that it distorts incentives: each country produces goods in which it has a comparative disadvantage, and consumes too little of imported goods. And under normal conditions that’s the end of the story. But these are not normal conditions. We’re in the midst of a global slump, with governments everywhere having trouble coming up with an effective response ... how would this change if each country adopted protectionist measures that “contained” the effects of fiscal expansion within its domestic economy? Then everyone would adopt a more expansionary policy — and the world would get closer to full employment than it would have otherwise. Yes, trade would be more distorted, which is a cost; but the distortion caused by a severely underemployed world economy would be reduced. And as the late James Tobin liked to say, it takes a lot of Harberger triangles to fill an Okun gap.


As we noted, Dani was assuming a fixed exchange rate model. I suspect Paul is also assuming a fixed exchange rate model:

And one part of the problem facing the world is that there are major policy externalities. My fiscal stimulus helps your economy, by increasing your exports — but you don’t share in my addition to government debt.


We also noted that Nick Rowe considered the implications of floating exchange rates:

Nick’s floating exchange rate version of the model, however, has the exchange rate automatically adjust such that the ultimate change in net exports is zero. In this case, the multiplier for fiscal policy is 5 and the multiplier for mercantilist policy is zero. In other words, a $200 increase in government purchases still achieves the goal of increasing real GDP by $1000. Lesson learned – floating exchange rates can achieve the same goal as Dani’s mercantilism. There is one difference, however, between the two approaches. Mercantilism often works by protecting the import competing sector. Under floating exchange rates, we are more likely to see increased employment in the export sector.


Let’s expound on this in three ways. First of all – the choice between floating v. fixed exchange rates plus protection (as we noted earlier) comes down to whether one wants the benefits of fiscal stimulus to accrue partly to the export sector v. whether one wants a lot of the benefits to accrue to sectors such as the steel industry. A lot of economists who argue against the Buy American provisions on the grounds of efficiency are implicitly favoring the export sector over the import competing sectors.

Secondly, some rightwing pundits fear that a dollar devaluation will prove inflationary. I think most economists would argue that the kind of real devaluation that Nick is referring to will have only a modest impact on the overall price index. Besides, the Federal Reserve seems to be more afraid of deflation that a little inflation.

The third point comes from several of the comments surrounding Nick’s contribution – that being that we may be in a Bretton Woods II era if the Chinese government maintains a fixed exchange rate. In other words, the lessons learned from Dani’s and Paul’s fixed exchange rate model are not as easily dismissed as applying to the current situation. Paul noted that if we had better international coordination of macroeconomic and exchange rate policies, we might not need protectionism. Alas, such coordination does not seem to be on the horizon.

Update: Nick Rowe adds more to this debate.

Sunday, February 1, 2009

The Source and Remedy of the National Difficulties

by the Sandwichman
How is it that notwithstanding the unbounded extent of our capital, the progressive improvement and wonderful perfection of our machinery, our canals, roads, and of all other things that can, either facilitate labour, or increase its produce; our labourer, instead of having his labours abridged, toils infinitely more, more hours, more laboriously...?
At the request of Michael Perelman, the Sandwichman is posting, below the jump, the 1821 pamphlet, The Source and Remedy of the National Difficulties, Deduced from Principles of Political Economy in a Letter to Lord John Russell. I've toyed with the idea of doing a point-by-point serialization so that people could digest and discuss the extraordinary logic and rhetoric of the piece. By my count, there's around 44 discrete "points" so such a serialization would be a vast undertaking. I think I'll wait and see how much popular clamor there is for such a serialization... 

Published anonymously in 1821, The Source and Remedy was, according to Frederick Engels, "saved from falling into oblivion," by Karl Marx, who, in published writings up to the time of Engel’s remark, had scarcely mentioned the pamphlet in a cryptic footnote in Volume I of Capital. Engels acclaimed the pamphlet as “but the farthest outpost of an entire literature which in the twenties turned the Ricardian theory of value and surplus value against capitalist production in the interest of the proletariat.” 

For his part, Marx declared in his unpublished notebooks that the pamphlet was an advance beyond Adam Smith and David Ricardo in its conscious and consistent distinction between the general form of surplus value or surplus labour and its particular manifestations in the form of land rent, interest of money or profit of enterprise. In commenting on the pamphlet, Marx returned several times to what he upheld as the "fine statement": "a nation is really rich if no interest is paid for the use of capital, if the working day is only 6 hours rather than 12. WEALTH IS DISPOSABLE TIME, AND NOTHING MORE." 

Marx noted that Ricardo had also identified disposable time as the true wealth with the difference for Ricardo, however, that it was disposable time for the capitalist that constituted such wealth, thus the ideal should be to maximize surplus value relative to total output. One of those citations occurs in Marx's Grundrisse, immediately after the following characteristically revolutionary proposition: "Forces of production and social relations -- two different sides of the development of the social individual -- appear to capital as mere means for it to produce on its limited foundation. In fact, however, they are the material condition to blow this foundation sky-high." 

Indeed, in his reinterpretation of Marx's critical theory, Time, Labor and Social Domination, Moishe Postone placed the issue of disposable time at the "essential core" of Marx's analysis in Capital. Although Postone didn't emphasize the pamphlet itself, he highlighted a passage from the same paragraph in the Grundrisse that concludes with the pamphlet's "fine statement."

Just how successful Marx was in saving the 1821 pamphlet from oblivion remains to be seen. Obviously, the pamphlet was spared from total oblivion or I wouldn't be writing this. A copy of it was included in the microfilm Goldsmiths-Kress Library of Economic Literature. Routledge republished it in 2005 as part of a ten-volume collection of Owenite Socialism : Pamphlets and Correspondence edited by Gregory Claeys (price?: 3891.66 Euros -- socialism ain't cheap y'know). 

Aside from the few references by Marx and Engels, there have been scattered mentions of the pamphlet but, to my knowledge, no sustained consideration, which seems odd considering the importance that Engels -- and in his manuscripts, Marx -- assigned to it. 

Perhaps one of the difficulties has been the anonymity of its authorship. That problem would appear to have been resolved by a disclosure in the biography of the 19th century editor and literary critic, Charles Wentworth Dilke, Papers of a Critic, written by his grandson, Sir Charles Wentworth Dilke. The younger Dilke reported having found an annotated copy of the pamphlet, acknowledging authorship, among his grandfather's papers. Subsequent authorities on Dilke and on the literary journal he edited for [30?] years, The Athaeneum, appear satisfied with the plausibility of this attribution, given Dilke's writing style, his proclivity for anonymous and pseudonymous publication, his political inclinations and his subsequent career. There doesn't appear to have been any concerted effort to either definitively establish or to refute Dilke's authorship. So Dilke qualifies as the leading and, so far, only candidate for authorship. 

If Dilke was indeed the author, this presents at least two rather significant bits of context to the pamphlet as well as several minor but intriguing ones. First, Dilke was an ardent disciple of William Godwin. The poet, John Keats, who was a close friend and next-door neighbor referred to him as a "Godwin perfectability man". He was said to have retained this political inclination throughout his life. Second, in his career as editor of the Athaeneum, Dilke campaigned famously against journalistic "puffery" -- the practice of publishers placing in literary journals, for a fee, promotional material for their books under the guise of independent reviews. Both of these contextual items could be significant for an interpretation of The Source and Remedy precisely because the pamphlet lends itself comfortably to a reading as a Godwinist tract (rather than a pre-Marxist one) but also to a reading as a polemic against yet another brand of puffery -- political economic puffery. As for "turning the Ricardian theory of value against capitalist production," such an intention would hardly seem to fit an essay that on its closing page counts among the great advantages of the measures proposed therein that "their adoption would leave the country at liberty to pursue such a wise and politic system of financial legislation as would leave trade and commerce unrestricted." 

The Source and Remedy of the National Difficulties appears to have had something to say somewhat distinct from the message Marx took away from it. In his various notes on the pamphlet, Marx seems to have paid closest attention to the first six pages of the 40-page pamphlet and to have glossed over the rest somewhat disparagingly or with an eye to the arresting quote. 

In his discussion of the pamphlet in Theories of Surplus Value, for example, the reader may wonder if Marx is actually still talking about the pamphlet after a few pages or has gone off on a tangent inspired by the pamphleteer having overlooked the impact of unemployment on wages. It has to be cautioned, though, that Marx's extended comments on the pamphlet appeared in manuscript notes that were published posthumously. They are not polished, fully thought out positions directly intended for publication. 

Although the first six pages are indeed interesting, in the context of the pamphlet as a whole their function is to set the stage for the crucial pair of questions that appear on page seven. That is, after deducing from principles of political economy that capital, left to its natural course, would soon do away with further accumulation, the author asks why that seemingly inevitable result has never happened and how it is that with all the presumably labor-saving wonders of modern industry, workers work longer hours and more laboriously than ever before. 

Dilke's answer was that government and legislation act ceaselessly to destroy the produce of labor and interfere with the natural development of capital. They do this indirectly by, on the one hand, maintaining "unproductive classes" at a constant proportion to productive laborers and on the other by enabling the immense expansion of "fictitious capital," based ultimately on protectionism and government finance. Government does these things so that it may raise an enormous level of revenues that it couldn't through direct taxation of the laboring population, because "it would have been gross, open, shameless, and consequently impossible." 

Instead, it makes the holders of this fictitious capital "particeps criminis" in a stratagem to exact a much-enlarged revenue. As partner in crime, the capitalist lays claim to a generous portion of the booty. Not surprisingly, war is a "powerful cooperator" in this relentless process of destroying the produce of labor and expanding the claims of fictitious capital. 

 As for the "natural" claims of surplus value exacted by the capitalist, Dilke viewed it as causing the laborer "no real grievance to complain of," a position at least apparently at odds with Marx's views of exploitation and almost certainly incompatible with Engels' assertion that the pamphlet turned Ricardian theory "against capitalist production." 

Not only was Dilke not opposed to capitalist production, he described it as leading to a Utopian condition of freedom if only it was left to unfold according to its nature. In his note, Marx objected that the pamphleteer had overlooked two things in coming to such a sanguine conclusion about the trajectory of capitalist accumulation. One was unemployment; the other Marx never got around to specifying. 

 Dilke's reasoning, although thought provoking, is far from airtight. He confesses in his closing pages that his argument "is not so consecutive, that the proofs do not follow the principles laid down so immediately as I could have wished. The reasoning is too desultory, too loose in its texture." Whether such regrets are heartfelt or simply an obligatory rhetorical gesture of modesty is hard to say. The subject matter itself is elusive and no treatment of it could be exempt some flaws. 

But, nevertheless, the case he presents is an original and important one that has as far as I know been overlooked by Marx and his intellectual heirs. The part of the argument that Marx appropriated to his own analysis -- the author's consistent reference to surplus value as the general form underlying profit, rent and interest was ultimately incidental to Dilke's main points that nature places a limit on accumulation and that the surpassing of those natural limits occurs only as a result of government intervention, which, in effect mandates excess exploitation of labor.

There is a problem that arises from Marx appropriating the (for Marx) correct premise of the pamphlet without first having systematically refuted the author's own deductions from it. What if Dilke's deductions were either equally or more plausible than Marx's? Rather than being a focal point of class struggle, might not surplus value then be "no real grievance to complain of?" Rather than underpinning a contradiction fated to blow the foundation of capital sky-high, might not the tension between "things superfluous" and disposable time have the potential to be adjusted like wing flaps to help bring capital in for a soft landing?

By things superfluous, I refer, first, to the unholy trinity of fictitious capital, unproductive labor and inconvertible paper money and second, to their commodified expression as luxury goods. What I am suggesting is that for Dilke it seems that the primary contradictions of capitalism (to use Marx's expression) lay not so much between capital and labor as between real and fictitious capital, productive and unproductive labor, convertible and inconvertible money, necessities and luxury goods. 

This internalizing of the contradictions recalls Solzhenitsyn's observation in the Gulag Archipelago that, "the line separating good and evil passes not through states, nor between classes, nor between political parties either, but right through every human heart, and through all human hearts." Might we not ask if it's not only the line between good and evil that passes through every human heart but also the line between labor and capital, proletariat and bourgeoisie? From the standpoint of the arguments presented in The Source and Remedy, a proletarian revolution would be entirely unnecessary. Ironically, the non-necessity of the revolution would arrive precisely at the moment in which such a revolution would have become possible.

Keeping Score

Your anonymous, absentee administrator is pleased to see site traffic here breach the daily thousand level. I thought it must be due to the recent Krugman link, but in fact there have been spikes in the past as well. If you check the Sitemeter link (bottom, right column), you can see a new plateau of 16,000 visitors a month was hit on September of 2008. This past month it was 26,000. In general the blog is doing pretty well for a group of deep thinkers. Of course, there is really nothing like it on the left. Among economics blogs of all political stripes, this was ranked 19th, ahead of 'Freakonomics' and other illustrious characters.

We should give a special shout-out to Diane Warth of Karmalised for help on the site management front.

Congratulations to all, and remember folks, the more you post the more readers you will get.

Milton Friedman and Paul Krugman on the Current Fiscal Policy Debate

Paul Krugman was gracious enough to say our discussion of Ricardian Equivalence exposed a higher-level fallacy with respect to some recent fiscal policy skeptics. Paul also extends the argument in a way that I suspect even Milton Friedman would approve:

suppose that the government introduces a new program that will cause it to spend $100 billion a year every year from now on. To pay for this, it will have to raise taxes by $100 billion a year, permanently — and if consumers take this into account, they might well cut their spending enough to offset the increase in government purchases. But suppose the government introduces a one-time, $100 billion program to repair bridges over the next year. The government will have to issue debt to pay for this, and will have to service that debt, requiring higher taxes — say, $5 billion a year. That’s a much smaller impact on consumers’ future after-tax income than the permanent program. So much less of the spending rise will be offset by a fall in consumer demand. (I’m not considering the effect of the spending in raising income, which would probably cause consumer demand to rise rather than fall.) So economic theory — Milton Friedman’s theory! — says that spending is a more effective form of stimulus than tax cuts.


This is also a very nice statement of the Barro-Ricardo equivalence proposition, which of course, is an extension of Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis.