"Don't know much about history." -- Sam Cooke
"Milton Friedman won the debate, and John Kenneth Galbraith lost." -- Nick RoweActually the military-industrial complex won the "debate" in 1950 but had to keep it secret. Friedman was just some guy with a broom sweeping up the droppings after the parade.
The fundamental principle animating the Wagner Act is that working people are supposed to be able to act in democratic concert, to get together, to talk with each other about the issues that concern them on the job, and to engage their employers in some constructive pushing and shoving about those issues. This right given to workers to combine, so the theory goes, will produce fairness and justice in the workplace by counteracting the innate strength of capital. Workers' institutions were supposed to prosper, to integrate themselves into the political fabric of the nation and to provide a counterweight in the market and in political discourse that was to inure to the benefit of society as a whole.
The NLRA also contemplates that employers -- though they have a First Amendment-based right to push and shove back against these workers' institutions -- are to permit, indeed respect, their workers' collective activities. Not only that, they are affirmatively obliged to respond in good faith to -- to bargain over -- their employees' proposals. The Wagner Act, modeled explicitly on the concepts underlying American representative democracy itself, requires nothing less than that workers be given the basic right to participate in discussions about the terms and conditions of their employment.
Why, then, does this almost never happen anymore? Why does the American labor movement-with union membership plunging below ten percent of the private-sector workforce-seem more and more "flat on its back" every time we look at it? Union leaders, members, supporters and activists ask themselves these questions incessantly, of course, and Professor Charles J. Morris is one of several eminent labor scholars among those doing so. His latest inquiry, The Blue Eagle At Work: Reclaiming Democratic Rights in the American Workplace, slaps down a dramatic and provocative challenge in the middle of this discourse. Charting a new approach (that is not so new), he proposes that democratic rights have atrophied in the workplace because unions have fallen into self-defeating, addictive reliance on elections conducted by the NLRB as the way to organize workers. They have forgotten the remarkably broad promise set out in Section 7 of the Act: that all employees -- not just those who work for an employer where a union has won an election -- have the right "to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing."
Ignoring the elegant simplicity of this proposition, unions have swallowed the intoxicating potion contained in the election/certification procedures provided for in Section 9 of the Act. Under its influence, they have opted to confront employers only when and if they become the certified or recognized representatives of a majority of those in "appropriate" bargaining units. Though this "all or nothing" approach led the union movement to spectacular successes in its early days, it has resulted more recently in increasingly futile attempts to win the hearts and minds of workers in situations where the odds are impossibly long. The annals of the union movement in the late twentieth century are full of bitter stories of struggle and defeat in National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)-supervised, set-piece battles in which employers hold all or most of the power.
Update: The "point" is that there is no basis for assuming that the given hours of labor maximize output. There is no basis for assuming that the hours that maximize labor output would maximize utility of the workers. There is no basis for assuming that the hours that maximize output today would maximize output 50 years in the future or that the hours that maximize worker utility would maximize utility 50 years in the future. There are plenty of reasons for assuming that the answer to each of those questions is "indeterminate." In short, the interactions here are "so ramifying, involved and conjectural" as to render omniscience a prerequisite for making quantitative projections.As I understood it then and understand it now, five things were happening: (1) Paul Volcker was trying back in 1982 to do what Alan Greenspan did in 1993–to condition a lower interest-rate policy on the administration’s taking the first step and committing to long-term deficit reduction, and the Reagan administration was stonewalling. (2) Ronald Reagan’s Treasury Department was engaged in a quiet and seeking a public administration-wide Reagan-led campaign to convince the Federal Reserve to lower interest rates. (3) Ronald Reagan’s communications staff was engaged in a quiet campaign to convince the Federal Reserve to lower interest rates, but was opposed to any public Reagan-led pressure as bad for Reagan’s image as a man in control of the government. (4) Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisors was on Paul Volcker’s side. (5) Reagan’s own personal papers are singularly unilluminating as to what he thought and was trying to do.Brad notes several New York Times discussions from 1982 including this one:
After being warned today by Republican Congressional leaders that his budget could not be approved in its present form, President Reagan said that he wanted to give Congress ''running room'' to cut the budget to reduce the deficit. But he said that he was not ready to compromise on his plans to reduce income taxes and increase military spending.Of course if one is not willing to cut defense spending or raise taxes – then how serious can one be about fiscal responsibility? The 1993 accord between the Greenspan FED and the Clinton White House was mainly accomplished on the fiscal side by a combination of tax increases and the “peace dividend”. And as I watch the coverage surrounding the movie Selma, I am reminded of certain CEA discussions with Lyndon Johnson on fiscal policy in 1966. We had seen a tax cut in 1964 followed by government spending for both the War on Poverty as well as the Vietnam War. His CEA warned President Johnson that if he could not reverse this fiscal stimulus, the FED would have to choose between higher interest rates versus letting inflation accelerate. Via Mark Thoma, we see this from Bruce Bartlett:
Just as an aside, I would note that Norman had been on the JEC staff in the 1960s, where he functioned as staff economist for Wilbur Mills while he was chairman of the House Ways & Means Committee. It was Mills who really got Kennedy to propose a cut in marginal tax rates in 1963, based on Ture's ideas. Since Norman was also deeply involved in the development of the Kemp-Roth bill, he was a bridge to both major tax-cutting episodes.Norman Ture indeed was the original supply-sider who basically told Chairman Mills to ignore the CEA’s recommendations for fiscal restraint in 1966. We now know the unfortunate history of politics not heeding the advice of sensible economists. And yes – the supply-siders once again pushed for fiscal stimulus in 1981. How did that work out? I bring this up today in light of the fact that Mitt Romney is once again running for President. The last time he did so, he advocated large tax cuts without any serious consideration of how to pay for them. I’m sure Romney will have plenty of supply-side enablers once again.
...if a dynamic expansion of the economy were achieved, the necessary build-up could be accomplished without a decrease in the national standard of living because the required resources could be obtained by siphoning off a part of the annual increment in the gross national product.In his article on "Evaluation of Real National Income" Samuelson had explained that including "such wasteful output as war goods" in the calculation of national income served only to indicate the potential for producing "useful things... in better times." NSC-68 contrived counting wasteful output as a direct contribution to maintaining the standard of living. This is the logic the Republicans employ when they extol the job-creating magic of Keystone. But, more subtly, it is also the logic William Nordhaus employs when discounting the net present value of the future costs and benefits of climate regulation.
"...the facts of economic life show little consideration for this urge, and remain, to a large extent, perversely and persistently indeterminate. This is the skeleton in the closet of economic theory. What is a proper attitude for a would-be science, forced to deal with such refractory material? One thing economists do is to construct hypothetical simplified 'models.' These can be used in two ways: as an approach to reality or as an escape from it. My problem is how to promote the first kind of use and set up safeguards against the second."Would Clark's attitude toward this "skeleton in the closet of economic theory" make him "heterodox"? How has the bureaucratically-imposed conventional cost-benefit analysis and the Kaldor-Hicks criterion that justifies it achieved its canonical status? How about the notion of shirking in New Keynesian models of sticky wages? The ritual invocation of the lump-of-labor fallacy claim? Ceteris paribus? General equilibrium?
"Improved measurement of national income has been one of the outstanding features of recent progress in economics. But the theoretical interpretation of such aggregate data has been sadly neglected, so that we hardly know how to define real income even in simple cases where statistical data are perfect and where problems of capital formation and government expenditure do not arise."In his article, Samuelson warned that "the last word on the subject will not be uttered for a long time." Not that anyone would still be listening when that proverbial "last word" (or even the next word) was uttered. Hedged in by observances of bureaucratic standards and procedures, mysteries of discounted net present value and taboos on interpersonal comparisons of utilities, the aggregate data of national income came to ritually stand in for its own interpretation.
First of all, magic is surrounded by strict conditions: exact remembrance of a spell, unimpeachable performance of the rite, unswerving adhesion to the taboos and observances which shackle the magician. If any one of these is neglected, failure of magic follows. And then, even if magic be done in the most perfect manner, its effects can be equally well undone: for against every magic there can be also counter-magic [ceteris paribus].
My point was that the legend of Reaganomics — that supply-side tax cuts produced a disinflation that confounded Keynesians — is not at all what happened in the 1980s. What happened instead was that harshly restrictive monetary policies created a deep recession, and a period of very high unemployment broke the wage-price spiral.This narrative went completely unchallenged by Samuelson in his strange attack on Krugman. So what was Samuelson’s beef?
From 1960 to 1980, inflation — the general rise of retail prices — marched relentlessly upward. It went from 1.4 percent in 1960 to 5.9 percent in 1969 to 13.3 percent in 1979.I guess Samuelson forgot that Nixon listened to Milton Friedman for his first couple of years as well as those Ford WIN buttons. And Volcker’s first monetary restraint occurred during Carter’s years in office. But let’s move on:
What Reagan provided was political protection. The Fed’s previous failures to stifle inflation reflected its unwillingness to maintain tight-money policies long enough to purge inflationary psychology.Paul questions whether the Reagan Administration was totally behind Volcker’s tight monetary policy:
As it happens, I don’t agree on the political story either; based in part on what I saw during my year in government (1982-3), Reagan’s inner circle didn’t even understand that monetary policy was what was going on.But we can go back to a 1986 discussion from Tom Redburn:
President Reagan's four appointees as governors of the Federal Reserve Board prodded Fed Chairman Paul A. Volcker toward a less restrictive monetary policy when they outvoted him last month on a cut in a key interest rate charged to financial institutions, sources said Tuesday.The people that President Reagan was appointing to the Federal Reserve did not agree with the Volcker majority and eventually garnered enough influence to force a less restrictive monetary policy. I offer this not as a criticism of President Reagan as some of us loathed the severity of Volcker’s tight monetary policy. But people like Samuelson heart both Reagan and tight monetary policies. Faced with the inconsistency of these two positions – they decide to rewrite history. Update: Dean Baker has more on this including a nice graph of inflation that undermines this line from Samuelson:
Worse, government seemed powerless to defeat it.Never mind that Dean’s graph shows inflation fell when the FED did tight money under Nixon and again fell after Gerald Ford started up with those damn WIN buttons.
"Qualitative factors would become increasingly important in proportion as computations of quantitative secondary benefits might be scaled down in the ways here suggested and might become dominantly important."Indeed, the gist of the entire report may be summed up as that there is only a limited case for quantitative estimates. I have taken the liberty of editing the following "executive summary" of the panel's main argument:
We believe in the importance of secondary benefits, but find them so ramifying, involved and conjectural that the attempt to compute them as a national total, in dollar terms, by the methods of the Manual or any other methods that appear at present available, cannot properly be regarded as "measurement," though computations of pertinent items may be useful as guides to judgment in rating the importance of these benefits.
Accordingly, we are able to "set forth a recommended basis for the evaluation of secondary benefits and costs" as directed in instruction (2) only on the assumption that "evaluation" can include, for important parts of these benefits and costs, ratings by the exercise of judgment which are not precise enough to justify regarding them as quantitative measurement.
This being the nature of our judgment, we are hardly in a position to recommend an alternative formula purporting to measure these secondary benefits. The inescapable difficulty, even for the quantitative differences, is that, for the ramifying secondary effects, accurate and definitive answers require omniscience.
Democracy has to rely on technicians in matters inscrutable to the non-specialist, but preferably where the specialist is following a well-authenticated technique. In this case, the disagreements among the specialists are evidence that they do not possess such an authenticated technique, for the results of which a representative government can safely take their word. It needs to be able to tell what they are doing, and what their procedures mean.
As to qualitative and intangible benefits and costs, our study has led us to look toward diminished reliance on quantitative computation and toward attaching greater relative importance to qualitative effects of the alterations in distribution of population, types of community, etc. We therefore suggest that these matters are worth increased attention and study, including sociological aspects. These are, of course, matters that can be described and appraised only by judgment.
1. Demand for the product is a prerequisite condition.
2. Quantitative or tangible benefits constitute total differences in national real income, with and without the project.
3. Increased national real income however caused, can be embodied in three and only three forms.
4. For an increase of national real income, both increased supply and increased demand are necessary, and full national computations of the two should not be added.
5. In a national with-and-without comparison, dollar-costs are important only insofar as they usefully represent the foregoing of primary and saleable products (for which their creator could collect a price) from alternative resource-uses that would otherwise have been made.
6. The "stemming-from" hypothesis, crediting production of raw products with acting as a "trigger" and causing the chain of subsequent processes, has limited validity which does not warrant carrying the computation through to the ultimate consumer in all cases.
7. One important effect of a successful project may be to raise the marginal productivity of resources in the economy or avoid a reduction but we know no present means of reducing this to calculation, beyond what is already represented in primary benefits.
8. Allowance for calling unused resources into use needs different treatment for original investment and for subsequent operation.
9. Local gains need not all be regarded as mere transfers, cancelling out from the national point of view.
10. Determination of the proper scope of projects should be governed by the principle of equal productivities of marginal increments.
11. Qualitative factors would become increasingly important in proportion as computations of quantitative secondary benefits might be scaled down in the ways here suggested and might become dominantly important.
