Unsolicited Advice for the Bali Brigades

The eco-elite have descended on Bali to devise a successor regime to the Kyoto Protocol. I think most of them are asking the wrong questions and are likely to come up with the wrong answers.



To begin with, we should be clear on what the limitations of Kyoto are. They are not primarily the weak targets that were set for carbon reduction, nor were they the forbearance shown to developing countries. Why not?

The targets proved not to matter because they have not been met. In fact, there is no way at present to force a country to act decisively on curbing greenhouse gases, so discussion of specific targets is a sideshow. In any case, no country should pull back from taking aggressive action because an international treaty sets the bar several notches lower.

For the same reason, it was never a problem that Kyoto exempted low income countries from the expectations put on the industrialized world. Aside from the question of equity – climate change is driven by accumulated emissions, most of which came from us and not them – there is no way to force a country like China or India to make its development conditional on reaching carbon goals.

The one thing Kyoto did that “worked” shouldn’t have, carbon offsets. The evidence shows that much of the offsets actually offset nothing at all: they are fictitious carbon reductions. And others take money to mitigate one environmental hazard by creating another, like tree plantations that replace living forests.

So the first thing an enlightened eco-diplomat in Bali should understand is that Kyoto should not be fixed; it should be scrapped. I appreciate its symbolic value, but surely the time for symbolism is past.

What to do then? The starting point for reasonable negotiation is the awareness that the majority of the world’s people will be direct financial beneficiaries of controlling climate change, if the job is done properly. Any country that sets up a system of carbon permits, auctions them off and rebates the money to its citizens on a per capita basis will find that most will come out ahead. This is because climate-bashing consumption is disproportionately done by the rich. Make them pay for it, and distribute the proceeds equally; the lower- and middle-consumption majority will get back more than they pay in. To put it another way, societies have been giving away their crucial environmental resources, like the atmosphere in its role as a waste sink, for free to anyone who wants to take them. Charging a price puts money in the pockets of the owners – us.

Implication: we don’t need a global treaty for countries to set up serious carbon emission controls. That’s not what Bali should be about.

What it can do are two things. First, by far the most efficient point at which to control carbon is where it enters the economy, as oil, coal or gas at the mine or wellhead. This is far less complicated than trying to track it down in its myriad uses, and it leaves the fewest loopholes. For any individual country this will mean requiring permits to bring fossil fuels across the border. Negotiators of a new international framework can work to standardize these permits, so that their markets can be international. This would minimize disruption to cross-border economic life. (I’m a rootless cosmopolitan and favor this sort of thing.)

The most important topic to discuss, however, is how to insulate national economies from the possibility that carbon control could raise domestic costs of production, hurting domestic producers in international markets. (Yes, I know the argument from trade theory that says this is not a problem, and no, I don’t believe it.) It is becoming clear that this will have to take the form of carbon adjustment tariffs (CAT’s), something I weighed in on a few posts back. I think there is a real risk that lobbyists would swarm all over the process of deciding how large a tariff is needed to offset carbon cost differences, and that an internationally negotiated schedule would have more integrity. That, more than anything else, is what Bali should be about, setting up a framework for negotiating such tariff schedules, so that each country can decide for itself how aggressive to be in carbon policy without worrying about getting too far out front.

What Bali should not do is convey to anyone anywhere that local or national action has to wait until a worldwide consensus has been reached.